FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

JANVARY

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 47 JANUARY 1969 No. 2

THE VIET NAM NEGOTIATIONS

By Henry A. Kissinger

THE peace negotiations in Paris have been marked by the classic Vietnamese syndrome: optimism alternating with bewilderment; euphoria giving way to frustration. The halt to the bombing produced another wave of high hope. Yet it was followed almost immediately by the dispute with Saigon over its participation in the talks. The merits of this issue aside, we must realize that a civil war which has torn a society for twenty years and which has involved the great powers is unlikely to be settled in a single dramatic stroke. Even if there were mutual trust—a commodity not in excessive supply—the complexity of the issues and the difficulty of grasping their interrelationship would make for complicated negotiations. Throughout the war, criteria by which to measure progress have been hard to come by; this problem has continued during the negotiations. The dilemma is that almost any statement about Viet Nam is likely to be true; unfortunately, truth does not guarantee relevance.

The sequence of events that led to negotiations probably started with General Westmoreland's visit to Washington in November 1967. On that occasion, General Westmoreland told a Joint Session of Congress that the war was being won militarily. He outlined "indicators" of progress and stated that a limited withdrawal of American combat forces might be undertaken beginning late in 1968. On January 17, 1968, President Johnson, in his State of the Union address, emphasized that the pacification program—the extension of the control of Saigon into the countryside—was progressing satisfactorily. Sixty-seven percent of the population of South Viet Nam lived in relatively secure areas; the figure was expected to rise. A week later, the Tet offensive overthrew the assumptions of American strategy.

What had gone wrong? The basic problem has been conceptual:

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the tendency to apply traditional maxims of both strategy and "nation-building" to a situation which they did not fit.

American military strategy followed the classic doctrine that victory depended on a combination of control of territory and attrition of the opponent. Therefore, the majority of the American forces was deployed along the frontiers of South Viet Nam to prevent enemy infiltration and in the Central Highlands where most of the North Vietnamese main-force units—those units organized along traditional military lines—were concentrated. The theory was that defeat of the main forces would cause the guerrillas to wither on the vine. Victory would depend on inflicting casualties substantially greater than those we suffered until Hanoi's losses became "unacceptable."

This strategy suffered from two disabilities: (a) the nature of guerrilla warfare; (b) the asymmetry in the definition of what constituted unacceptable losses. A guerrilla war differs from traditional military operation because its key prize is not control of territory but control of the population. This depends, in part, on psychological criteria, especially a sense of security. No positive program can succeed unless the population feels safe from terror or reprisal. Guerrillas rarely seek to hold real estate; their tactic is to use terror and intimidation to discourage coöperation with constituted authority.

The distribution of the population in Viet Nam makes this problem particularly acute. Over 90 percent of the population live in the coastal plain and the Mekong Delta; the Central Highlands and the frontiers, on the other hand, are essentially unpopulated. Eighty percent of American forces came to be concentrated in areas containing less than 4 percent of the population; the locale of military operations was geographically removed from that of the guerrilla conflict. As North Vietnamese theoretical writings never tired of pointing out, the United States could not hold territory and protect the population simultaneously. By opting for military victory through attrition, the American strategy produced what came to be the characteristic feature of the Vietnamese war: military successes that could not be translated into permanent political advantage. (Even the goal of stopping infiltration was very hard to implement in the trackless, nearly impenetrable jungles along the Cambodian and Laotian frontiers.)

As a result, the American conception of security came to have

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little in common with the experience of the Vietnamese villagers. American maps classified areas by three categories of control, neatly shown in various colors: Government, contested and Viet Cong. The formal criteria were complicated, and depended to an unusual extent on reports by officers whose short terms of duty (barely 12 months) made it next to impossible for them to grasp the intangibles and nuances which constitute the real elements of control in the Vietnamese countryside. In essence, the first category included all villages which contained some governmental authority; "contested" referred to areas slated to be entered by governmental cadres. The American notion of security was a reflection of Western administrative theory; control was assumed to be in the hands of one of the contestants more or less exclusively.

But the actual situation in Viet Nam was quite different; a realistic security map would have shown few areas of exclusive jurisdiction; the pervasive experience of the Vietnamese villager was the ubiquitousness of both sides. Saigon controlled much of the country in the daytime, in the sense that government troops could move anywhere if they went in sufficient force; the Viet Cong dominated a large part of the same population at night. For the villagers, the presence of Government during the day had to be weighed against its absence after dark, when Saigon's cadres almost invariably withdrew into the district or provincial capitals. If armed teams of administrators considered the villages unsafe at night, the villagers could hardly be expected to resist the guerrillas. Thus, the typical pattern in Viet Nam has been dual control, with the villagers complying with whatever force was dominant during a particular part of the day.

The political impact of this dual control was far from symmetrical, however. To be effective, the Government had to demonstrate a very great capacity to provide protection; probably well over 90 percent. The guerrillas' aim was largely negative: to prevent the consolidation of governmental authority. They did not need to destroy all governmental programs; indeed in some areas, they made no effort to interfere with them. They did have to demonstrate a capability to punish individuals who threw in their lot with Saigon. An occasional assassination or raid served to shake confidence for months afterwards.

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had another advantage which they used skillfully. American "victories" were empty

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unless they laid the basis for an eventual withdrawal. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, fighting in their own country, needed merely to keep in being forces sufficiently strong to dominate the population after the United States tired of the war. We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win. The North Vietnamese used their main forces the way a bullfighter uses his cape —to keep us lunging in areas of marginal political importance.

The strategy of attrition failed to reduce the guerrillas and was in difficulty even with respect to the North Vietnamese main forces. Since Hanoi made no attempt to hold any territory, and since the terrain of the Central Highlands cloaked North Vietnamese movements, it proved difficult to make the opposing forces fight except at places which they chose. Indeed, a considerable majority of engagements came to be initiated by the other side; this enabled Hanoi to regulate its casualties (and ours) at least within certain limits. The so-called "kill-ratios" of United States to North Vietnamese casualties became highly unreliable indicators. Even when the figures were accurate they were irrelevant, because the level of what was "unacceptable" to Americans fighting thousands of miles from home turned out to be much lower than that of Hanoi fighting on Vietnamese soil.

All this caused our military operations to have little relationship to our declared political objectives. Progress in establishing a political base was excruciatingly slow; our diplomacy and our strategy were conducted in isolation from each other. President Johnson had announced repeatedly that we would be ready to negotiate, unconditionally, at any moment, anywhere. This, in effect, left the timing of negotiations to the other side. But short of a complete collapse of the opponent, our military deployment was not well designed to support negotiations. For purposes of negotiating, we would have been better off with 100 percent control over 60 percent of the country than with 60 percent control of 100 percent of the country.

The effort to strengthen Saigon's political control faced other problems. To be effective, the so-called pacification program had to meet two conditions: (a) it had to provide security for the population; (b) it had to establish a political and institutional

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link between the villages and Saigon. Neither condition was ever met: impatience to show "progress" in the strategy of attrition caused us to give low priority to protection of the population; in any event, there was no concept as to how to bring about a political framework relating Saigon to the countryside. As a result, economic programs had to carry an excessive load. In Viet Nam—as in most developing countries—the overwhelming problem is not to *buttress* but to *develop* a political framework. Economic progress that undermines the existing patterns of obligation—which are generally personal or feudal—serves to accentuate the need for political institutions. One ironic aspect of the war in Viet Nam is that, while we profess an idealistic philosophy, our failures have been due to an excessive reliance on material factors. The communists, by contrast, holding to a materialistic interpretation, owe many of their successes to their ability to supply an answer to the question of the nature and foundation of political authority.

The Tet offensive brought to a head the compounded weaknesses—or, as the North Vietnamese say, the internal contradictions—of the American position. To be sure, from a strictly military point of view, Tet was an American victory. Viet Cong casualties were very high; in many provinces, the Viet Cong infrastructure of guerrillas and shadow administrators surfaced and could be severely mauled by American forces. But in a guerrilla war, purely military considerations are not decisive: psychological and political factors loom at least as large.

On that level the Tet offensive was a political defeat in the countryside for Saigon and the United States. Two claims had been pressed on the villages. The United States and Saigon had promised that they would be able to protect an ever larger number of villages. The Viet Cong had never made such a claim; they merely asserted that they were the real power and presence in the villages and they threatened retribution upon those who collaborated with Saigon or the United States.

As happened so often in the past, the Viet Cong made their claim stick. Some twenty provincial capitals were occupied. Though the Viet Cong held none (except Hué) for more than a few days, they were there long enough to execute hundreds of Vietnamese on the basis of previously prepared lists. The words "secure area" never had the same significance for Vietnamese civilians as for Americans, but, if the term had any meaning, it

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applied to the provincial and district capitals. This was precisely where the Tet offensive took its most severe toll. The Viet Cong had made a point which far transcended military considerations in importance: there are no secure areas for Vietnamese civilians. This has compounded the already great tendency of the Vietnamese population to await developments and not to commit itself irrevocably to the Saigon Government. The withdrawal of government troops from the countryside to protect the cities and the consequent increase in Viet Cong activity in the villages even in the daytime have served to strengthen this trend. One result of the Tet offensive was to delay—perhaps indefinitely—the consolidation of governmental authority, which in turn is the only meaningful definition of "victory" in guerrilla warfare.

For all these reasons, the Tet offensive marked the watershed of the American effort. Henceforth, no matter how effective our actions, the prevalent strategy could no longer achieve its objectives within a period or with force levels politically acceptable to the American people. This realization caused Washington, for the first time, to put a ceiling on the number of troops for Viet Nam. Denied the very large additional forces requested, the military command in Viet Nam felt obliged to begin a gradual change from its peripheral strategy to one concentrating on the protection of the populated areas. This made inevitable an eventual commitment to a political solution and marked the beginning of the quest for a negotiated settlement. Thus the stage was set for President Johnson's speech of March 31, which ushered in the current negotiations.

II. THE ENVIRONMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS

Of course, the popular picture that negotiations began in May is only partially correct. The United States and Hanoi have rarely been out of touch since the American commitment in Viet Nam started to escalate. Not all these contacts have been face to face. Some have been by means of public pronouncements. Between 1965 and 1968, the various parties publicly stated their positions in a variety of forums: Hanoi announced Four Points, the NLF put forth Five Points, Saigon advanced Seven Points and the United States—perhaps due to its larger bureaucracy—promulgated Fourteen.

These public pronouncements produced a fairly wide area of apparent agreement on some general principles: that the Geneva

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Accords could form the basis of a settlement, that American forces would be withdrawn ultimately, that the reunification of Viet Nam should come about through direct negotiation between the Vietnamese, that (after a settlement) Viet Nam would not contain foreign bases. The United States has indicated that three of Hanoi's Four Points are acceptable.[1]

There is disagreement about the status of Hanoi's forces in the South; indeed, Hanoi has yet to admit that it has forces in the South—though it has prepared a "fall-back position" to the effect that North Vietnamese forces in the South cannot be considered "external." The role of the NLF is equally in dispute. Saigon rejects a separate political role for the NLF; the NLF considers Saigon a puppet régime. There is no agreement about the meaning of those propositions which sound alike or on how they are to be enforced.

In addition to negotiations by public pronouncements, there have been secret contacts which have been described in many books and articles.[2] It has been alleged that these contacts have failed because of a lack of imagination or a failure of coördination within our Government. (There have also been charges of deliberate sabotage.) A fair assessment of these criticisms will not be possible for many years. But it is clear that many critics vastly oversimplify the problem. Good will may not always have been present; but even were it to motivate all sides, rapid, dramatic results would be unlikely. For all parties face enormous difficulties. Indeed, the tendency of each side to overestimate the freedom of manœuvre of the other has almost certainly increased distrust. It has caused Hanoi to appear perversely obstinate to Washington and Washington to seem devious to Hanoi.

Both the Hanoi Government and the United States are limited in their freedom of action by the state of mind of the population of South Viet Nam which will ultimately determine the outcome of the conflict. The Vietnamese people have lived under foreign rule for approximately half of their history. They have maintained a remarkable cultural and social cohesion by being finely attuned to the realities of power. To survive, the Vietnamese have had

[1] These are: withdrawal of U.S. forces, the provision of the Geneva agreements calling for neutrality for North and South Viet Nam, and reunification on the basis of popular wishes. The United States has rejected the third point which implies that the internal arrangements for South Viet Nam should be settled on the basis of the NLF program—though the United States has agreed to consider the NLF program among others.

[2] See, for example, Kraslow and Loory, "The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam." New York: Random House, 1968.

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to learn to calculate—almost instinctively—the real balance of forces. If negotiations give the impression of being a camouflaged surrender, there will be nothing left to negotiate. Support for the side which seems to be losing will collapse. Thus, all the parties are aware—Hanoi explicitly, for it does not view war and negotiation as separate processes; we in a more complicated bureaucratic manner—that *the way* negotiations are carried out is almost as important as *what* is negotiated. The choreography of how one enters negotiations, what is settled first and in what manner is inseparable from the substance of the issues.

Wariness is thus imposed on the negotiators; a series of deadlocks is difficult to avoid. There are no "easy" issues, for each issue is symbolic and therefore in a way prejudges the final settlement. On its merits, the debate about the site of the conference—extending over a period of four weeks in April and May—was trivial. Judged intellectually, the four weeks were "wasted." But they did serve a useful function: they enabled the United States to let Saigon get used to the idea that there *would* be negotiations and to maintain that it retained control over events. It would not be surprising if Hanoi had a similar problem with the NLF.

The same problem was illustrated by the way the decision to stop the bombing was presented. Within twenty-four hours after announcement of the halt, both Hanoi and Saigon made statements of extraordinary bellicosity, which, taken literally, would have doomed the substantive talks about to begin. But their real purpose was to reassure each side's supporters in the South. Saigon especially has had a difficult problem. It has been pictured by many as perversely stubborn because of its haggling over the status of the NLF. However, to Saigon, the status of the NLF cannot be a procedural matter. For South Viet Nam it has been very nearly the central issue of the war. Washington must bear at least part of the responsibility for underestimating the depth and seriousness of this concern.

The situation confronted by Washington and Hanoi internationally is scarcely less complex. Much of the bitter debate in the United States about the war has been conducted in terms of 1961 and 1962. Unquestionably, the failure at that time to analyze adequately the geopolitical importance of Viet Nam contributed to the current dilemma. But the commitment of 500,000 Americans has settled the issue of the importance of Viet Nam. For what is in-

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volved now is confidence in American promises. However fashionable it is to ridicule the terms "credibility" or "prestige," they are not empty phrases; other nations can gear their actions to ours only if they can count on our steadiness. The collapse of the American effort in Viet Nam would not mollify many critics; most of them would simply add the charge of unreliability to the accusation of bad judgment. Those whose safety or national goals depend on American commitments could only be dismayed. In many parts of the world—the Middle East, Europe, Latin America, even Japan—stability depends on confidence in American promises. Unilateral withdrawal, or a settlement which unintentionally amounts to the same thing, could therefore lead to the erosion of restraints and to an even more dangerous international situation. No American policymaker can simply dismiss these dangers.

Hanoi's position is at least as complicated. Its concerns are not global; they are xenophobically Vietnamese (which includes, of course, hegemonial ambitions in Laos and Cambodia). But Hanoi is extraordinarily dependent on the international environment. It could not continue the war without foreign material assistance. It counts almost as heavily on the pressures of world public opinion. Any event that detracts from global preoccupations with the war in Viet Nam thus diminishes Hanoi's bargaining position. From this point of view, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was a major setback for Hanoi.

Hanoi's margin of survival is so narrow that precise calculation has become a way of life; caution is almost an obsession. Its bargaining position depends on a fine assessment of international factors—especially of the jungle of intra-communist relations. In order to retain its autonomy, Hanoi must manœuvre skillfully between Peking, Moscow and the NLF. Hanoi has no desire to become completely dependent on one of the communist giants. But, since they disagree violently, they reinforce Hanoi's already strong tendency toward obscurantist formulations. In short, Hanoi's freedom of manœuvre is severely limited.

The same is true of the Soviet Union, whose large-scale aid to Hanoi makes it a semi-participant in the war. Moscow must be torn by contradictory inclinations. A complete victory for Hanoi would tend to benefit Peking in the struggle for influence among the communist parties of the world; it would support the Chinese argument that intransigence toward the United States is, if not

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without risk, at least relatively manageable. But a defeat of Hanoi would demonstrate Soviet inability to protect "fraternal" communist countries against the United States. It would also weaken a potential barrier to Chinese influence in Southeast Asia and enable Peking to turn its full fury on Moscow. For a long time, Moscow has seemed paralyzed by conflicting considerations and bureaucratic inertia.

Events in Czechoslovakia have reduced Moscow's usefulness even further. We would compound the heavy costs of our pallid reaction to events in Czechoslovakia if our allies could blame it on a quid pro quo for Soviet assistance in extricating us from Southeast Asia. Washington therefore requires great delicacy in dealing with Moscow on the Viet Nam issue. It cannot be in the American interest to add fuel to the already widespread charge that the superpowers are sacrificing their allies to maintain spheres of influence.

This state of affairs would be enough to explain prolonged negotiations progressing through a series of apparent stalemates. In addition, a vast gulf in cultural and bureaucratic style between Hanoi and Washington complicates matters further. It would be difficult to imagine two societies less meant to understand each other than the Vietnamese and the American. History and culture combine to produce almost morbid suspiciousness on the part of the Vietnamese. Because survival has depended on a subtle skill in manipulating physically stronger foreigners, the Vietnamese style of communication is indirect and, by American standards, devious—qualities which avoid a total commitment and an overt test of strength. The fear of being made to look foolish seems to transcend most other considerations. Even if the United States accepted Hanoi's maximum program, the result might well be months of haggling while Hanoi looked for our "angle" and made sure that no other concessions were likely to be forthcoming.

These tendencies are magnified by communist ideology, which defines the United States as inherently hostile, and by Hanoi's experience in previous negotiations with the United States. It may well feel that the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962 (over Laos) deprived it of part of its achievements on the battlefield.

All this produces the particular negotiating style of Hanoi: the careful planning, the subtle, indirect methods, the preference for

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opaque communications which keep open as many options as possible toward both foe and friend (the latter may seem equally important to Hanoi). North Viet Nam's diplomacy operates in cycles of reconnaissance and withdrawal to give an opportunity to assess the opponent's reaction. This is then followed by another diplomatic sortie to consolidate the achievements of the previous phase or to try another route. In this sense, many contacts with Hanoi which seemed "abortive" to us, probably served (from Hanoi's point of view) the function of defining the terrain. The methods of Hanoi's diplomacy are not very different from Viet Cong military strategy and sometimes appear just as impenetrable to us.

If this analysis is correct, few North Vietnamese moves are accidental; even the most obtuse communication is likely to serve a purpose. On the other hand, it is not a style which easily lends itself to the sort of analysis at which we excel: the pragmatic, legal dissection of individual cases. Where Hanoi makes a fetish of planning, Washington is allergic to it. We prefer to deal with cases as they arise, "on their merits." Pronouncements that the United States is ready to negotiate do not guarantee that a negotiating position exists or that the U.S. Government has articulated its objectives.

Until a conference comes to be scheduled, two groups in the American bureaucracy usually combine to thwart the elaboration of a negotiating position: those who oppose negotiations and those who favor them. The opponents generally equate negotiations with surrender; if they agree to discuss settlement terms at all, it is to define the conditions of the enemy's capitulation. Aware of this tendency and of the reluctance of the top echelon to expend capital on settling disputes which involve no immediate practical consequences, the advocates of negotiations coöperate in avoiding the issue. Moreover, delay serves their own purposes in that it enables them to reserve freedom of action for the conference room.

Pragmatism and bureaucracy thus combine to produce a diplomatic style marked by rigidity in advance of formal negotiations and excessive reliance on tactical considerations once negotiations start. In the preliminary phases, we generally lack a negotiating program; during the conference, bargaining considerations tend to shape internal discussions. In the process, we deprive ourselves of criteria by which to judge progress. The over-

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concern with tactics suppresses a feeling for nuance and for intangibles.

The incompatibility of the American and North Vietnamese styles of diplomacy produced, for a long time, a massive breakdown of communication—especially in the preliminary phases of negotiation. While Hanoi was feeling its way toward negotiations, it bent all its ingenuity to avoid clear-cut, formal commitments. Ambiguity permitted Hanoi to probe without giving away much in return; Hanoi has no peers in slicing the salami very thin. It wanted the context of events rather than a formal document to define its obligations, lest its relations with Peking or the NLF be compromised.

Washington was unequipped for this mode of communication. To a government which equates commitments with legally enforceable obligations, Hanoi's subtle changes of tense were literally incomprehensible. In a press conference in February 1968, President Johnson said, "As near as I am able to detect, Hanoi has not changed its course of conduct since the very first response it made. Sometimes they will change 'will' to 'would' or 'shall' to 'should,' or something of the kind. But the answer is all the same." A different kind of analysis might have inquired why Hanoi would open up a channel for a meaningless communication, especially in the light of a record of careful planning which made it extremely unlikely that a change of tense would be inadvertent.

Whatever the might-have-beens, Hanoi appeared to Washington as devious, deceitful and tricky. To Hanoi, Washington must have seemed, if not obtuse, then cannily purposeful. In any event, the deadlock produced by the difference in negotiating style concerned specific clauses less than the philosophical issue of the nature of an international "commitment" or the meaning of "trickery." This problem lay at the heart of the impasse over the bombing halt.

III. LESSONS OF THE BOMBING HALT

The bombing halt occupied the first six months of the Paris talks. The formal positions were relatively straightforward. The American view was contained in the so-called San Antonio formula which was put forth by President Johnson in September 1967: "The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Viet Nam when this will lead promptly

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to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Viet Nam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation." In its main outlines, the American position remained unchanged throughout the negotiations.

Hanoi's reaction was equally simple and stark. It scored the obvious debating point that it could guarantee useful but not "productive" talks since that depended also on the United States.[3] But in the main, Hanoi adamantly insisted that the bombing halt had to be "unconditional." It rejected all American proposals for reciprocity as put forward, for example, by Secretary Rusk: respect for the DMZ, no attack on South Vietnamese cities, reduction in the level of military operations.

Though this deadlock had many causes, surely a central problem was the difficulty each side had in articulating its real concern. Washington feared "trickery;" it believed that once stopped, the bombing would be politically difficult, if not impossible, to start again even in the face of considerable provocation. Too, it needed some assurance as to how the negotiations would proceed *after* a bombing halt. Washington was aware that a bombing halt which did not lead rapidly to substantive talks could not be sustained domestically.

The legalistic phrasing of these concerns obscured their real merit. If bombing were resumed under conditions of great public indignation, it would be much harder to exercise restraint in the choice of targets and much more difficult to stop again in order to test Hanoi's intentions. The frequently heard advice to "take risks for peace" is valid only if one is aware that the consequences of an imprudent risk are likely to be escalation rather than peace.

Hanoi, in turn, had a special reason for insisting on an unconditional end of the bombing. A government as subtle as Hanoi must have known that there are no "unconditional" acts in the relation of sovereign states, if only because sovereignty implies the right to reassess changing conditions unilaterally. But Hanoi has always placed great reliance on the pressures of world opinion; the "illegality" of U.S. bombing was therefore a potent political weapon. Reciprocity would jeopardize this claim; it would suggest that bombing might be justified in some circumstances. Hanoi did not want a formula under which the United States

[8] Article by Wilfred Burchett, *The New York Times*, October 21, 1967.

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could resume bombing "legally" by charging violations of an understanding. Finally, Hanoi was eager to give the impression to its supporters in the South that it had induced us to stop "unconditionally" as a symbol of imminent victory. For the same reason, it was important to us that *both* sides in South Viet Nam believe there had been reciprocity.

As a result, six months were devoted to defining a quid pro quo which could be represented as unconditional. The issue of the bombing halt thus raised the question of the nature of an international commitment. What is the sanction for violation of an understanding? The United States, for a long time, conducted itself as if its principal safeguard was a formal, binding commitment by Hanoi to certain restraints. In fact, since no court exists to which the United States could take Hanoi, the American sanction was what the United States could do unilaterally should Hanoi "take advantage" of the bombing pause. Hanoi's fear of the consequences is a more certain protection against trickery than a formal commitment. Communicating what we meant by taking advantage turned out to be more important than eliciting a formal North Vietnamese response.

The final settlement of the problem seems to have been arrived at by this procedure. In his address announcing the bombing halt, President Johnson stressed that Hanoi is clear about our definition of "take advantage." Hanoi has not formally acknowledged these terms; it has, in fact, insisted that the bombing halt was unconditional. But Hanoi can have little doubt that the bombing halt would not survive if it disregarded the points publically stated by Secretary Rusk and President Johnson.

If the negotiations about the bombing halt demonstrate that tacit bargaining may play a crucial role in an ultimate settlement, they also show the extraordinary danger of neglecting the political framework. Washington had insisted throughout the negotiations that Saigon participate in the substantive talks which were to follow a bombing halt. President Johnson, in his speech announcing the bombing halt, implied that Saigon's participation satisfied the requirement of the San Antonio formula for "productive talks." How we came to insist on a condition which was basically neither in our interest nor Saigon's cannot be determined until the records are available—if then. It should have been clear that the participation of Saigon was bound to raise the issues of the status of the NLF and the internal structure of

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Viet Nam—issues which, as will be seen below, it is in everybody's interest to defer to as late a stage of the negotiations as possible.

Having made Saigon's participation a test case, we advanced the "your side, our side" formula. Under it, Saigon and the NLF are to participate in the conference. Each side can claim that it is composed of two delegations; its opponent is free to insist that it really deals with only one delegation. Thus the United States does not "recognize" the NLF and insists that Hanoi is its negotiating partner; Hanoi can take a similar view and maintain its refusal to deal formally with Saigon. It is difficult to disentangle from public sources whether Saigon ever agreed to this formula and whether it understood that our formula amounted to giving the NLF equal status.[4]

On the face of it, Saigon's reluctance to accept equal status with the NLF is comprehensible for it tends to affect all other issues, from ceasefire to internal structure. The merits of the dispute aside, the public rift between Saigon and Washington compromised what had been achieved. To split Washington and Saigon had been a constant objective of Hanoi; if the Paris talks turn into an instrument to accomplish this, Hanoi will be tempted to use them for political warfare rather than for serious discussions.

Clearly, there is a point beyond which Saigon cannot be given a veto over negotiations. But equally, it is not preposterous for Saigon to insist on a major voice in decisions affecting its own country. And it cannot strengthen our position in Paris to *begin* the substantive discussions with a public row over the status of a government whose constitutionality we have insistently pressed on the world for the past two years. The impasse has demonstrated that to deal with issues on an ad hoc basis is too risky;

[4] Clashes with our allies in which both sides claim to have been deceived occur so frequently as to suggest structural causes (see Skybolt, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, now the bombing halt). What seems to be happening is the same bureaucratic deadlock internationally which was noted above within our Government. When an issue is fairly abstract—before there is a prospect for an agreement—our diplomats tend to present our view in a bland, relaxed fashion to the ally whose interests are involved but who is not present at the negotiations. The ally responds equally vaguely for three reasons: (*a*) he may be misled into believing that no decision is imminent and therefore sees no purpose in making an issue; (*b*) he is afraid that if he forces the issue the decision will go against him; (*c*) he hopes the problem will go away because agreement will prove impossible. When agreement seems imminent, American diplomats suddenly go into high gear to gain the acquiescence of the ally. He in turn feels tricked by the very intensity and suddenness of the pressure while we are outraged to learn of objections heretofore not made explicit. This almost guarantees that the ensuing controversy will take place under the most difficult conditions.

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before we go much further in negotiations, we need an agreed concept of ultimate goals and how to achieve them.

IV. CEASEFIRE AND COALITION GOVERNMENT

Substantive negotiations confront the United States with a major conceptual problem: whether to proceed step by step, discussing each item "on its merits," or whether to begin by attempting to get agreement about some ultimate goals.

The difference is not trivial. If the negotiations proceed step by step through a formal agenda, the danger is great that the bombing halt will turn out to be an admission ticket to another deadlock. The issues are so interrelated that a partial settlement foreshadows the ultimate outcome and therefore contains all of its complexities. Mutual distrust and the absence of clarity as to final goals combine to produce an extraordinary incentive to submit all proposals to the most searching scrutiny and to erect hedges for failure or bad faith.

This is well illustrated by two schemes which public debate has identified as suitable topics for the next stage of negotiations: ceasefire and coalition government.

It has become axiomatic that a bombing halt would lead—almost automatically—to a ceasefire. However, negotiating a ceasefire may well be tantamount to establishing the preconditions of a political settlement. If there existed a front line with unchallenged control behind it, as in Korea, the solution would be traditional and relatively simple: the two sides could stop shooting at each other and the ceasefire line could follow the front line. But there are no front lines in Viet Nam; control is not territorial, it depends on who has forces in a given area and on the time of day. If a ceasefire permits the Government to move without challenge, day or night, it will amount to a Saigon victory. If Saigon is prevented from entering certain areas, it means in effect partition which, as in Laos, tends toward permanency. Unlike Laos, however, the pattern would be a crazy quilt, with enclaves of conflicting loyalties all over the country.

This would involve the following additional problems: (1) It would lead to an intense scramble to establish predominant control before the ceasefire went into effect. (2) It would make next to impossible the verification of any withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces that might be negotiated; the local authorities in areas of preponderant communist control would doubtless certify

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that no external forces were present and impede any effort at international inspection. (3) It would raise the problem of the applicability of a ceasefire to guerrilla activity in the non-communist part of the country; in other words, how to deal with the asymmetry between the actions of regular and of guerrilla forces. Regular forces operate on a scale which makes possible a relatively precise definition of what is permitted and what is proscribed; guerrilla forces, by contrast, can be effective through isolated acts of terror difficult to distinguish from normal criminal activity.

There would be many other problems: who collects taxes and how, who enforces the ceasefire and by what means. In other words, a tacit de facto ceasefire may prove more attainable than a negotiated one. By the same token, a formal ceasefire is likely to predetermine the ultimate settlement and tend toward partition. Ceasefire is thus not so much a step toward a final settlement as a form of it.

This is even more true of another staple of the Viet Nam debate: the notion of a coalition government. Of course, there are two meanings of the term: as a means of legitimizing partition, indeed as a disguise for continuing the civil war; or as a "true" coalition government attempting to govern the whole country. In the first case, a coalition government would be a façade with non-communist and communist ministries in effect governing their own parts of the country. This is what happened in Laos, where each party in the "coalition government" wound up with its own armed forces and its own territorial administration. The central government did not exercise any truly national functions. Each side carried on its own business—including civil war. But in Laos, each side controlled contiguous territory, not a series of enclaves as in South Viet Nam. Too, of all the ways to bring about partition, negotiations about a coalition government are the most dangerous because the mere participation of the United States in talking about it could change the political landscape of South Viet Nam.

Coalition government is perhaps the most emotionally charged issue in Viet Nam, where it tends to be identified with the second meaning: a joint Saigon-NLF administration of the entire country. There can be no American objection, of course, to direct negotiations between Saigon and the NLF. The issue is whether the United States should be party to an attempt to *impose* a coali-

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tion government. We must be clear that our involvement in such an effort may well destroy the existing political structure of South Viet Nam and thus lead to a communist takeover.

Some urge negotiations on a coalition government for precisely this reason: as a face-saving formula for arranging the communist political victory which they consider inevitable. But those who believe that the political evolution of South Viet Nam should not be foreclosed by an American decision must realize that the subject of a coalition government is the most thankless and tricky area for negotiation *by outsiders*.

The notion that a coalition government represents a "compromise" which will permit a new political evolution hardly does justice to Vietnamese conditions. Even the non-communist groups have demonstrated the difficulty Vietnamese have in compromising differences. It is beyond imagination that parties that have been murdering and betraying each other for 25 years could work together as a team giving joint instructions to the entire country. The image of a line of command extending from Saigon into the countryside is hardly true of the non-communist government in Saigon. It would be absurd in the case of a coalition government. Such a government would possess no authority other than that of each minister over the forces he controlled either through personal or party loyalty.

To take just one example of the difficulties: Communist ministers would be foolhardy in the extreme if they entered Saigon without bringing along sufficient military force for their protection. But the introduction of communist military forces into the chief bastion of governmental strength would change the balance of political forces in South Viet Nam. The danger of a coalition government is that it would decouple the non-communist elements from effective control over their armed forces and police, leaving them unable to defend themselves adequately.

In short, negotiations seeking to impose a coalition from the outside are likely to change markedly and irreversibly the political process in South Viet Nam—as Vietnamese who believe that a coalition government cannot work quickly choose sides. We would, in effect, be settling the war on an issue least amenable to outside influence, with respect to which we have the least grasp of conditions and the long-term implications of which are most problematical.

This is not to say that the United States should resist an out-

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come freely negotiated among the Vietnamese. It does suggest that any negotiation on this point by the United States is likely to lead either to an impasse or to the collapse of Saigon.

V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Paradoxical as it may seem, the best way to make progress where distrust is so deep and the issues so interrelated may be to seek agreement on ultimate goals first and to work back to the details to implement them.

This requires an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. Hanoi's strength is that it is fighting among its own people in familiar territory, while the United States is fighting far away. As long as Hanoi can preserve some political assets in the South, it retains the prospect of an ultimately favorable political outcome. Not surprisingly, Hanoi has shown a superior grasp of the local situation and a greater capacity to design military operations for political ends. Hanoi relies on world opinion and American domestic pressures; it believes that the unpopularity of the war in Viet Nam will ultimately force an American withdrawal.

Hanoi's weaknesses are that superior planning can substitute for material resources only up to a point. Beyond it, differences of scale are bound to become significant and a continuation of the war will require a degree of foreign assistance which may threaten North Viet Nam's autonomy. This Hanoi has jealously safeguarded until now. A prolonged, even if ultimately victorious war might leave Viet Nam so exhausted as to jeopardize the purpose of decades of struggle.

Moreover, a country as sensitive to international currents as North Viet Nam cannot be reassured by recent developments. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia removed Viet Nam as the principal concern of world opinion, at least for a while. Some countries heretofore critical of the United States remembered their own peril and their need for American protection; this served to reduce the intensity of public pressures on America. Hanoi's support of Moscow demonstrated the degree of Hanoi's dependence on the U.S.S.R.; it also may have been intended to forestall Soviet pressures on Hanoi to be more flexible by putting Moscow in Hanoi's debt. Whatever the reason, the vision of a Titoist Viet Nam suddenly seemed less plausible—all the more so as Moscow's justification for the invasion of

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Czechoslovakia can provide a theoretical basis for an eventual Chinese move against North Viet Nam. Finally, the Soviet doctrine according to which Moscow has a right to intervene to protect socialist domestic structures made a Sino-Soviet war at least conceivable. For Moscow's accusations against Peking have been, if anything, even sharper than those against Prague. But in case of a Sino-Soviet conflict, Hanoi would be left high and dry. International crises threatening to overshadow Viet Nam in successive years—the Middle East in 1967; Central Europe in 1968—thus may have convinced Hanoi that time is not necessarily on its side.

American assets and liabilities are the reverse of these. No matter how irrelevant some of our political conceptions or how insensitive our strategy, we are so powerful that Hanoi is simply unable to defeat us militarily. By its own efforts, Hanoi cannot force the withdrawal of American forces from South Viet Nam. Indeed, a substantial improvement in the American military position seems to have taken place. As a result, we have achieved our minimum objective: Hanoi is unable to gain a military victory. Since it cannot force our withdrawal, it must negotiate about it. Unfortunately, our military strength has no political corollary; we have been unable so far to create a political structure that could survive military opposition from Hanoi after we withdraw.

The structure of the negotiation is thus quite different from Korea. There are no front lines with secure areas behind them. In Viet Nam, negotiations do not ratify a military status quo but create a new political reality. There are no unambiguous tests of relative political and military strength. The political situation for both sides is precarious—within Viet Nam for the United States, internationally for Hanoi. Thus it is probable that neither side can risk a negotiation so prolonged as that of Panmunjom a decade and a half ago. In such a situation, a favorable outcome depends on a clear definition of objectives. The limits of the American commitment can be expressed in two propositions: first, the United States cannot accept a military defeat, or a change in the political structure of South Viet Nam brought about by external military force; second, once North Vietnamese forces and pressures are removed, the United States has no obligation to maintain a government in Saigon by force.

American objectives should therefore be (1) to bring about

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a staged withdrawal of external forces, North Vietnamese and American, (2) thereby to create a maximum incentive for the contending forces in South Viet Nam to work out a political agreement. The structure and content of such an agreement must be left to the South Vietnamese. It could take place formally on the national level. Or, it could occur locally on the provincial level where even now tacit accommodations are not unusual in many areas such as the Mekong Delta.

The details of a phased, mutual withdrawal are not decisive for our present purposes and, in any case, would have to be left to negotiations. It is possible, however, to list some principles: the withdrawal should be over a sufficiently long period so that a genuine indigenous political process has a chance to become established; the contending sides in South Viet Nam should commit themselves not to pursue their objectives by force while the withdrawal of external forces is going on; in so far as possible, the definition of what constitutes a suitable political process or structure should be left to the South Vietnamese, with the schedule for mutual withdrawal creating the time frame for an agreement.

The United States, then, should concentrate on the subject of the mutual withdrawal of external forces and avoid negotiating about the internal structure of South Viet Nam for as long as possible. The primary responsibility for negotiating the internal structure of South Viet Nam should be left for direct negotiations among the South Vietnamese. If we involve ourselves deeply in the issue of South Viet Nam's internal arrangements, we shall find ourselves in a morass of complexities subject to two major disadvantages. First, we will be the party in the negotiation least attuned to the subtleties of Vietnamese politics. Second, we are likely to wind up applying the greater part of our pressure against Saigon as the seeming obstacle to an accommodation. The result may be the complete demoralization of Saigon, profound domestic tensions within the United States and a prolonged stalemate or a resumption of the war.

Whatever the approach, the negotiating procedure becomes vital; indeed, it may well determine the outcome and the speed with which it is achieved.

Tying the bombing halt to Saigon's participation in the substantive discussions was probably unwise—all the more so as Hanoi seems to have been prepared to continue bilateral talks.

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The participation of Saigon and the NLF raised issues about status that would have been better deferred; it made a discussion of the internal structure of South Viet Nam hard to avoid. Nevertheless, the principles sketched above, while now more difficult to implement, can still guide the negotiations. The tension between Washington and Saigon can even prove salutary if it forces both sides to learn that if they are to negotiate effectively they must confront the fundamental issues explicitly.

As these lines are being written, the formula for resolving the issue of Saigon's participation in the conference is not yet clear. But the general approach should be the same whatever the eventual compromise.

The best procedure would be to establish three forums. If the South Vietnamese finally appear in Paris—as is probable—the four-sided conference should be looked upon primarily as a plenary session to legitimize the work of two negotiating committees which need not be formally established and could even meet secretly: (*a*) between Hanoi and the United States, and (*b*) between Saigon and the NLF. Hanoi and Washington would discuss mutual troop withdrawal and related subjects such as guarantees for the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia. (The formula could be the implementation of the Geneva Accords which have been accepted in principle by both sides.) Saigon and the NLF would discuss the internal structure of South Viet Nam. The third forum would be an international conference to work out guarantees and safeguards for the agreements arrived at in the other committees, including international peacekeeping machinery.

If Saigon continues to refuse the "our side, your side" formula, the same procedure could be followed. The subcommittees would become principal forums and the four-sided plenary session could be eliminated. The international "guaranteeing conference" would not be affected.

To be sure, Saigon, for understandable reasons, has consistently refused to deal with the NLF as an international entity. But if Saigon understands its own interests, it will come to realize that the procedure outlined here involves a minimum and necessary concession. The three-tiered approach gives Saigon the greatest possible control over the issues that affect its own fate; direct negotiations between the United States and the NLF would be obviated. A sovereign government is free to talk to any group

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that represents an important domestic power base without thereby conferring sovereignty on it; it happens all the time in union negotiations or even in police work.

But why should Hanoi accept such an approach? The answer is that partly it has no choice; it cannot bring about a withdrawal of American forces by its own efforts, particularly if the United States adopts a less impatient strategy—one better geared to the protection of the population and sustainable with substantially reduced casualties. Hanoi may also believe that the NLF, being better organized and more determined, can win a political contest. (Of course, the prerequisite of a settlement is that both sides think they have a chance to win or at least to avoid losing.) Above all, Hanoi may not wish to give the United States a permanent voice in internal South Vietnamese affairs, as it will if the two-sided approach is followed. It may be reinforced in this attitude by the belief that a prolonged negotiation about coalition government may end no more satisfactorily from Hanoi's point of view than did the Geneva negotiations over Viet Nam in 1954 and Laos in 1962. As for the United States, if it brings about a removal of external forces and pressures, and if it gains a reasonable time for political consolidation, it will have done the maximum possible for an ally—short of permanent occupation.

To be sure, Hanoi cannot be asked to leave the NLF to the mercy of Saigon. While a coalition government is undesirable, a mixed commission to develop and supervise a political process to reintegrate the country—including free elections—could be useful. And there must be an international presence to enforce good faith. Similarly, we cannot be expected to rely on Hanoi's word that the removal of its forces and pressures from South Viet Nam is permanent. An international force would be required to supervise access routes. It should be reinforced by an electronic barrier to check movements.

A negotiating procedure and a definition of objectives cannot guarantee a settlement, of course. If Hanoi proves intransigent and the war goes on, we should seek to achieve as many of our objectives as possible unilaterally. We should adopt a strategy which reduces casualties and concentrates on protecting the population. We should continue to strengthen the Vietnamese army to permit a gradual withdrawal of some American forces, and we should encourage Saigon to broaden its base so that it is stronger

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for the political contest with the communists which sooner or later it must undertake.

No war in a century has aroused the passions of the conflict in Viet Nam. By turning Viet Nam into a symbol of deeper resentments, many groups have defeated the objective they profess to seek. However we got into Viet Nam, whatever the judgment of our actions, ending the war honorably is essential for the peace of the world. Any other solution may unloose forces that would complicate prospects of international order. A new Administration must be given the benefit of the doubt and a chance to move toward a peace which grants the people of Viet Nam what they have so long struggled to achieve: an opportunity to work out their own destiny in their own way.

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COLOR IN WORLD AFFAIRS

By Harold R. Isaacs

MATTERS of race and color are not actually more important in world affairs now than they were, say, a generation ago; only the thrust and direction of their importance have changed. This has been, of course, quite a change. The world of the 1940s was still by and large a Western white-dominated world. The long-established patterns of white power and nonwhite non-power were still the generally accepted order of things. All the accompanying assumptions and mythologies about race and color were still mostly taken for granted, hardly as yet shaken even by the Japanese challenge to Western primacy in Asia or by the attempt of the Germans to make themselves masters of the master race. The world of these late 1960s is a world in which this white dominance no longer exists, certainly not in its old forms. The power system which supported it has crumbled. Its superstructure of beliefs about the superiority-inferiority patterns of races and cultures lies in pieces amid the ruins. While some people cling to chunks of the debris and stand defiantly in the door-openings of their shattered towers, most of us are stumbling blindly around trying to discern the new images, the new shapes and perspectives these changes have brought, to adjust to the painful rearrangement of identities and relationships which the new circumstances compel. This is now the pressing business of individuals, nations and whole societies, and in the cluster of matters with which they must deal, hardly any is more nettling and more difficult to handle than the matter of race, especially as symbolized by differences of physical feature and color of skin. Of all the elements involved in this wrenching rearrangement, race or color is surely one of the most visible, more important in some cases than in others but hardly in any case not important at all.

Taking it in perhaps its largest aspect, we begin with the fact that the entire cluster of some 70 new states carved out of the old empires since 1945 is made up of nonwhite peoples newly out from under the political, economic and psychological domination of white rulers. Our legacy from the fallen empires is a world now often seen as divided between the northern and southern hemispheres, between have-nations and have-not-nations, and in this

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picture all the haves, except the Japanese, are white, and the have-nots are all nonwhite, each bearing the heavy burden of the carryover of the past with its experience of subjection or of mastery. To the political and economic tensions and conflicts that divide the world along these hemispheric and class lines, race differences and the recent history of racial behavior by whites add their own special quality of greater explosiveness. Indeed, among those who feel these differences most strongly—usually the angriest nonwhite radicals or the most frightened white conservatives—many are prone to put the race issue at the front and center of all current and prospective world conflict. Their prime threat or prime fear is the approach of a series of racial confrontations leading to a universal race war that will drive the line of color across all the other fields of conflict that now crisscross the globe. This is commonly foreseen as an apocalyptic collision between what Sukarno used to call the OLDEFO (old established forces) under the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union brought together by their common whitism, and NEFO (new emerging forces) led by China, mobilizing behind it all the peoples of the Third World united by their nonwhitism and their shared hatred of all whites. It would come as a crushing and catastrophic fulfillment of the famous prediction of W.E.B. DuBois of nearly 70 years ago, that the problem of the twentieth century would be "the problem of the color line—the relation of the darker to the lighter men in Asia and Africa, in America, and the islands of the sea," bringing a terrible time of reckoning for the white man called to account for his sins.

This may seem an unnecessarily feverish view of a world whose prospects under the plainest light just now are lurid enough. But it will not do to dismiss it just because it is usually held in this form by racial extremists of one kind or another. This would be like dismissing as wholly implausible the notion that the United States would not have dropped on Germany the atom bomb it did drop on Japan, or speculation over the possible reasons having to do with race why a mercy airlift to rescue a handful of Europeans in the Congo was feasible while a mercy airlift to bring succor to thousands of dying Africans in Biafra is not. Even the most cogently argued explanations in both these matters could not entirely ignore their racial components. In any case, it takes only a slight jog of the kaleidoscope to produce a view of the future held by some quite sober citizens who believe

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that the necessary power arrangement to come—and possibly the ultimate nuclear showdown as well—must be a Russian-American combination against the Chinese, a prospect not as far removed from the race-war view as some of these sober citizens might want to insist it is.

But it is not necessary to be overcome by overheated visions of an oncoming race war to see that issues of race and color *are* in some degree almost universally present in the great issues and problems that dominate this hemispheric set of confrontations. These are in the main issues of resources and development, population and the shaping of the political institutions—more open or more closed—that will govern the great majority of men for the next long while. Wherever the racial element is added to national, class, religious, ethnic and tribal lines of cleavage, it brings its own peculiar accretion of greater glandular involvement and emotional violence to all the other elements of conflict in which we are now entangled.

II

Race or color does not often appear as the central or single most critical factor in conflicts affecting international relations. As an issue of identity or relationship it is more usually present as one element among many. There are, however, some countries and situations where color does in fact figure as the core issue making for both internal and external conflict. Of these the most obvious and most important is the Union of South Africa.

The maintenance of white power by brute force in southern Africa—taking in Rhodesia and South West Africa—probably supplies the main source in current reality for the vision of a world eventually engulfed in a race war. If the actualities of power in southern Africa and in black Africa have so far belied the frequent predictions of explosive racial conflict there, this hardly means that it will not come to pass at all. The chances for that depend on whether the whites of southern Africa do finally come to their senses before it is too late, or whether the black peoples of those countries will submit indefinitely to their condition of total subjection. There is no present sign of the first outcome and no basis for expecting the second. An ultimately bloody confrontation of black and white in South Africa, with all its possible, predictable or imaginable consequences in the rest of the world and especially in the United States, is by no means the least certain

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of all the grim possibilities that lie ahead for us all. It may be a nightmare of a prospect, but as so much of our recent history has shown, nightmares are a good deal more likely to come true than any of our sweeter dreams.

But it is not only the possibility of future eruption that counts in this measure of things. White power in southern Africa is right now probably the sharpest of all the wedges that separate the newly emergent nonwhites of the world from its whites. It continuously mobilizes the emotions, if not yet the effective action, of the new nonwhite nations, especially in Africa, which figure so prominently and yet so insecurely in the world's politics. It may very well be that the South African mote helps them not to see their own assorted beams with respect to racism or oppression of minorities, but the fact remains nevertheless that the survival and blatant exercise of white supremacy in South Africa keeps their own experience with white racism alive and vivid. It provides them—and the communist powers who are happy to be handed an additional weapon—with a set of issues and emotions on which they can all join despite so much else that divides them. Colonialism, often used to serve the same purpose, may indeed be a dead horse—except, to be sure, in Angola and Mozambique—but there is nothing dead about white power as it is wielded in southern Africa. It has figured on the United Nations agenda every year since 1952. Pushed by the nonwhite newcomers, often to the acute discomfort especially of the British and the Americans, U.N. majorities have repeatedly denounced South African apartheid, pressed the South West Africa issue, handed down detailed indictments of oppression of blacks and Indians, and demanded international action to put down the South African and Rhodesian white racists.

The dragging reluctance of Britain and the United States to join in these indictments—much less to take the actions voted—has served as a measure in the minds of many nonwhites (American as well as others) of the value of the commitments which these governments always make on the issues of equality and justice in general. Those winds of change which blew away the British Empire have by now largely also dissipated the sentimental-romantic fog that for a while overhung Britain's relations with its ex-colonies. The influx of black and brown immigrants from the Caribbean, India and Pakistan has produced a full-fledged white backlash in England, complete with riots, liberal

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dismay, civil rights legislation and restrictions on immigration. This new state of affairs was dramatically underlined when the British Government recently reneged on its promise of an open door for passport-holding Asian British subjects fleeing, ironically enough, from black nationalism in Kenya. Britain's temporizing response to white Rhodesian defiance has undoubtedly been due mainly to Britain's post-imperial weakness, but African blacks and Asian browns could quite reasonably interpret Britain's behavior as not so much weak as white. In the case of the United States, the equivocation over white racism in Africa helped to cancel out the flickering sympathy the United States commanded at times during the last ten years or so for its own turbulent and only half-successful effort to do away with the survivals of white racism at home. Into this equation must also go the size and weight of Anglo-American investments and strategic-military interests in South Africa, not to speak of the demonstrated overreadiness of American power to intervene forcibly elsewhere when its vital interests were thought to be involved. The overall effect has been to reinforce in a general way the communist, radical nationalist and radical racialist views of Anglo-American realities.

III

Race or color is also a central or even governing factor in a number of other places and situations which may have less weight in the balance of world affairs but can hardly be seen as negligible in the working out of the next chapter of the human story.

Of these only Portugal's stubborn effort to keep power in its African colonies carries over what we might now call the old colonial pattern of things, although the Portuguese style of handling the color issue is several shades more ambiguous than that of its ex-counterparts elsewhere. Somewhat like the French colonialists, the Portuguese like to insist that they are a good deal more flexible in such matters, especially with nonwhites whom they coöpt as willing instruments of white power, whether in bed, in politics or in business. It is rather striking to note that the colonialists who have insisted most strongly on their paternalistic or racial flexibility as masters have tried the hardest or fought the longest and bloodiest wars to hold on to their colonies: the Dutch, the French and lastly now the Portuguese. On the political side, no enduring vitality appeared in the meth-

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ods and institutions by which they gave some limited voice to their colonials in their own affairs. On the racial side, there is little to support the claims of greater humanity that have often been made for themselves by the French, Dutch and Portuguese colonialists as compared, say, to the British. The differences are more a matter of style than of substance. Taking it in its most literal aspect, much waits to be learned about these differences from a comparison of the experience of the varieties of Eurasians and Eurafricans produced out of some of these colonial relationships. None of it seems likely to put any higher gloss on the picture we already have of this past. It is a matter of some suggestive relevance to our present theme, however, that the nationalist movement in Angola is reportedly split between at least two groups, one of which is said to be led by blacks, the other by mulattoes.

The other examples that fall into this category are in quite a different way part of our legacy from the colonial era. They all arise from the effort to create nations out of the often disparate and mutually hostile population groups which made up the former colonies where, as the saying went, division generally made for easier ruling. These differences are usually regional, tribal and in highly varying degrees "ethnic" or "racial," two vaguely defined terms used, for lack of more precise definition, to mark out some blurry lines between distinctions and differences that are sometimes physical, sometimes cultural, often both. Almost every "new" nation—and not a few "old" ones—is now more or less painfully hung on this kind of centrifuge.

Probably the bloodiest of these new confrontations where the difference is most distinctly racial is going on in the Sudan. Here a civil war has been under way since 1962 between the predominantly lighter-skinned Arab rulers in the north and the black non-Moslem people of the south, a clash in which this difference plays a paramount role. Another example was the heavy bloodletting between the tall Hamitic Watusi and the short Negroid Bahutu that accompanied the creation of the two small states of Burundi and Ruanda. Other situations with similar elements exist in several West African countries, like Sierra Leone, Gambia, Liberia, where coastal "creoles" of varying degrees of racial mixture or foreign origin confront indigenous tribes in contests to hold or win power. There are north-south divisions in India which are divisions of culture and language but also, to no small extent,

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divisions between light-skinned northerners and dark-skinned southerners with strong feelings about their lightness and darkness. Some of our "new" situations are filled with "new" anomalies that in some cases have a strong racial cast, as in the encounter between European and Oriental Jews in Israel, Arabs and Berbers in the Maghreb, Hindus and Nagas in India's northeast, Hindus and Singhalese in Ceylon, the "black" Khmers and the "yellow" Vietnamese. Also on this list must appear the bizarre reproduction of older imperialist patterns by the neo-imperialist brown Indonesians in the imposition of their rule on the black Papuans in West New Guinea.

If we were to extend this catalogue from the more distinctly "racial" to the more vaguely "ethnic" or "tribal," it would obviously be possible to multiply examples almost indefinitely. In cases where the colonial boundaries have been retained as national boundaries, again without regard for population groups, conflict has been revived or ignited, both internally and across borders, between peoples whose physical or racial differences may be much less marked but between whom the ethnic or racial clash is hardly any less intense. Consider on this score Nigeria, the Congo, India in Assam and Nagaland, Indonesia in Borneo, the Ethiopian-Somali-Kenyan irredentisms, the high permeability of the frontiers of all the countries of the Indochina peninsula, to say nothing of the presence of this factor on both sides of the lines which arbitrarily divided North and South Korea and North and South Viet Nam, with rather notable effects on American and world affairs.

Nor can we entirely fail to mention here—despite the absence of the color factor as such—the long-vibrating hostility that separates such European tribes as the Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs and Croats, Flemands and Walloons, Welsh and Scots and English, Bretons and French, French and English Canadians, Spaniards and Basques, etc. The failure of so many political systems—national, imperial, international—to satisfy the identity needs of people in these many groups has led to the powerful resurgence of their feelings about their special separateness. Some of these tribal differences have been bloodying the world's fields for ages and we are plainly not done with them yet. However else they are caused and defined, almost all are rooted in or reinforced and rationalized by those physical and cultural differences which they themselves often see as "racial" or "ethnic" and which, de-

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spite all the mixing that has been done, manage somehow still to dominate so much of man's affairs.

There is, however, one group of "new" nations crippled by divisions of this kind which are in a peculiarly special way the most direct legacy from the colonial era. The largest and most internationally important of these is Malaysia, whose bi- or tri-racial character and consequent political and social fragility are mirrored in such smaller new states or microstates as Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Mauritius, Fiji (all former parts of the British Empire) and in Surinam, which is still a Dutch dependency. These are countries into which the colonial power deliberately imported working populations, either enlarging on older migrations or organizing new ones by large-scale contract labor, indenture or semi-indenture, in numbers large enough to become, in two or three generations, a significant minority, a plurality or even a majority of the entire local population.

In one territory where this took place, Hawaii, a political solution was ultimately found in statehood within the developing framework of a new and uniquely American pluralism. In other areas, the option has had to be for nationhood, generally with much less hopeful results. In the Caribbean this process began with the slaves brought from Africa, ultimately displacing the indigenous Amerindians with a predominantly black population. When slavery was abolished, the freed blacks largely abandoned the land for the towns. The colonial rulers then brought in shiploads of more docile laborers for their plantations, in the main drawn from some of the lowest strata of the peasantry in India. The result today, in Guyana, for example, is a society composed of nearly equal parts of black Afro-Guyanese and brown East Indian Guyanese, whose differences, mutual antipathies and conflicting interests have erupted in outbreaks of cruel violence as each group sought the uncertain prize of power in their rickety new national home.

Of considerably greater importance in world affairs, however, is Malaysia, a country of some eight million people at the tip of the Southeast Asian peninsula where the Indian Ocean meets the South China Sea at one of the world's major interoceanic crossroads. Here under the uncomfortably ill-fitting mantle of nationhood is a population made up of close to equal parts of Malays, who see themselves as the indigenous "sons of the soil," and Chinese, some of whose families have lived in the region for cen-

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turies but most of whom are products of the immigration begun in the last century when the British began to need workers more energetic than the pastorally inclined Malays. They also brought in workers from India for the rubber plantations, and Indians now comprise about 10 percent of the population. The bulk of the Malays remained poor farmers and fishermen while the Chinese came, in a generation or two, to control all sectors of the economy not dominated by the British. When the Japanese invaded in 1942, the Malays welcomed them and the Chinese resisted them, a difference that erupted in Chinese-Malay bloodletting just after the war ended. The communist-led uprising that kept the country in turmoil for about five years thereafter was a virtually all-Chinese movement. When the assorted Malay states and sultanates were put together for the first time in their history in 1957 as the new state of Malaya, the Malay princes and other leaders negotiated Malay political dominance with the willing British. The Chinese, most of them uncertain or ambivalent about their hitherto firm political ties to their homeland, now a communist power, found themselves insecurely relocated as second-class citizens, accepted as nationals of the new state only under certain limitations and restrictions.

When Malaya was enlarged to become Malaysia in 1963, taking in the predominantly Chinese city of Singapore and the North Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah, the population also acquired sizeable minorities of Dayaks and other tribes who shared an immense lack of any affinity—racial, cultural or political—with either the Chinese or the Malays. The Borneo territory was brought in partly to offset the threat of an ethnic Chinese majority produced by the inclusion of Singapore. The mutual mistrust and hostility between Malays and Chinese forced the withdrawal of Singapore in 1965, with Singapore becoming an independent city-state on its own, leaving Malaysia still with a 40-percent Chinese minority. The cleavage between Chinese and Malays here is deeply cultural, having to do with history, language, religion, philosophy and style of life. These are accented all the more by the racial and physical differences, including color, which mark them off from each other and which provide, as always, the handiest and most explicit basis for expressed hostility between individuals. On some satisfactory resolution of this conflict depends the viability of the Malaysian nation and on this viability depends much that has to do with the bigger politics,

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the power alignments and positions, and the issues of war and peace among the larger powers whose interests meet or clash in that strategic corner of the world.

IV

Running far out beyond these small and localized blots of detail, changing color patterns are staining and rearranging the look of much larger areas of the new power-political map of the world. Besides the new and highly fluid patterns created by the north-south hemispheric view of the world to which we have already referred, there are also the triangular shapes created by that other hemispheric arrangement—East and West: the U.S.-Russian, Russian-Chinese and Chinese-U.S. cleavages. In each of these combinations and often spreading through and across all of them run the feelings that have to do with race and all the attitudes, fears, self-perceptions and mutual perceptions that go with it.

The Soviet Union has long had to deal with race and color problems in its effort to create a successful federation of many diverse peoples, including the many nonwhites who make up the populations of the Soviet east. The dominance of the Great Russians in Soviet affairs has often had a racial as well as national character. More recently the most visible outcropping of this kind in the Soviet Union has been the appearance of its own set of "yellow peril" fixations around its power conflict with China. The Russian-Chinese conflict has deep roots in the geography and history of these two huge continental powers. As in all such cases, mutual fears and hostilities are fed by racial differences which serve to reinforce or to rationalize politically dictated behavior. In recent years Russians have more and more openly expressed their feelings about Chinese in these terms. In conversations with Americans and Europeans, they frequently promote a common cause against the prospective Chinese threat in terms of a common "whiteness" united against Chinese "yellowness." They endow the latter with full-strength versions of all the most negative and fearsome stereotypes, bearing on numbers, limitless energy and endurance, fiendish cleverness and cruelty, deviousness and inscrutability. These are all images they already hold in common with other Westerners, especially Americans, who get them from the same sources, indeed, from the same historic experiences. That Russians also share other varieties of "white" attitudes and

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behavior patterns toward nonwhites is amply indicated by the testimony of African students in Russia who met with discrimination, hostility and violence at the hands of their Russian hosts and fellow students. Chinese students in Russia had similar experiences. However one might balance out the "facts" of these episodes, it is clear that some of this Russian "whiteness" is at least part of the story of the Russian failure to win allies and keep influential friends both in black Africa and yellow China.

In the case of China, its racial chauvinism has been a factor of great weight in communist Chinese political behavior, as it indeed has been in all of China's history. Chinese pride of place in the history and culture of the world is not always easily separable from pride of race in its most literal physical form. Chinese feeling about the inferiority of all non-Chinese is almost always expressed in physical terms; outsiders are often portrayed as animals or animal-like demons, or are otherwise denied the status of human beings. It took a good deal of Chinese self-pride to sustain these convictions of Chinese superiority during the last century or so of repeated humiliation at the hands of foreigners. Repairing this damage to the Chinese ego and restoring the Chinese sense of greatness to its fullest luster are among the prime purposes and driving motivations of the present communist leadership in China. Although racism, at least crude racism, is anathema in communist ideology (as it is in the American credo), the Chinese, like the Russians, play heavily on its themes. They do so mainly negatively, charging their foes with its evils. Peking's heavy-handed and largely unsuccessful efforts to whip up support for itself in Africa and in the Third World movements associated with Bandung, Cairo and Algiers were deeply—if informally—larded with racial arguments. In open propaganda the Third World formula became a code for "nonwhite world" counterposed to the white world of the United States and the Soviet Union. In their private manœuvring, it was specifically on racial grounds that the Chinese moved to keep Russia out of the councils of the Third World and to create an all-nonwhite international trade union movement which they could dominate.

The failures of this Chinese effort were, again, due to many causes: the actuality of Chinese weakness; the marked lack of enthusiasm among a great many Afro-Asians for Maoist extremism or for becoming tributaries to a new celestial empire; the counter-pulls of Western strength, resources, influence; or,

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often most powerfully of all, their own nationalism or their own values. But to judge from a variety of accounts, they also came about in part because the Chinese involved in these encounters could not help conveying their strong belief that, if Western whites were not superior to Africans and others, the Chinese *were*. We are far from through with Chinese chauvinism or with its racial component.

V

For the United States most of all—more than for any other nation, new or old—the element of race and color has finally become a matter of central and crucial concern. Its importance cannot be separately assigned or portioned out between our internal or our external affairs. In the fundamental sense that the role of the United States as a world power will be determined by the nature and quality of the American society, the United States itself has now become the principal arena of our struggle to shape the future. In that arena the principal issue, plainly put, is whether our partially opening society will open enough to include Americans who are black on the same common and equal basis as all others.

This is not to suggest that race and color did not figure importantly in our foreign affairs before this. Until 25 years or so ago, white supremacy was a generally assumed and accepted state of affairs in the United States as well as in Europe's empires. It did not begin to give way seriously in the United States until it had clearly begun to give way in the rest of the world. Up until that time, the notions of white supremacy and superiority and the subordinate position of blacks and other nonwhites in American society had been duly refracted in American affairs abroad. It showed up mainly in American relations with Asia, where in the middle of the nineteenth century we joined Europe's freebooting imperialist system, acquiring our own "little brown brothers" in the process. Our behavior in these affairs was marked by that uniquely American combination of benevolence and rapacity, attraction and repulsion, virtue and cynicism which, for a great many Chinese at least, became our special national hallmark. At home in the United States in the same period we moved into an era of remarkable bigotry and violence against nonwhites. This was in the post-Reconstruction decades when nominally freed blacks were driven into new and even deeper pits of debasement.

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It was a period marked by the exclusion acts aimed at the Chinese beginning in 1882 and then against the Japanese, and not long thereafter similar restrictions on all further immigration from anywhere except Anglo-Saxon northern Europe. The restrictions on Chinese and Japanese, including denial of the right to citizenship by naturalization, were continued until as recently as 1946. On the political side, we did not yield our extraterritorial position in China—won for us by European armed conquest a century earlier—until 1943. We are obviously not dealing here with matters of ancient or remote history.

The direct role of racism in these relationships and its effect on Asian-American relations during the last hundred years are almost always more or less consciously underplayed in American historical accounts. But there it is, barely out of view beneath the surface of most versions of our experience in the Philippines, where we were, to be sure, enormously benevolent, but where our soldiers sang about the monkeys who had not tails in Zamboanga. It is seen in the lynchings and other mob violence against Chinese in America; in the first anti-foreign boycott in China in 1905, which was directed specifically against U.S. maltreatment of Chinese there; in the practice of discrimination against Japanese in the United States and its effect on Japanese-American relations before and after the First World War and particularly in the negotiations at Versailles; and in the heavily race-tinted propaganda used by Japan against the United States before and during the Second World War.

Today this part of our past continues to dog us, mutedly in Japan just now, but quite explicitly in China, where communist propaganda against the United States makes heavy use of racial themes and images, not just because the Chinese are themselves racial chauvinists but because this kind of crude racism is no small part of what they had to take from us in the years of their weakness. It is still not easy for many Americans to understand that we are now simply getting quite a bit of our own thrown back at us, whether from China or Japan, from Latin America where the gringo syndrome carries its own special racial ingredient, or from Africa, in whose darkest experience of human enslavement we played such a prominent role.

But now the worms—and the wheels of history—have turned. The end of the system of white supremacy in the world, except in southern Africa, has forced the quickening of the end of white

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supremacy in the United States. The changes that have taken place in this country in the last twenty years have come about for many reasons and as the outcome of many slowly—oh, so slowly—converging forces and circumstances. But surely not the least of these was the sudden American need to deal as a great power with a world in which long-subordinate, submissive races had ceased to be subordinate or submissive. The racial facts of American life abruptly became vital to our success as leader, whether in pitting our claim of democratic freedom against the challenge of communist totalitarianism or in winning the trust, not to say the alliance, of the new nations. It is hardly necessary to belabor this point at this late hour in the proceedings. It does not require too much distortion by our enemies to depict our destructiveness in Viet Nam as a product of our disregard for nonwhite Asian lives. It does not require much imagination to guess how much more hopelessly untenable our position in Viet Nam would be if we were claiming to fight there for Vietnamese democratic freedom of choice with an army that was still as racially segregated as it was when we fought for democracy and freedom in World War II, and as it remained until harsh military necessity imposed battlefield integration in Korea in 1950.

Through the 1950s and early 1960s, these issues were dramatized by repeated incidents in the United States involving newly arrived black and brown diplomats from the newly independent nations, who were constantly being caught in the still-prevailing patterns of discrimination and exclusion in hotels, restaurants and other public places as well as in housing in New York, Washington and elsewhere. The embarrassed apologies to the diplomats involved and the exhortations addressed to recalcitrant white Americans about these episodes must fill a large file at the State Department and at the headquarters of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations. It is not far wrong to say that the desegregation of many of these places was largely won in the first instance because nobody could ever be sure any more that a reasonably well-dressed dark-skinned man who came seeking service was not the Ambassador from Ghana or India, an outcome that served only to deepen the humiliation and anger of dark-skinned men or women who happened to be just ordinary Americans who wanted that service too.

Much more dramatic was the turmoil set in motion by the Supreme Court decisions and the early racial clashes in the

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schools and universities, at the lunch counters, in terminals and other public places. The events of this period commanded the fascinated attention of a world that had never seen anything like it: the Negro rebellion launched by Martin Luther King's walkers in Montgomery in 1955; Federal soldiers and marshals enforcing compliance with the law on southern white racists at Little Rock, Tuscaloosa and elsewhere; the sit-in movement and the freedom rides; the civil rights laws finally pushed through a reluctant Congress; the climactic confrontation at Birmingham; and the tardy but unmistakable commitment of the Kennedy Administration in 1963 to see the issue through. All of this on balance offset the uglier scenes that even then were cast so widely on all the world's screens. There remained the image of a society finally moving to cope with some of its most deep-seated problems, and doing so more boldly and more openly than any other nation in a world where scarcely anyone was free to cast stones.

In the last five years, the picture has cruelly changed. Belief abroad in the relative virtue or morality and—perhaps even more decisive—even in the intelligence of American behavior as a world power has been largely shot away in Viet Nam. At home, the civil rights revolution, having cleared the barricades of legal segregation, came up against the much more difficult problem of achieving a decent existence freed of the shackles imposed by poverty, of overcoming the rot of our inner cities and the persistence of strong racial attitudes and behavior in large sections of the surrounding white population. Negro hopes of change raised by the swift victories of the civil rights revolution have given way to deep frustration that often seeks an outlet in bristling ultra-militancy and a profound skepticism about the society's good intentions. Hopes of many Negroes in the promises of integration have given way to despairing impulses toward some new kind of separation. For large numbers of white Americans, especially among the young, much of the same faith has been buried in the Viet Nam morass, while in other large sections of the population a nascent readiness to accept change in race relations has been obscured by the angry and fearful resurrection of old racial spectres spurred by outbreaks of violence in the ghettos. The crisis now wide open in American life is a concatenation of long-unsolved problems of poverty, the cities and race, each set formidable enough in itself but woven all together now in a single massive tangle of issues, demands and circumstances.

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Of the three, the most critical is clearly race. To see that this is so, one has only to imagine what our present national condition and state of mind would be if our poor, especially in our city slums, were not so largely black. Without the problem of race, we would be facing demands of the kind this society has shown itself matchlessly able to confront and solve. It is the demand that we finally resolve the place of the black man in the American society that makes this the potentially mortal climax of an issue that has been with us since the founding of the Republic. It bears on what our society is and on what we say we think it is or want it to be—namely an open society offering freedom of choice and growth and well-being to all its citizens regardless of race, creed, color or national origin.

There has been no such society on earth and the American promise of it is in fact the unique substance of the American alternative to the claims of the communist totalitarians. It is the difference between the promise of our open society and the closed society of the communists that makes the world power struggle something more than a matter of deciding an issue of brute force. It can of course be argued that American power will impinge heavily on the world no matter what is done about the place of the black man in American society. This is no doubt so. But the proposition here is that the world power role and impact of an American society on its way to becoming an open, humane society for all its members is one thing. The role and impact of an American society moving toward new forms of racial separation in a garrison state will be quite another.

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NATO AFTER THE INVASION

By Harlan Cleveland

IT was the third week in August 1968 and the North Atlantic allies were relaxing on their beaches, in their mountains and in their chancelleries too. There was plenty to relax about, for 1968 had started as a big year for détente in Europe. The East-West exchange in political leaders was at an all-time high; a Western leader who had not recently been in Poland or Rumania was hardly alive politically unless he was home preparing to receive his opposite number from Hungary or Bulgaria. The Mayor of Moscow was in The Hague; the Red Army Choir was about to entertain in the concert halls of England; the University of Minnesota Band was practicing for its trip to the Soviet Union. The John F. Kennedy Airport was braced for the second ceremonial Aeroflot flight, part of the new nonstop service between Moscow and New York. In Moscow, carpenters were hammering together a big Italian trade fair. And in Washington, the White House was working hard on the possibility of talks with the Soviet Union about strategic nuclear missile and anti-missile systems.

The atmospheric improvement in East-West relations was matched by a growing clarity in the West that making peace with the Russians would require a judicious mix of collective desire and collective defense. In May 1968 the NATO Defense Ministers, meeting in Brussels, "reaffirmed the need for the Alliance to maintain an effective military capability and to assure a balance of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe and elsewhere. . . . Ministers endorsed the proposition that the overall military capability of NATO should not be reduced except as part of a pattern of mutual force reductions balanced in scope and timing."

Then in June at the Reykjavik meeting, NATO's Foreign Ministers signed a Declaration which, in effect, invited the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies to negotiate about mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe—while repeating their determination to maintain NATO's defensive capability. NATO was so credibly anxious to move beyond static peacekeeping to dynamic peacemaking that in the Norwegian Storting an anti-militaristic Left could without embarrassment join a Conserva-

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tive government in passing a pro-NATO measure by a vote of 144 to 6. The Western democracies, their competitive spirit aroused, had dipped their toes in "coexistence" and found they could live with it. Defense and détente had been glued together for the difficult period of "peaceful engagement" assumed to be just around the corner.

Then the Warsaw Five moved into Czechoslovakia, and showed that the Soviet leaders are no longer so sure they can live with competitive coexistence themselves.

II

Very few Europeans or Americans can honestly say they correctly predicted this enormous event. Most of them were holding in their heads two propositions we now perceive as contradictory: first, that the Czechoslovak liberalization program would be fatal to the communist system; second, that the Soviets would inveigh but not invade.

The experts and intelligence analysts soon testified that the Russian move was perfectly rational and indeed inevitable from the Soviet point of view. Being professionals, most of them could even point to passages in their own writings which "did not exclude" an invasion. But the truth is that few experts really thought of invasion as a rational move before the event; Budapest 1956 was regarded as one of a kind. Perhaps Western experts should be excused for underrating the will of the Soviets to use force in Czechoslovakia; so did Ceaucescu and Tito—not to mention Alexandre Dubçek.

Why did the Russians do it? Because they decided that their hold on the Warsaw Pact countries had first priority—ahead of East-West relations in Europe, ahead of Soviet-American relations, even ahead of Russian leadership in the world communist movement.

"The defense of socialism in Czechoslovakia is not only the internal affair of the people of that country," said *Pravda* on August 22. "Can a country wrested from the socialist community really safeguard its genuine sovereignty?" asked *Izvestia* on August 24. The Warsaw Pact nations "have the right of self-defense," Poland's Gomulka argued on September 8, "when the enemy mines our own house, the community of socialist states, with dynamite." "Marxism is irreconcilable with nationalism no matter how 'just,' 'clean,' fine or civilized the latter may be,"

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Soviet Russia declared on September 11. "Neutrality for the socialist countries means alienation from the socialist camp," said *Pravda Ukrainy* on September 14.

Sovereignty has thus been collectivized—at least for the purpose of justifying, ex post facto, the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia. It took until September 26 for the Soviets to work out a full-blown intellectual defense of their August 20 action, but when it appeared in *Pravda* it was nothing if not perfectly clear. The particular must give way to the "general" (read Soviet) interest; "the sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interests of the world of socialism." Sovereignty, as preached and practiced by unidentified anti-socialist elements in Czechoslovakia, would have enabled NATO troops to "come up to the Soviet border, while the community of European socialist states would have been split." In such conditions "law and legal norms are subordinated to the laws of the class struggle."

An older Soviet adage said it less bureaucratically and more frankly: "Law is like the tongue of a wagon—it goes in the direction in which it is pointed."

III

The forces of the Warsaw Pact began moving at 11 p.m. the evening of August 20. A couple of hours later, in Paris, London, Washington and some other capitals, Soviet Ambassadors hastened to deliver assurances that the tanks and planes were in Prague by invitation, and were not directed against the "state interests" of the United States or other allies. At 2 a.m., August 21, Prague radio aired news of the invasion; at 2:09 the Associated Press carried its first "flash," based on the Prague broadcast. Meanwhile some of NATO's air defense radars were partially jammed—a by-product of Soviet jamming in Czechoslovakia, as it turned out. By breakfast time in Europe, the NATO "crisis-consultation" machinery was in high gear.

The first big debate inside NATO was not about long-term policy but on a disturbing tactical question: Why didn't we know the invaders were going to move before they moved?

For NATO strategists, the question is no side issue. NATO's flexible strategy rests heavily on the assumption that the West would have two kinds of warning of any move by the Warsaw Pact against NATO. We would have political warning, because

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a surprise attack not preceded by a build-up of political tensions seems almost inconceivable. We would have strategic warning, because we would see and sense the build-up of forces the Soviets would require to undertake a serious military operation against the NATO defense system. But it has always seemed unlikely that we could tell in advance the precise moment at which an attack by those built-up forces would be launched. So the doctrine has been: There shouldn't be any such thing as political surprise or strategic surprise, but tactical surprise is always possible.

In the first shock of seeing Russian troops just across the Bavarian border, this whole set of assumptions was called into serious question. But if anything, the events of August show that our warning doctrine stands up pretty well. We (and the Czechoslovaks) had eight months of quite visible political warning—the Soviets had been visibly distressed ever since Dubçek came into power. We had a number of weeks of strategic warning, as the Soviet forces got into position to threaten the Czech leaders with a military invasion.

As far as it went, therefore, our analysis in NATO was about right: the Soviets, we thought, were massing most of their strength in Eastern Europe on the Czech border. NATO correctly guessed that these very large military movements—the largest in Europe since the Second World War—were not aimed against NATO; they were designed either to pressure the Czechs or, if the pressure failed, to be ready for invasion. What we didn't know was whether they *would* invade—until they started to move, and told us they were moving. Certainly the military plan was laid long before all the negotiating and palavering in Warsaw, Cierna and Bratislava. But the political decision was evidently taken quite late in the game.

The Soviet military move was impressively rapid, well planned and well executed. It was of course massively overdone to meet the contingency of armed resistance: more than one-third of a million men, more than twenty-five ground divisions, some airlifted from as far away as the Baltic regions, and the occupation of all the large airfields in Czechoslovakia. Yet this efficient operation was in the service of an almost childishly sloppy political scenario.

The Soviets' poor political planning, and the passive but remarkable resistance of the Czechs, made quite a drama for a few

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days. The first quick assumption was that once the Soviets set their mind to it, the deed was as good as done. The troops rolled in, the airfields were taken, the borders sealed; then something went wrong. If the Soviets achieved tactical military surprise, the Czechs achieved a tactical political surprise by keeping their government in being and in motion—and in communication with the outside world. Czech diplomats remained busy and at work at the U.N. and in foreign capitals, still in touch with a government in Prague which astonishingly was neither controlled nor swept aside by the otherwise efficient Soviet forces. The Czechoslovak radio and press networks went underground, and the world could actually witness the arrival of Soviet tanks filmed by Czech television cameramen and relayed by the Czech television network to Eurovision.

In the end, that much power was bound to prevail—for the time being—over the stubborn, resourceful and embarrassing passive resistance of the Czech leaders and people. In a quick change of plans, the Soviets "negotiated" with their prisoners and elicited what amounted to an "invitation"—retroactively, with duress, in a communiqué issued not from Prague but from Moscow. Another arm-twisting negotiation in October confirmed Prague's agreement to a Soviet garrison of indefinite duration. Just how many Soviet troops will stay is not important: whatever troops the Soviets keep in Czechoslovakia will be enough to make sure they can bring more in whenever necessary. And they will stay as long as Moscow pleases.

IV

What does all this mean for Western security? The quick answer—too quick—is that détente is dead and the cold war is back on. Once again at a moment of doubt and disarray, the Soviets have done something to illustrate for the doubters the case for hanging together. Their take-over of Czechoslovakia in 1948 helped pass the Marshall Plan; the invasion of 1968 sidetracked the Mansfield Resolution and the Symington Amendment, which called for pulling U.S. troops out of Europe. But 1969 is not 1949 all over again.

In 1949 the communists thought one big war was inevitable. The Soviets were just testing their first atomic bomb, and thought they were in an arms race against us; now they (and we) find the race was really against time, and we both won it in the sense

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of achieving a capability for Assured Destruction no matter who strikes first. Then (in 1949), a would-be monolithic movement, run by one dictator, was promoting and presiding over world communism; now (in 1969) a collective leadership is busy trying to hang onto a dependable socialism-in-one-region. Then the Soviet empire was expanding; now its rulers are trying by force to prevent it from coming apart.

In short, the invasion of Czechoslovakia can be read as the latest and most dramatic spasm in the nervous decomposition of the "socialist commonwealth" and the attempt by its bosses to arrest the rot by repression. The result is a range of dangers, but also some opportunities, which are neither the cold war of our bygone fears nor the warm détente of our recent dreams.

The East-West military confrontation in Europe is certainly more acute than it was before. There are, quite simply, more Soviet troops, farther west, in a higher state of readiness than before last summer. It is true that the large Soviet troop movements were directed against their own allies and not against ours. But there is more to intentions than current plans of action. There are many ways in which turbulence and terror inside the Warsaw Pact area could spill over onto NATO's frontiers.

The collective decision to beef up NATO's military strength, and the national decisions to invest more men and money in NATO-committed forces, were caused less by the sudden rise in Soviet military readiness than by the quantum jump in uncertainty about Soviet behavior. If the Soviet leaders could misread as badly as they did their near neighbors, the Czechs, how well are they reading us today?

The disturbing fact is that we do not really know what the Soviet leaders have in mind. They have said all too clearly that they propose to hang onto their empire no matter what. But how big is the empire they have chosen to "defend"? How far beyond the Warsaw Pact does the "socialist commonwealth" extend? Rumania is hard-line communist on the inside; how independent an external policy can Bucharest get away with? Is Jugoslavia a link in the "chain of socialist states"? In whose "camp" do the Soviet leaders place Albania today—or will they tomorrow? Beyond communist rule there are other European lands not part of the NATO defense system which we have been assuming were safe from Soviet "protection" but where new anxieties have arisen.

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On the first day of the Czechoslovak crisis, a perceptive European made this relevant comment in a NATO meeting: "The Russians have said they're serious about protecting their harem, but they haven't said how big it is." Trying to limit it by preventive diplomacy, fifteen Foreign Ministers, meeting as the North Atlantic Council on November 16, warned the Soviets that any more interventions "would create an international crisis with grave consequences."

V

The first reaction of the North Atlantic Alliance to the mounting Czech crisis—before the invasion—was to watch carefully but lie low. Despite the big build-up of Warsaw Pact forces around Czechoslovakia, despite their vigorous manœuvres not far from NATO's borders, the political judgment (that this threat was directly against a Pact ally, not against the NATO alliance) led to agreed Allied policy: scrupulously to avoid giving the Russians any Western excuse to move into Czechoslovakia.

This restraint was not, as restraint so often is, the paralysis of timidity. It was a conscious policy consensus in the North Atlantic Council. It did not save the Czechs, of course; nor was it intended to. But the policy "worked" in the sense of helping to make ridiculously unbelievable the pathetic attempts to pin the ideological "crimes" of the Czechoslovak leaders on "imperialists" and other dark forces of external subversion.

When the Russians struck, NATO was readier for round-the-clock crisis management than it had ever been before. For one thing, when NATO's political headquarters was moved from Paris to Brussels in October 1967, the Council decided to build into the new headquarters a modern Situation Room, complete with up-to-date visual aids and serviced by a new NATO-wide communication system. And the Council's Committee of Political Advisers, in earlier times a once-a-week mutual information society, had been converted to an every-day "watch committee" producing overnight political assessments to guide NATO's military commanders. These facilities proved their value as the allies turned immediately to consulting together about what had happened, and what it meant for Western security.

The Council's first political decision after the invasion was to continue to lie low—to take some obvious precautions but not to imply by a noisy alert or mobilization that there was a sudden

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danger to the West. Nothing, it was felt, should be done to distract from the efforts to condemn the Soviet invasion in the U.N. Security Council.

But behind the scenes the invasion had brought into being a NATO work program of impressive and exhausting scope—a book of lessons learned from the invasion about Soviet logistics and mobility and tactics, a special inquiry into the "warning" issue, a reëstimate of Soviet intentions, a complex consultation about the dampening of East-West contacts, a study on the economic implications, a revision of plans for regional arms-control proposals, and a new look at NATO's force plans in the light of the new uncertainties. The first product of the intensive daily work—"drafting by night and tearing it to pieces by day"—emerged on September 4, when NATO's Defense Planning Committee (a euphemism for the North Atlantic Council when it meets without France) published a declaration marking the end of the "lie-low" policy. The statement reminded a suddenly attentive world of the defense-cum-détente policy formalized by NATO Ministers at their May and June meetings. Prospects for mutual force reductions having "suffered a severe setback," the NATO nations said they proposed to maintain their military capabilities, and announced a thorough assessment of NATO's forces in the light of "recent developments in Eastern Europe."

In effect, this was a pledge that there would be no reduction of forces pending comprehensive analysis and deliberate decision-making by the Council. It was needed as a stopgap policy because many of the allies were well into a process of trimming defense budgets, shaving their contributions to NATO, relaxing their readiness levels and neglecting standards for weapons and stocks. The natural urge to save money on the defense establishment had been reinforced by apparent symptoms of a growing détente.

VI

To shift gears, from reverse to forward, is hard enough inside a single government; in an international organization the task is compounded by a factor somewhat greater than the number of its members. An international organization moves by fits and starts, and the fits are called Ministerial meetings. Western Europe's first reaction to the Czech invasion was to assume that NATO would call a special meeting of Foreign and Defense

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Ministers—Chancellor Kiesinger even suggested a meeting at summit level—to stress Alliance solidarity and rebuild the Western defense system.

The other NATO nations began by looking to Washington for a cue. Somewhat to their surprise, Washington passed the initiative back to them: a great gathering of NATO Ministers would be useful only when each government had had time to give its allies "concrete indications" of what it thought it could do to enhance its contribution to the NATO defense system. We should know the denouement before turning on the drama.

None of the other potential leaders—the Germans, the British, the Italians—quite felt able to step forward and break the multilateral game of "Après vous, Alphonse." And the smaller allies, considering it a big crisis, thought the big countries should take the lead. Thus for a variety of reasons—all related to their internal politics—none of the members wanted to blow the opening whistle and suggest a new target for NATO-after-Czechoslovakia. Yet most said privately that they could do more for NATO if NATO asked for more to be done. The problem was to put together concrete national steps in the form of a "collective initiative" in which no member seemed to be out in front, and to which each member could respond. This was a job for the Council in Permanent Session. In time, with mutual prodding, there were enough "concrete indications" of added defense efforts to justify moving up to mid-November the regular December meeting of NATO Ministers.

It was a foregone conclusion that the collective Western defense system would have to be strengthened. As the meetings were held, the deficiencies unveiled, the plans for improvement laid and the cost of alertness calculated, a wide consensus was soon evident on what kind of collective response NATO should make. (The question of exactly who should do exactly what, for how much, at whose expense, naturally took a little longer.) Before the end of September, NATO's fourteen active defenders had decided that what was needed was not so much *more,* as *better* forces. If the Soviets are readier, NATO had better be readier. If Soviet behavior is less predictable, then NATO needed an even more flexible "flexible response" strategy, with all that implies for mobility and trained reserves and speed of reaction in a crisis.

NATO's force goals—part of a five-year defense-planning sys-

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tem to accompany the "flexible response"—are a blend of military requirements and the resources likely to be available. They have a built-in "carrot factor," or incentive gap, of about 10 percent between the feasible and the desirable. The post-Czechoslovakia plans are, by and large, to try to meet the full force goals immediately. Every NATO ally has latterly been below NATO standards of manning, equipment and training; the allies quickly agreed that each of them should try to meet the agreed standards. The Mobile Force that serves Allied Command Europe is to be enlarged. NATO-committed tactical air forces, which have been too largely reserved for the "least likely eventuality" of general nuclear war, are to be converted more rapidly for use in less glamorous but more relevant conventional roles—tactical bombing, close support, air defense, reconnaissance. And the much-discussed "transatlantic bargain," whereby the Europeans improve their capacity to mobilize ready reserves in a hurry and the North American members improve their capacity to provide air and ground reinforcements in a hurry, is also part of the "collective response."

Some of the new effort is being applied outside of Central Europe, which naturally got most of the attention at first because that was where Czechoslovakia happened to be. NATO was already planning, for example, to take on as an alliance responsibility the surveillance of Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean and to organize an "on call" NATO naval unit for special exercises and limited emergencies. New anxieties about the future of Jugoslavia and Albania stirred in NATO's Mediterranean allies an even livelier interest in organizing NATO-committed naval power so that it would be usable in something short of a general war. A NATO Command of Maritime Air Forces for the Mediterranean was officially established in November; its program will include use of some planes newly based by the United Kingdom in Malta, as well as those provided by the Italian and U.S. forces in the area.

Beefing up the NATO defense system is going to cost money, and much of the manœuvring by each ally to get the others to speak up first was occasioned by the enormous difficulty each government perceived in reversing a budget-cutting trend already well started between 1967 and 1968. In reporting their defense plans to NATO, the twelve participants other than the United States said last year they expected to spend upwards to $90 bil-

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lion over the five-year period 1968–72. Taken together, they have been using just under 5 percent of their Gross National Product for defense purposes. (We spend about 10 percent of our GNP for defense, but that of course includes the heavy budgetary burden of the war in Viet Nam; the "pure" U.S. contribution to NATO would run well under 2 percent, even if our Atlantic Navy and all our nuclear weapons in the theater are included.) But in 1968 our allies' spending was down to 4.5 percent of GNP. The first essential will be to turn this allied spending curve back up; for the allies other than the United States, a total expenditure of $100 billion, rather than $90 billion, might be a reasonable target over the next five years.

The new pledges of men, matériel and money, announced at the November 14 Ministerial meeting of NATO, were a big step in this direction. And for the first time in Alliance history, the lion's share—80 to 90 percent of the new effort—was contributed by the Europeans.

VII

The Soviet action in Czechoslovakia was a deep wound to the agreed Western policy of pursuing détente between East and West. During the last ten days of August every NATO country hastened to dampen contacts, postpone political visits and generally defer the building of East-West bridges. The Minnesota Band did not visit the Soviet Union, and the Red Army Choir was not heard in England. The Mayor of Moscow was shipped hurriedly out of The Hague. Ministers in half a dozen Western countries who had been preparing trips designed to bolster their personal contributions to peace, suddenly discovered urgent business at home. Diplomatic parties celebrating Polish Army Day, the Bolshevik Revolution and the like were boycotted by all but minor Western officials. The Italian fair in Moscow went on, but when in a show of business-as-usual the top Soviet leaders turned up as visitors, they found no Italian official of comparable rank had made the trip.

All these moves were the product of quick, instinctive agreement, made explicit in political consultations at NATO headquarters in Brussels; nobody wanted to be accused of acting chummy with the Warsaw Five in the fall of 1968. But how long should the period of mourning be? The more difficult policy choices are in the longer range.

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The rationale for all this East-West bridge building, all these cultural exchanges and reciprocal political visits, has been the underlying assumption that the limits of tolerance in Moscow would permit the highly differentiated impulses in Eastern Europe toward independence, toward internal reform, toward easier and closer relations with the West to help bring about gradually, and perhaps erratically, a sea change in the climate of East-West relations. This process was seen as a prerequisite for a renewed approach to the fundamental issues which have divided Europe for more than two decades; and it is only by resolving these fundamental issues that one can begin to think seriously about a "European security system" that is any improvement over a stalemated balance of military forces.

Assumptions of this sort were fundamental to West Germany's *Ostpolitik,* to France's decision to pull out of NATO's military work, to the British interest in an East-West "code of conduct," to the beginning of "special relationships" between several pairs of states on opposite sides of the dividing line, and to the Group of Ten—an informal small-country forum of NATO countries, Warsaw Pact members and European neutrals. The sense that things were loosening up in the East was equally fundamental to President Johnson's bridge-building policy; in a major policy speech October 7, 1967, he pressed Congress to act on U.S.-Soviet consular relations, loosened controls on East-West trade, allowed the Export-Import Bank to guarantee commercial credits to more East European countries and spoke of easing the Polish debt burden, helping the Fiat auto plant in Russia, liberalizing travel, completing the U.S.-Soviet civil air agreement and exchanging photographs taken from weather satellites.

The Russian leaders have now made it brutally plain that the efforts of the Dubçek régime to create a "socialist humanism" went well beyond the limits of their tolerance for change in Eastern Europe. If each step toward liberalization or closer relations with the West produces another turn of the repressive screw in the East, the NATO allies are face-to-face with an excruciating policy dilemma. Peacemaking efforts by Western leaders will run into more political criticism at home; "détente politics," which assisted many European Ministers to power, will lack the thrust it had in European politics before August 20.

The new obstacles to disarmament dealings with the communists are especially obvious. On August 20 NATO's hand was

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outstretched, holding a proposal to talk seriously with the Eastern allies about arms control in Europe. The desire for détente is so deep, in the domestic politics of the NATO allies, that this welcoming hand will probably not be clenched into a fist. But the staff work on "balanced and mutual force reductions," the building of models, the development of concrete proposals, are bound to be accorded a low priority within Western governments and in NATO until the Soviets give some sign that they are thinking hard about them too.

The sharpest dilemma of all presented itself when the Johnson Administration had to face the question of whether and when to talk to the Soviets about the limitation of strategic nuclear missiles and anti-missile systems. Before the invasion, Canada and our European partners were unanimous in urging us to get on with strategic arms limitation talks. Immediately after the invasion, just to set a date and begin such talks with the Soviets would have been widely resented. And it was not in the U.S.—or allied—interest to help the Soviets wipe out the stain of Czechoslovakia by conducting business as usual.

On the other hand, the case for trying to do something about the nuclear missile race, and do it soon, is simply overwhelming; subjects that even possibly bear on survival cannot long be postponed for the sake of appearances. We are at one of those historic moments when technology has made possible another great leap in history's costliest and most terrifying arms race: we have learned how to shoot at incoming missiles, and at the same time we have learned how to multiply the number of warheads in each offensive missile. If both the United States and the Soviet Union exploit to the limit the known technologies, the mutual escalation will add enormously to the cost, while if anything subtracting from the security each side would be trying to buy with the extra billions of dollars and rubles. We cannot know, from their mere agreement to talk, whether the Soviet leaders have at last concluded, or are open to persuasion, that the next phase of this arms race makes no more sense for them than it does for us. But if there is even a fractional possibility that we could get some agreement on this cosmic complex of life-and-death issues, it would be madness to pass it up.

VIII

It is too early to judge what the new Soviet doctrines, backed by Soviet forces, may do to the Western Alliance system in the

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long run, but it is already clear that the long run has been lengthened. Even before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it was apparent that no NATO ally was seriously proposing to avail itself of the provision by which signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty can, after the twentieth birthday of its coming into force —that is, after August 24, 1969—give one year's notice of withdrawal from its obligations and protections. The betting was that even France, which participates in political consultation while standing aside from the NATO defense system, would stay in the Alliance in its special way. Now, at a stroke, the Warsaw Five have solved what remained of the much-debated question: After 1969, what of NATO?

The authoritative answer was provided by the Foreign Ministers of NATO in the communiqué issued after their moved-up annual meeting. Skirting the kind of formal commitment that would constitute an amendment to the withdrawal clause of the Treaty (and would therefore have to be ratified by legislatures), the Ministers declared on November 16, 1968:

"The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to stand as the indispensable guarantor of security and the essential foundation for the pursuit of European reconciliation. By its Constitution the Alliance is of indefinite duration. Recent events have further demonstrated that its continued existence is more than ever necessary."

In what amounted to a concurring opinion, French Foreign Minister Michel Debré adapted some 1966 language of General de Gaulle to add that "unless events in the years to come were to bring about a radical change in East-West relations, the French Government considers that the Alliance must continue as long as it appears to be necessary." And Secretary of State Dean Rusk let it be known that the U.S. intention to stick with NATO "for the foreseeable future" was bipartisan U.S. policy checked out earlier that week with President-elect Nixon.

It also seems probable that this Alliance will continue, despite Czechoslovakia, to consider its task to be defense-cum-détente —the preservation of Western security as the essential basis for making peace with the East. In the midst of all the autumn talk about beefing up European defenses, the NATO allies had no difficulty at all in agreeing that "the only political goal consistent with Western values is that of secure, peaceful and mutually beneficial relations between East and West."

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But peacemaking takes two or more. The prospect for getting back on the road toward détente in Europe is deeply shadowed by the very fact of the Soviet invasion, no matter what happens next in Czechoslovakia itself. The Soviet fear of man's natural instinct for freedom will for some little time force NATO to concentrate, more than its members would prefer, on the peacekeeping side of its dual personality—while its latent peacemaking function awaits better days and brighter prospects.

The Russians may have the raw power to contain with tanks and terror the growing desire of the East Europeans for the decencies of freedom and the niceties of life. But repression cannot indefinitely smother expectations in the East which are produced, not by NATO's machinations but by the yearnings of people for a more humane society—nourished, to be sure, by the lively example of more liberal life in the West. A cartoon in a European newspaper last fall managed to say it all in a single caption. It showed a group of students and workers standing on a street corner, discussing politics with animation. In the background, two Russian commissars are wringing their hands, and one of them is saying to the other: "The trouble with all these people's democratic republics is that they seem to be producing democratic republican people."

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LESSONS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

By Anatole Shub

FOR the third time in a generation—1938, 1948, 1968—Czechoslovakia has transformed the political atmosphere of the civilized world. The eight-month "Prague spring," the Soviet invasion of August 20 and its grim consequences have stirred strong emotions throughout Europe and beyond. Not since the Hitler-Stalin Pact, perhaps, has the outrage at Kremlin policy been so general, embracing Richard Nixon and Herbert Marcuse, Chou En-lai and Josip Broz-Tito, Bertrand Russell and Yevgeni Yevtushenko, Luigi Longo and Paul VI.

However, the Soviet régime has in fact suffered many such "moral defeats," from its dispersal of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in 1918 to its intervention in Hungary in 1956. It has, then and now, shown less concern for "bourgeois morals" and for "formalistic juridical" concepts of international law than for power. Lenin crystalized its fundamental outlook in the famous question *Kto kovo?* (Who rules whom?) Stalin asked, "How many divisions has the Pope?" Brezhnev declared on the fiftieth anniversary of Bolshevik rule that Marxism-Leninism was the science of "how to win"—and the Soviet press after the invasion of Czechoslovakia did not hesitate to quote Bismarck: "Whoever rules Bohemia holds the key to Europe."

It is clearly tempting now for the West to consign the Czechoslovak experience to the archives of historical tragedies and lost causes. Yet the West would do so at its own peril. For Soviet conduct in the Czechoslovak crisis has challenged several of the most important assumptions on which Western policy has been tacitly based. These assumptions concern the evolution of communist rule in Russia and its dependencies; such concepts as the status quo and spheres of influence; and the orientation of American policy toward the conflict between Russia and China. These assumptions have never been fully shared by the handful of seasoned experts with thorough personal knowledge of the Soviet Union; but they have nevertheless permeated popular Western opinion and thus, to a large extent, determined the policies of Western governments.

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II

Surely the most striking aspect of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was the way it surprised even the closest observers. To be sure, many had perceived the danger of military intervention earlier in the summer—and particularly during the three tense weeks between the so-called Warsaw Letter (or ultimatum) of the Soviet leaders and their friends, and the climactic conferences at Cierna-nad-Tisou and Bratislava. Following these conferences, however, the entire world, including the Czechoslovak leaders themselves, believed that the crisis had been resolved by compromise agreement. This belief, consonant with the traditional rhythms of political crises over the centuries, proved completely false.

As Professor Leo Mates of Belgrade has observed, Czechoslovakia provided a case, virtually unique in modern history, where enormous military forces were unleashed *after* the climax in tension had passed, with scarcely any new preparation of world or Soviet domestic opinion for such drastic action. Professor Mates has stated the broad implications as follows: "If it is possible for unprovoked military intervention to follow negotiations and agreement, then the danger to peace is transferred to the domain of the unpredictable, which can but leave deep traces on the general behavior of states in international relations." For belief in the rationality, and therefore predictability, of Soviet as well as American conduct has been one of the pillars of international relations in the thermonuclear age.

Belief in Soviet predictability has been called into question not merely by the suddenness of the August 20 invasion but by the peculiar manner in which the decision to intervene appears to have been taken. There was the failure, both immediately before and for months after the invasion, to summon a plenary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. There was the prolonged silence of the nominally highest leaders of the party and state, none of whom seemed to wish to identify himself publicly with the actions taken. There were the persistent reports that the senior Politburo members respectively charged with supervising Soviet relations with foreign governments and foreign communist parties—Alexei Kosygin and Mikhail Suslov —were among those who had opposed the invasion. There was the insistence, all spring and summer, by the Czechs and Slovaks

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that their most implacable foes had been the supposedly "second line" Politburo members, the Ukrainian leader Pyotr Shelest and party secretary Andrei Kirilenko. And, of course, there was the startling Soviet turnabout toward Alexandre Dubçek—embraced publicly by Brezhnev in Bratislava on August 3, arrested on August 21, anathemized by *Pravda* next day as a "right-wing opportunist" who had "betrayed socialism," brought secretly to Russia under armed guard, and then released on August 26 as a signatory of the Moscow "agreement."

These and other curious circumstances provoke two disturbing observations. First, the mysteries of Soviet decision-making appear even more inscrutable than during the Stalin era. For Stalin was an absolute ruler, and a careful reading of his personality and doctrines offered an accurate guide to perceptive statesmen of the calibre of Churchill and de Gaulle. There is no such personality today, and Soviet doctrines (including the most recent attempts to preach a "collective sovereignty") are more than ever impromptu, inconsistent rationalizations of actions hastily decided in the stress of internal and international struggle.

Second, collective leadership in the Kremlin is not, as some had thought, "intrinsically" and under all circumstances a force for conservatism and caution in Soviet policies, and therefore an element of stability in the world. In the crisis over Czechoslovakia, such leadership, anonymous as well as secret, proved to be a factor of instability, capable of generating rash, abrupt and objectively inexplicable turns. Indeed, for the foreign analyst seeking to discern Soviet intentions as well as capabilities, the current system of Soviet government—which one East European observer has labeled a system of "collective irresponsibility"—may well be the most dangerous possible. For it offers neither the relative clarity and continuity of traditional autocracy (Tsarist or Stalinist) nor the safeguards provided by an open society with autonomous, countervailing institutions and a free press. It need hardly be added that a system capable of such surprises as the invasion of August 20 is inherently capable of other surprises no less unpleasant. Not the least unfortunate consequence of the Soviet action will be to revive the "Pearl Harbor complex" among large sections of American public opinion.

Yet, even without the element of surprise, even had the Soviet armies marched a month earlier (that is, just after the Warsaw ultimatum), there would be ample grounds for rethinking more

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basic Western ideas on Soviet development. The most important such assumption has been the traditional liberal faith in the inevitability of progressive evolution of Soviet Russia after the death of Stalin.

To some degree, this faith was based on a misreading, or faulty memory, of George F. Kennan's measured hopes (expressed in this journal in 1947 and 1951) for an eventual "mellowing of Soviet power" and "erosion from despotism." Ambassador Kennan carefully grounded these hopes on the condition that the West found "the strength and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years." The policy of containment, as viewed by its author, involved not merely or even mainly an American arms race with the Soviet Union, but an unstinting political effort "to release and make effective all those forces in the world which, together with our own, can serve to convince the masters of the Kremlin that their grand design is a futile and unachievable one, persistence in which promises no solution of their own predicaments and dilemmas."

From the felicitous nouns "mellowing" and "erosion" rather than from Kennan's actual analysis, and under the impact of the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress and the peculiar charm of Nikita Khrushchev, it was, unfortunately, but a short step to illusions and pseudo-Marxist theories predicting that Soviet power would soon "mellow" and "erode" of itself. From 1956 onward, it was increasingly imagined that this withering of the Bolshevik essence would take place merely under the impact of the arms race, or of limited measures of arms control—without the West's playing its side of the political court, and with rhetorical expressions of willingness to negotiate in place of concrete, serious proposals for the future of the area in which the cold war originated: Central and Eastern Europe. It was largely believed that, however the United States might become absorbed in Southeast Asian jungles, Russia was progressing irreversibly toward rationality, restraint and traditional norms in its foreign policies, as well as toward more humane and responsive government of its own subjects.

To be sure, there were Hungary and Cuba, two Berlin crises and the ugliness of the Pasternak affair; yet these were viewed as unfortunate throwbacks to a Stalinist past which could never be revived. For each step backward (it was argued), there had been —or would be sooner or later—two steps forward. For the Soviet

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Union had advanced from famine and scarcity to relative economic abundance; the old Stalinist ideology had lost credibility and relevance; and the new generation of scientists, managers and technocrats was gradually compelling changes in the Soviet economic system which in turn would force modification of the political dictatorship.

Such beliefs captured popular imagination not merely because they suited universal hopes but because they contained more than a grain of truth. The Soviet ideology is, indeed, virtually indistinguishable from a crude, xenophobic Russian nationalism, and (as both cause and effect) the world communist movement is in a state of fairly rapid decomposition. The younger generation in Russia is largely free of both the misguided fervor and particular neuroses of its elders, who made and survived Stalin's bloody experiments. The Soviet intelligentsia, as its attitude toward Czechoslovakia showed, is as alienated from official policies as the Russian intelligentsia of a century ago. Straining for supremacy in armaments and space, Russia is losing the peaceful economic competition with the West which Khrushchev proclaimed; and, the longer her rulers resist profound social and political reforms, the more difficult and painful such reforms may have to be.

Nevertheless, despite changes, actual Kremlin policies over the last fifteen years have by no means conformed to a simple pattern of "two steps forward, one step back." A close reëxamination of the period since Stalin's death discloses three distinct phases: the great steps forward, crowned and symbolized by the Twentieth Congress, which took place almost immediately, in the disarray of the struggle over the succession; the seven years from the first Sputnik in October 1957 to the fall of Khrushchev, which witnessed sharply contradictory trends, now liberal and realistic, now dogmatic and adventurous, both at home and abroad; the Brezhnev period, which apart from modest corrections of some of Khrushchev's "hare-brained schemes" in economic management, has been marked by steady regression to Stalinist principles and methods in nearly all fields. If the publication in 1962 of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* was rightly regarded as a sign of hope, the systematic persecution of that gifted writer since 1965 must be viewed with alarm. If the nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov's underground blueprint for peaceful coexistence disclosed serious

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political dissent among the Soviet scientific élite, then it should be recalled that, after Sakharov hailed the Czechoslovak experiment, the Politburo and Red Army crushed it.

To be sure, a full-fledged return to the mass terror and paranoia of the Stalin years still appears improbable. Yet the current régime in the Kremlin is as clearly a deliberate "restoration" of the "old days" as the reign of Alexander III embodied a conscious effort to reimpose the autocratic order of Nicholas I.

There are all too many explanations for the current regression. The Soviet Union is a great power stubbornly embattled on two fronts, Western and Chinese; its rulers fear that any domestic disarray would be exploited by their rivals abroad. The Soviet state is also a multinational empire, in which harsh centralism appears the simplest response to nationalist stirrings on the periphery. The ruling generation of Soviet politicians is one of particular mediocrity, for it consists of precisely those members of the party, state and police apparatus capable of surviving or rising during Stalin's blood purges. The older generations of the intelligentsia were even more thoroughly decimated, terrorized or corrupted, so that their juniors lack leaders. In fact, two world wars, the civil war, two emigrations, successive purges and leveling economic policies have "decapitated" Russian society as no other in modern history, destroying or atomizing the very groups and classes which elsewhere (including nineteenth-century Russia) set moral and cultural standards and were the bearers of liberal ideas.

Among the great Soviet masses, there has been a paralysis or atrophy of what might be called the political sense—the ability of an individual to relate the grim, inchoate details of social life to a larger, coherent political framework and to draw independent conclusions in theory and practice. This political sense, as well as the capacity for civil courage, has been deadened by decades of demeaning propaganda, censorship, police control, exaltation of brutality and thorough isolation from the living world outside. It is the kind of atrophy familiar to students of postwar Germany, where the "middle generation" was (with very few exceptions) hopelessly disoriented by only twelve years of Hitler, Goebbels and Himmler.

The disorientation in Russia is even more grave after half a century; and it is a kind of miracle that young men like Pavel Litvinov and Yuri Galanskov have nevertheless arisen to reënact the lonely protests and martyrdom of the first radical "circles"

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in Tsarist Russia a century ago. Yet such young men are relatively few, and those who sympathize with them are inhibited not merely by the sanctions of the Party and the KGB but by the indifference of the Soviet masses to purely political issues so long as the régime can continue the slow but steady raising of material standards.

All of this suggests that the prospects for positive evolution in Russia should be regarded with greater patience and caution; that neither technology, "prosperity" nor young people automatically produce significant political change in the short run; that the very existence of profound contradictions and rising libertarian aspirations in Russia may well (as they did a century ago) lead its rulers to repression rather than reform; and that a reassertion of police power, some form of military rule, or a new "strongman" must be considered as being at least as possible over the next decade as the "erosion from despotism" or the "violent upthrust of liberty" which Ambassador Kennan discussed at the dawn of the cold war. These may yet come to pass; but after the Czechoslovak experience, it would seem prudent to err on the side of pessimism.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia has also undermined a popular belief that liberalization in Eastern Europe could precede and compel change in the Soviet Union itself. This belief, based partly on the survival of certain East European traditions, partly on the indisputable appeal of Titoism, nevertheless ran counter to the facts of 1955–56, when it was Khrushchev, with his rehabilitation of Tito, spirit of Geneva and de-Stalinization at the Twentieth Congress, who set off the dramatic events in Hungary and Poland. The Czechoslovak experience shows even more clearly that the influence of Eastern Europe on the Kremlin is either limited or perverse. While the East German rebels of 1953 and the Hungarians of 1956 stood virtually alone, the Prague reformers in 1968 enjoyed the support of an "arithmetical majority" in Eastern Europe. They were openly supported by the communist governments of Rumania and Jugoslavia, covertly supported by Hungary, and enjoyed (for what that was worth) the indifference of Bulgaria and benevolent neutrality of Albania. None of this made any difference.

Indeed, a kind of Gresham's Law operated in the Eastern camp, with the dogmatists of occupied East Germany and Poland able to arouse the decisive support in Moscow of the forces of Soviet

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hegemonism and neo-Stalinism. Neither the legal, bloodless character of the Czechoslovak revolution nor the Prague Communists' repeated assurances of loyalty to the Warsaw Pact affected the outcome. It is realistic to assume, therefore, that no great change is possible in Eastern Europe without corresponding change in Russia itself—so long, that is, as the West (as in 1953, 1956 and 1968) refrains from trying to influence directly Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe.

III

There is no more thorny thicket in which to wander, in discussions of the cold war, than the complex of unexamined assumptions and ground rules conveyed by the phrases "status quo" and "spheres of influence." There is no need here to dwell on the particular controversies aroused by past misunderstandings (such as what did or did not happen at Yalta) or long-standing contradictions (such as the Allied refusal to recognize the Oder-Neisse frontier). It is sufficient to state broadly what has been the dominant Western view, namely:

(1) That the aim of Western policy, in Europe and elsewhere, is the preservation and perfection of the existing order until such time as the Kremlin may be prepared to discuss more just arrangements.

(2) That in Europe this status quo involves a clear line of East-West demarcation (originally drawn from Stettin to Trieste, now partitioning Berlin as well as Germany and rather fuzzy in Southeastern Europe).

(3) That, rightly or wrongly, the communist-ruled nations of Eastern Europe form a Soviet game preserve, or sphere of influence, on which the West can impinge only marginally through conventional diplomatic, commercial and cultural exchange.

These assumptions largely determined the Western stance toward Czechoslovakia in 1968. They were shown there to be highly dubious, if not self-defeating. In the summer of 1968, what in fact *was* the status quo in Czechoslovakia? Was it the free, open society created by the communist reformation between January and April? Was it the Czechoslovakia of Novotny's last five years—clearly in the throes of decisive metamorphosis? Was it the era of pure Stalinism, which led the country to economic ruin and its communists to total disillusion by the early 1960s? Or was the status quo in Czechoslovakia that which had been

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defined in the Yalta period—namely, the Benes-Gottwald coalition régime of 1944–47, which represented the model for the most extreme aspirations of the non-party "counterrevolutionaries" of 1968? Only if Stalinism is considered the eternal norm can the Soviet intervention properly be called a defense of the status quo.

In fact, the crisis enabled the Soviet Union to make at least one very important change in the state of affairs which had existed since the end of the war. Between 1945 and 1968, Czechoslovakia had been free of Soviet occupation troops. As a result of the undeterred invasion of August 20, however, the Western powers will now be confronted indefinitely with a minimum of six Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia, possessing the most modern Russian equipment. These forces may not greatly alter the overall strategic balance between the United States and Russia. However, like the steady attrition of Allied rights in Greater Berlin since 1945, the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia has considerably reduced the Allies' capacity for diplomatic manœuvre along the most critical sector of the East-West line.

The inadequacy of "status quo" thinking is even more evident in considering the current object of Kremlin pressures, Rumania. Which status quo should Soviet power be permitted to restore there in place of the increasingly independent Rumania of 1964–68? The loyal but unoccupied Rumania of 1958–63? Or the Rumania occupied and controlled by Soviet armed forces before 1957? All may hope that Soviet pressures remain nonmilitary. Yet it should be recognized that the reëntry of Soviet troops into Rumania, a decade or more after their withdrawal, would surely create a new and serious threat to independent Jugoslavia—and (given Bulgaria's traditional posture) probably to Greece and Turkey as well.

It will doubtless be argued that, whatever the wishes of its rulers or people, historically Rumania has, like Czechoslovakia, become part of the acknowledged Soviet sphere of influence. This sphere was most candidly defined by Stalin when he told Djilas in 1944 that each side imposed its system as far as its armies could march. It was formalized by Khrushchev's organization of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. Its immutability has been tacitly accepted by the West in the belief that organization of Europe into two neat military blocs provides greater security than any attempt to risk the free play of political change.

Several objections must be made to this view. First, the frozen

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bloc system leaves at least four nations—Finland, Albania, Austria and Jugoslavia—in an anomalous position. The West has no obligations whatever to Finland or Albania; and to Austria, only the obligation to consult among the Big Four. Jugoslavia's position is ambiguous. There is no formal Western commitment to its independence; yet the establishment of Soviet military power on the Adriatic could hardly be tolerated. There are grounds here for tragic miscalculation.

Second, permanent acceptance of Soviet control over the Warsaw Pact nations not merely forecloses significant internal change within them but condemns all Europe to the dangers and frustrations arising from the unnatural division of that continent. There have been three major crises over Berlin in the past two decades, and there is little reason to suppose that the Kremlin and its East German agents will not try again. Soviet policy toward West Germany itself has been disquieting. Although Khrushchev sought in 1955 and again in 1964 to open a dialogue with Bonn, his successors have reverted to Stalin's tragic "the worse, the better" strategy of the 1930s. Moscow has done all in its power to keep West Germany in a state of frustration and tension indefinitely, with the obvious hope of stimulating the sort of right-wing nationalist reaction which would either isolate Bonn morally from its allies, or lead to the fulfillment of the eternal dream of anti-Western reactionaries in both Germany and Russia—another Tauroggen, Rapallo or Hitler-Stalin Pact in which the price for some relief of legitimate German national aspirations would be the expulsion of Western influence beyond the Rhine.

Yet, even should these Stalinist tactics toward Germany fail, acceptance of the division of Europe into two hostile armed camps, with no reasonable hope for an abatement of the cold war, involves the condemnation of yet new generations (in the United States as well as Europe) to a future without horizons—to the lifelong strain of the ever costlier, deadlier armaments race. Quite apart from the danger of nuclear and rocket accidents, such prolongation of cold-war frustrations can breed all too easily among the young a spirit of nihilism which might well foster irresponsible illusions or dangerous adventures. Memory is short; and already to "new left" and anarchist students in 1968, the cold war was some kind of myth conjured up by the Western "Establishment" rather than the tragic result of the Soviet armed presence in the heart of Europe.

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Finally, Western acquiescence in permanent Soviet rule east of the Elbe may well be, over the long run, a prescription for ultimate suicide on a global scale. For Western respect for the Soviet sphere of influence has been a purely one-sided undertaking. The Kremlin has not hesitated, whenever opportunities arose, to move into areas formerly part of the Western sphere. Despite the Monroe Doctrine, the Kremlin took advantage of the Cuban Revolution to win a new ally and create a center of Latin American mischief ninety miles from the U.S. coast. Similarly, in the wake of three Israeli-Arab wars, the Soviet Union has gained a political influence in the Middle East and a naval presence in the Mediterranean previously denied to both the Tsars and Stalin. Nor did Khrushchev's successors hesitate to pour an estimated billion dollars annually into Vietnamese communist military operations which, by enmeshing the United States in a hopeless quagmire, produced deep fissures in American society itself.

Similar opportunities will doubtless occur in the future, if only in the undeveloped world, where the population explosion, tribalism, falling raw material prices and the inadequacy of received tradition are an invitation to demagogy and adventurism. Yet even in the West, the stability, prosperity and alliance of the last two decades have not been divinely decreed as eternal. It does not take great imagination to foresee all sorts of possible crises in the future—American absorption in domestic racial conflict, a breakdown in the world monetary system, new civil conflict in Spain, war over Cyprus, political instability in France or Italy. Can anyone doubt that the Kremlin would seek to exploit any such opportunities—as well as the certain emergence of new Castros, Lumumbas and Sukarnos—to the maximum disadvantage of the West?

Peace rests ultimately on a balance of power which is political as well as military. The political balance is a subtle tissue composed of diverse elements including hope and will; and it can collapse as rapidly as the Versailles system did between 1934 and 1938. The longer the Kremlin is free to scavenge among the unresolved conflicts of the West and the Third World, while its occupation of half of Europe is permanently guaranteed, the greater the danger that sooner or later the precarious political balance will be upset. Even the best football team cannot indefinitely survive a game in which its adversaries are entitled to re-

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cover all its fumbles as well as all their own, and in which movement is permanently restricted to one end of the field.

In such a perspective, and especially when the United States has begun to weary of "playing the world's policeman," the time has surely come to reappraise the West's thoughtless and inconsistent passivity toward the future development of Central and Eastern Europe; and to elaborate, with the aid of the genuine democratic forces in Germany as well as the independent neutral states of Europe, a constructive and realistic approach to the problem of a German peace treaty. The details of concrete proposals are clearly beyond the scope of this article, but they would inevitably involve modification of the existing bloc system as well as some measure of disengagement of American and Soviet forces from Central Europe. Although in the present mood of Kremlin intransigence no such proposals would soon be accepted, they are necessary to clarify European realities—to isolate irrational, chauvinistic elements in Germany and Poland as well as in Russia, and to provide future Soviet leaders with an honorable alternative to the present Germanophobia and military rule of Eastern Europe.

At the same time, it would be tragic if the West did not now realize the necessity of framing a qualitatively different response for the next "Czechoslovakia" or "Hungary," with regard both to the Rumanian case already at hand and to future eventualities. It is neither necessary nor desirable to return to the "dirty tricks" approach symbolized by the Albanian "insurrection" entrusted by Western statesmen to Kim Philby; nor to the misleading "liberation" propaganda conducted by some Western radio stations in the 1950s; nor indeed to any form of interference, overt or covert, in the internal affairs of East European nations.

However, if and when in future the legitimate authorities of any of the East European nations make clear their desire for greater independence, the West should be prepared, swiftly and decisively, to deter Kremlin reprisals by extending to such nations the same assistance and protection which it offered to Jugoslavia in 1948. What is required is neither military bases, pacts nor conspiracies, neither restoration of the old order nor utopian promises—but prompt, vigorous defense of the right to independence and nonalignment of communist as well as other sovereign states.

The largest of the independent communist states is, of course, China.

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IV

In the Balkans, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend;" and in the days of Aristotle and Machiavelli, Metternich and Bismarck, it was a principle of statecraft that, if a great power had two adversaries, it supported the weaker against the stronger, accepting the risk of abetting a potential future menace in order to check the immediate one. Future historians may well be perplexed as to why the United States, in the 1950s and 1960s, failed to apply this principle to the growing divergence between Russia and China, indeed, bemused itself with the notion that the good offices of a benign Kremlin would be required to cope with Peking.

The future researcher will discover many irrational elements: the remnants of "yellow peril" prejudice; the trauma of America's disappointed love affair with China; the tragic persecution of the very experts who predicted, in 1944–45, that the Chinese Communists would both win the civil war and prove independent of Russia; the skill of Khrushchev in persuading the West—even while he was launching two Berlin crises, meddling in the Congo and installing missiles in Cuba—that the Kremlin stood for peaceful coexistence while China was aggressively bent on world revolution.

The historian will also be obliged to wade through mountains of quotations, culled from Chinese periodicals and interpreted by Western analysts, to draw the most frightening conclusions about Chinese reality. He will inevitably be struck, however, by the contrast between Peking's wild words and its relatively sober deeds.

For Peking's actual performance on the international stage has been that of a power with discreet and limited aims. Mao has made no attempt to impose his system as far as his armies could march, nor to create subservient vassal states corresponding to the Soviet "sphere of influence." In the Korean War, Chinese troops intervened only after MacArthur reached the Yalu, and only in sufficient strength to restore the prewar partition. The Chinese forces were withdrawn from North Korea a few years afterwards, in contrast to the "temporary" Soviet Army still present in Hungary. In the two border clashes with India, Chinese forces made limited advances in accordance with Peking's historic view of the frontier controversy. China did not seize or claim any territory historically and indisputably Indian.

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In Viet Nam, China made no attempt to intervene directly, either in the "French" or the "American" phases of the war, although Viet Nam is as close and "vital" to China as Czechoslovakia is to Russia. Furthermore, the Chinese doctrine of "relying on one's own forces" was an explicit admonition to the Vietnamese Communists that they alone should make their revolution, and a firm rejection of the Soviet thesis that all authentic revolutions require "fraternal aid" and a guiding hand from the "international communist movement" (*i.e.* the Kremlin and, when possible, the Red Army).

The West automatically echoed the Soviet view that the Chinese "cultural revolution" was a lurch toward radicalism and "leftist" extremism, with some Western analogists immediately recalling Stalin's purges of the 1930s. However, several important facts cast doubt on such interpretations. The revolution was accompanied by the final rejection of Brezhnev's appeals for "unity of action" against the United States. Its principal victims in the leadership were precisely those most firmly dedicated to military alliance with Russia (Teng Hsiao-ping, Liu Shao-chi, Lo Jui-ching, Peng Chen). Its principal survivors thus far have been Chou En-lai, Chen Yi and others previously considered more moderate, flexible and realistic.

There is room for legitimate controversy over many aspects of Chinese policy, but certain fundamentals should at last be clearly recognized: China is (like Jugoslavia) an independent communist state which has made its own revolution and successfully resisted Soviet hegemony. Its foreign policies have been no more aggressive, provocative or irrational than those of the Kremlin. The injuries its leaders have received at the hands of the Soviet Union are more recent, personal and vivid than those inflicted by the United States. Although China might eventually acquire the potential to inflict military damage on the United States, the Soviet Union already possesses the capacity to obliterate the United States and all its major allies. While the conflict between Moscow and the West over Germany and Eastern Europe involves historic dilemmas of unusual complexity (not susceptible to easy solution even with the best of will on all sides), the single outstanding issue between the United States and China—the future status of Formosa—might far more readily yield to compromise in the course of a broadening dialogue.

This is not to suggest that the United States, having uncon-

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sciously opted for the Soviet side in the Moscow-Peking dispute, should now consciously swing to the other extreme and uncritically embrace China as a noble ally against unholy, incurable Muscovy. Certainly the United States should have no part of Chinese territorial claims against Russia. The door should always remain open to Russia to reach honorable settlements of issues great and small, on the basis of principles once proclaimed in Moscow as well as Bandung and Peking: peaceful coexistence, sovereignty, national independence, mutual respect and noninterference.

Nevertheless, there is little to be lost, and much to be gained, in according to China treatment fully equal to that given the Soviet Union in recent years. This involves respect for Chinese pride, for Chinese civilization and for the genuine accomplishments (as distinguished from the follies) of the communist government. It involves conscious, patient efforts to end China's isolation and restore its rightful place in the international community (*i.e.* normal diplomatic relations and a permanent seat in the Security Council). It involves serious, direct negotiations on the problem of Formosa. In short, the President of the United States should be as ready to treat with Chou En-lai as with Khrushchev, Kosygin and their successors.

Such efforts are long overdue in any case, and the end of the Viet Nam war should make them politically feasible. The Czechoslovak tragedy will not have been completely in vain if it serves to bring Washington and Peking closer in recognition of a common interest in containing Soviet hegemonial ambitions. More than perhaps any other single step, the pursuit of good relations with China might help the United States ultimately to persuade the masters of the Kremlin that their grand design is futile and unachievable—and that such actions as the repression of Czechoslovakia lead neither to the "inevitable triumph of Marxism-Leninism" nor to a global condominium of the two superpowers, but to dismal isolation.

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INTELLIGENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY: DILEMMAS OF A DEMOCRACY

By William J. Barnds

WITH the obvious exception of Viet Nam, nothing the U.S. Government has done in recent years in the field of foreign policy has created so much controversy as its intelligence operations, especially the secret subsidizing of private American institutions. The sinking of the *Liberty* with the loss of 34 American lives during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the capture of the *Pueblo* by North Korea in 1968 brought home to the American public the dangers involved in one type of intelligence collection and embarrassed an already beleaguered Administration. Of all the U.S. intelligence organizations, the Central Intelligence Agency has been the most vociferously attacked. It has been accused of perpetrating the 1967 Greek coup, arranging the death of Ché Guevara and even fanning the flames of the recent student riots in Mexico as a means of influencing the Mexican Government to adopt an anti-Castro stance in hemispheric affairs.

Some critics of CIA view it as omnipotent and evil; others attack it as bumbling and incompetent. Although only a minority accepts either of these extreme characterizations, many Americans and foreigners are concerned about CIA's activities, and they are far from reassured by repeated official statements that it is an efficient and fully controlled instrument of the U. S. Government. The CIA has undoubtedly contributed more than other agencies to the alienation from the U. S. Government of an important segment of the academic-intellectual community and of young people; the arrival of its recruiters on a college campus is more likely to start a student riot than those of any other institution—with the possible exception of talent scouts from the Dow Chemical Company.

Present attitudes toward CIA represent a sharp departure from the situation a decade ago. Yet in the immediate postwar years there was considerable uneasiness about establishing such an organization. To do so seemed undemocratic and out of keeping with American traditions. Many Americans regarded spying as a dirty business, and looked on interfering in the internal affairs of other nations as inconsistent with our professed

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principles of nonintervention. Yet agreement slowly emerged that if the United States was to protect its interests and fulfill its international responsibilities in a harsh environment it had little choice but to engage in such activities.

This consensus, like so many others, has now vanished. Therefore it is appropriate to consider why CIA was created, how an intelligence agency operates, the relationship of intelligence activities to foreign policy, and the difficulties and dilemmas (as well as the capabilities) such an institution creates for a democracy which is also a major power.

II

The collapse of Soviet-American coöperation late in World War II gradually convinced most Americans that Soviet communism posed a critical challenge to U. S. security. The development of the cold war and the withdrawal of the European colonial powers from Asia made it clear that this country could not escape a much deeper involvement in world politics than had formerly been the case in peacetime. Complex and difficult decisions had to be made on a bewildering variety of issues in a rapidly changing international environment. The United States was becoming involved in areas of the world about which it knew next to nothing. It was uncertain about the capabilities and intentions of both friendly and unfriendly nations—and sometimes not sure which was which. The implications of the scientific revolution for world politics and military affairs were difficult to discern with any clarity, and the relationships between American interests in different parts of the world were obscure.

It soon became apparent that the United States lacked not only a foreign policy adequate to cope with this new situation but even the institutions within the U. S. Government necessary to develop and carry out an effective policy. Institutions and procedures had to be established which would enable the President to bring together the key U. S. officials who dealt with the various aspects of foreign policy to consider the relevant facts, weigh the alternative courses of action, make the necessary policy decisions and see that they were carried out. The result was the National Security Act of 1947, which created the National Security Council to help the President formulate foreign policy and established the Department of Defense as a step toward unification of the armed forces. This Act also created the Central In-

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telligence Agency; it was the nation's first separate peacetime intelligence organization.

Those responsible for U. S. foreign policy in this period felt keenly the need for more and better information on many unfamiliar areas and problems, and they decided that the task of providing much of this information should rest with men who had no direct policy responsibilities and thus no position to support, no interest to defend. American leaders also concluded that the United States needed an organization able to perform certain tasks in the execution of policy that fell between the traditional instruments of foreign policy and the open use of armed force. Thus CIA was given three general functions: (1) to gather information by covert as well as overt means; (2) to combine the information it collects with that of other agencies, to evaluate it and to present it in useful form to the policy-makers; and (3) to be prepared to intervene covertly in the affairs of other nations when so directed.[1]

The communist seizure of power in China and Peking's involvement in the Korean War greatly intensified the cold war. This led to a major expansion of U.S. military forces and of CIA and other U. S. intelligence organizations. A less tangible but perhaps more important effect of the communist gains in East Asia, coming so quickly after the imposition of communist rule on Eastern Europe, was to create in American minds the image of a worldwide movement of incredible unity and dynamism pressing hard on a disunited and weak non-communist world. America was the only serious obstacle to even more dramatic communist gains, and American leaders were determined that this country would not fail in its responsibilities as it had after the First World War.

When uneasy stalemates developed in Europe and East Asia, the struggle between the communist bloc and the West shifted to Asia and Africa. In view of the inherent weaknesses and immense problems of most Afro-Asian countries, few people were confident that communism could be successfully combatted in

[1] CIA was thus the central element of the intelligence community, and the Director of Central Intelligence was made responsible for coördinating the intelligence activities of the U.S. Government. The intelligence community is now composed of CIA, the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence Research, the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency (which is responsible for communications intelligence), the intelligence components of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and—on certain matters—the intelligence units of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

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all these lands. CIA was assigned an important part of the task of turning back the communist offensive—partly because in the atmosphere of those years Congress would not have openly provided funds for those liberal or leftist groups which were often the most effective in opposing the communists. U. S. covert operations during the late 1940s and the early 1950s were successful in a variety of situations. CIA was generally regarded as something new, exciting and effective, and it stood rather high in public esteem.

Simultaneously, the advent of hydrogen weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles made it of crucial importance that the U. S. Government have reasonably accurate knowledge about enemy capabilities. Fortunately, the technological revolution which led to the development of such weapons also made it possible to develop means of penetrating the Soviet veil of secrecy. The U-2, reconnaissance satellites and electronic intercept stations around the edges of the communist world enabled the United States steadily to increase its knowledge of the Soviet military establishment.

These technological advances first came to public attention in connection with the U-2, which was an invaluable instrument of intelligence gathering until it was shot down on the eve of the 1960 Summit meeting. The U-2 affair, followed by the spectacular failure of the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961, ended the relative immunity of such operations from public criticism. Those members of Congress who had long been convinced that the legislators should exercise a more formal and extensive control over CIA renewed their push for creation of a Joint Committee on Intelligence. The press began to take a more critical view of American intelligence operations, and gradually became eager to disclose information about them. From then on there were periodic revelations of past U. S. intelligence operations, and after each disclosure there was a new outcry for more control over CIA and less reliance on it. (It was only among the novelists and television producers that the intelligence agent remained the hero par excellence.)

The more critical public attitude was also stimulated by changes in this country and abroad and by the impact these developments had on American views of the world. The Sino-Soviet split, the declining intensity of the U.S.-Soviet conflict (especially after the Cuban missile confrontation), the growing

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awareness that the intense nationalism of the Asian and African nations limited communist prospects in these countries, and the upheavals in China gradually convinced many Americans that the external dangers were declining. By the time Viet Nam had reached crisis proportions, the case for according higher priority to domestic affairs was winning growing support, especially among young people. To them Stalin was but a name from the past, and the Cuban missile crisis was either a blurred memory or was looked upon as an aberration in Soviet policy. In this atmosphere the revelation in 1967 that CIA had been supporting the National Student Association and other private institutions led to such bitter and sustained attacks on the U. S. Government and on CIA as to force a basic reëxamination of American intelligence activities.

Perhaps the most important lesson of these events was to make it clear that even supposedly secret intelligence organizations do not and cannot operate outside and apart from the American milieu or mood. Clearly, American attitudes toward intelligence activities are closely related to the public view of the external dangers facing the United States and the foreign policy the nation should pursue. Yet today the task of reaching even general agreement on these matters is most difficult. As the danger is seen less clearly, confusion concerning U. S. goals has correspondingly increased. The United States is coöperating with the U.S.S.R. on some issues and competing with it in others. The decline in many Americans' fear of communism and the lack of agreement on foreign policy has led many to argue that covert operations should be drastically curtailed if not eliminated. This raises the question whether the intelligence community can continue to perform effectively without some degree of consensus as to the threat we face.

III

Although CIA's covert operations have received most public attention and criticism because of their dramatic nature, far greater resources are devoted to the less spectacular effort of collecting, analyzing and reporting intelligence. These activities permeate the entire foreign-policy process; important policy decisions and the allocation of billions of dollars often depend on the judgments and conclusions reached by U. S. intelligence organizations. In such circumstances, intelligence judgments

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inevitably become involved in domestic political controversies.

It is simple to state the formal responsibilities and to describe the work, varied and voluminous though it is, of the U. S. intelligence community in the area of intelligence production as distinct from operations. It is to give the policy-makers judgments as to what the situation actually is in the world at any given time, what it will be in the future, and (to a degree) what the implications of such judgments are. A task simple to state, but awesome to contemplate. Historians dispute the meaning of past events, students of contemporary affairs are seldom wholly persuasive when they describe current events and their implications, and the difficulties of forecasting even general trends are obvious to all who have tried it and remember their record.

To carry out its responsibilities the U. S. intelligence community has become one of the largest consumers and producers of information in the world today—and thus in history. It gathers masses of facts, rumors and opinions by reading everything from *Pravda* to the cables of U. S. missions abroad and the reports of secret agents, and from the photographs taken by satellites to the information gleaned from National Security Agency reports. Even though much of this information goes no farther than the intelligence analysts themselves, the intelligence organizations regularly produce a variety of reports (National Intelligence Estimates, daily and weekly intelligence journals, special memoranda and various studies in depth) and send them forth to compete for the attention of the overburdened and harassed policy-makers.

In theory, the intelligence officer does not recommend policy, but his decisions as to which facts are relevant and the way in which they are presented can make a current policy look sound or silly. He does not fulfill his role unless he brings unpleasant as well as welcome facts and analysis to the attention of the policy-makers. Yet the latter, who must also consider U. S. domestic needs, may have quite different ideas about which facts are relevant. And if the senior policy-makers are to fulfill their responsibilities to inform the public, they must present some of the facts upon which U. S. foreign policy is based; the danger is that their use of intelligence data and judgments will be selected in a manner designed primarily to justify their policies. Thus the relationship between intelligence officers and policy-makers is as complex and varied as the personalities involved.

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Yet despite the inherent tensions and frictions in this relationship, U.S. leaders have an indispensable asset in the U.S. intelligence community. It is worth the policy-makers' time and trouble to keep the appropriate parts of the intelligence community informed of all significant policy matters coming up for decision, and to learn where and how to tap into the intelligence apparatus in order to ask the right questions of the right people. It is also important for U.S. leaders to let the intelligence community know their opinion of the quality of its output. For the great danger is that the intelligence officer, often involved in tedious and painstaking work, will come to feel completely cut off from the policy-making process. When this happens, he either becomes a time-server or else studies his subject only for its own sake rather than in the light of its importance to the United States.

But, one may fairly ask, has the quality of American intelligence research and analysis been such as to warrant this effort, or even to warrant the cost of the intelligence apparatus? Even the informed part of the public probably has only a vague impression of a few spectacular intelligence failures and of some of the outstanding successes, but no real feel for the general quality of the effort. CIA's researchers and analysts have produced a broad range of studies of a quality that often matches the best turned out by universities and private research organizations. Other parts of the intelligence community have done very good work in more specialized fields. On the whole, the performance of the intelligence community has been effective, especially when one remembers America's lack of experience and the complexity of the problems involved. None the less, there have been more failures and, less excusably, more mediocrity than the United States should be willing to accept.

In any case, there is no room for complacency. The volume of information to be processed will continue to increase and, while computers will in time be of growing value, sound human judgment will remain the crucial element. Moreover, the tasks of the future are likely to be more difficult than those of the past, for international affairs probably will become more fluid and complex. If greater complexity and more rapid change characterize the world of the future, the importance of appraising the attitudes, capabilities and intentions of other nations will increase rather than decline. Yet prediction is especially difficult regarding nations striving to modernize, for in such countries tradi-

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tional and modern attitudes are intricately interwoven. In such circumstances, the intelligence analyst's perennial problem of deciding when a political leader or a nation will act "out of character" and then of convincing his colleagues and his readers to be ready for a discontinuity of behavior becomes acutely difficult. These problems will remain even if American involvement abroad becomes more selective than it has been in the past.

The size of U.S. intelligence organizations gives them a great capability for research in depth, but their size also imposes limitations, for subtlety of thought is not the most noteworthy trait of any large organization. Special efforts will constantly be necessary to see that thoughtful, unorthodox views and individual insights are encouraged rather than stifled by the system.

IV

The tasks of the CIA clandestine service are at least as varied as those of the intelligence analysts and reporters, and much of what has been written about its activities has condemned or supported its efforts rather than analyzed its functions. Essentially, a clandestine service performs four different types of activities: (1) it collects information secretly—traditional espionage or spying activities; (2) it has a counterintelligence role—protecting the United States against penetration by other intelligence services; (3) it works with the intelligence services of allies and, at times, other nations—exchanging information with them and sometimes helping them to protect their own societies against penetration or upheaval; (4) it conducts covert political operations, which include advising foreign politicians, conducting covert propaganda, supporting labor unions or political parties, and occasionally attempting to overthrow a foreign government.[2] These diverse activities can be separated in theory more easily than in fact, since a CIA station abroad is at times involved in several activities simultaneously, and they thus tend to interact and overlap.

The most widely accepted of these activities is the counterintelligence function, for it is difficult to criticize a government for striving to protect itself against penetration by foreign agents. The counterintelligence function is not the exclusive responsibility of CIA, however, for the military services and the Federal

[2] Technically, covert political action is not an *intelligence* activity, but since it is carried on by intelligence organizations it must be considered in any discussion of intelligence activities.

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Bureau of Investigation are also deeply involved in this area. The difficulty of this task in a world of shifting and uncertain loyalties is attested to by the varied list of men—Richard Sorge, Klaus Fuchs, Kim Philby and Oleg Penkovsky, to name but a few—who long served governments other than their own.

Most of the critics of CIA also accept the necessity of clandestine intelligence collection, but there is considerable public confusion as to its purpose, value and limitations. All governments try to keep certain of their actions and plans secret, and every government of consequence tries to secure as much of this information as it deems necessary to protect itself against the actions of other nations and to formulate its own policies on a sound basis. Properly conceived and operated, a clandestine collection system is essentially an extension of a government's overt information system, and represents an attempt to gain key pieces of information that cannot be obtained from open sources or through other channels.

The intelligence supplied by a Richard Sorge or an Oleg Penkovsky can be of momentous importance. As Hugh Trevor-Roper said in his penetrating article on Kim Philby: "To have a reliable, intelligent, highly-placed agent in the center of a potentially hostile power, with access to 'hard' evidence, is the dream of every intelligence service. . . . A well-placed agent of known fidelity and intelligence who can advise his masters, answer specific questions, comment on the disjointed texts which any Secret Service picks up, correct the illusions to which it is prone, has a value which transcends the occasional questionable scoop."[3]

But there are few Sorges, Penkovskys or Philbys, and the real question concerns the value of the information supplied by the typical agent. Everyone with any experience in collecting or reading clandestine reports recognizes that they range from the uniquely important to the routine, which at best confirm information obtained through other channels and at worst mislead. Wherever the norm truly lies, it is natural that officers of the clandestine service tend to place a higher value on the intelligence they acquire than do many foreign service officers or even intelligence analysts.

Covert political action—and particularly the use of private

[3] Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Philby Affair: Espionage, Treason, and Secret Services," *Encounter*, April 1968.

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American institutions, sometimes with the knowledge of few if any of their officials—is the principal cause of the controversy surrounding CIA in recent years. A more recent criticism by an increasing number of Americans opposed to the basic thrust of U.S. foreign policy is that CIA's coöperation with foreign intelligence organizations in the area of counterintelligence demonstrates that it is a prime instrument of a government intent on upholding repressive régimes against revolutionary movements dedicated to social justice. These activities have led to a broad and sustained barrage of criticism, ranging from the thoughtful and serious to the wild and irresponsible, and have even led some to suggest that CIA is an invisible government which really runs the foreign policy of this country. Whatever CIA is, it is neither invisible nor a government.

Is there adequate control of CIA within the executive branch —by the White House, the Department of State, and (when appropriate) the Department of Defense? (In this connection, it is important to distinguish control from *influence,* for many of the charges that CIA is not adequately controlled reflect the conviction that the Agency has too much influence.) CIA has always secured approval from the senior policy-makers before initiating covert political action. Although for some years the procedures for approval of new programs were informal and established programs often were not subjected to critical scrutiny, these weaknesses have steadily diminished. Today covert political activities are approved and reviewed by a top-level committee composed of senior members of the White House staff, the State Department and the Defense Department. Moreover, projects are now initially discussed at lower levels with the relevant assistant secretaries in the Department of State or Defense. Ambassadors in the countries involved are also almost always brought into this decision-making process. Control procedures have thus improved steadily over the years, and they enable the appropriate policy-makers to exercise effective and flexible control over the initiation and continuation of covert operations. However, these procedures will remain effective only so long as the officials involved remain determined to make them work rather than let them become a formal ritual.

If control is not the problem, what have been the reasons for the troubles CIA has experienced? And how damaging have these troubles been in comparison to the substantial contribution made

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to American security by covert operations, many of which remain secret to this day? I make no pretense of having the background necessary to answer the second question. Probably only a handful of men have, and none of them is likely to reveal the evidence which would support his conclusions. However, it is obvious that covert operations have caused considerable trouble and that continual efforts to improve them are indispensable.

CIA's covert operations have suffered from several specific weaknesses. Briefly, the clandestine service has not been able to maintain adequate standards of secrecy and has overestimated its ability to operate secretly, especially for prolonged periods. The U.S. Government's policy of virtually automatic denial when accused of conducting a covert operation compounded the problem once an operation was compromised. Finally, Washington has often overestimated its ability to influence and manipulate the internal affairs of other nations, and has sometimes exaggerated the importance of doing so. This latter criticism applies to its overt as well as to its covert activities. The Government's successes with both types of activities during the height of the cold war led many officials to fail to recognize that America's capacity to influence situations abroad would decline when conditions changed. In time they also discovered that some projects which were successful in the short run had no lasting effect. All of these shortcomings tend to reinforce one another.

The United States intervenes in the affairs of foreign countries in a variety of ways which clearly pose political and ethical questions, but intervention is not prima facie immoral simply because it is covert. People will differ as to whether the ends justify the means in particular circumstances; policy-makers can perhaps agree as to whether a proposed intervention is necessary, judicious and well conceived. What is required is a sense of proportion and a determination not to be unduly influenced by short-term considerations, and these are qualities difficult to gain and hold. Guidelines can be set forth for some aspects of covert activities, but not for all of them, and it is important to understand the differences involved.[4]

[4] If the CIA's sharpest critics—the radicals who favor support of revolutionary movements—were to gain power in the United States, they would almost certainly have to rely on covert operations to achieve their aims. Reactionary and oppressive régimes are not easily dislodged, as Rhodesia and South Africa demonstrate, and will not fade away because of moral disapproval or even economic boycott. An activist policy short of direct military intervention would lead such critics to adopt the very instruments and methods they had formerly denounced.

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These political and moral problems, as well as those of secrecy, are most acute with regard to covert support of private American institutions. Whatever the arguments once advanced for this practice (and some were compelling), they are no longer persuasive. On the basis of the Katzenbach (Gardner and Helms) recommendations, following the 1967 disclosures, the U.S. Government has announced that it has abandoned secret subsidies to private voluntary American institutions. The Katzenbach report did state, however, that in cases involving overriding national security interests individual exceptions should be made, provided extremely stringent procedures were followed. This is a sound basic policy, but should be supplemented by a major effort by the Administration to secure Congressional approval for one or more publicly financed agencies to extend support to private institutions when it is in the national interest to do so. If some new institutional arrangement is not made, the Government may in a time of danger feel compelled to resort to covert subsidies again, and if this became known the domestic and foreign political impact could be extremely severe.

V

A second area where a basic policy change would be helpful concerns government-press relations. The disclosure of intelligence activities in the press in recent years is a clear national liability. These disclosures have created a public awareness that the U.S. Government has, at least at times, resorted to covert operations in inappropriate situations, failed to maintain secrecy and failed to review ongoing operations adequately. The public revelation of these weaknesses, even though they are now partially corrected, hampers CIA (and the U.S. Government) by limiting those willing to coöperate with it and increasing those opposed to it and its activities. As long as such disclosures remain in the public mind, any official effort to improve CIA's image is as likely to backfire as to succeed.

Moreover, in the present atmosphere the press will seek and publish any information about intelligence activities it can acquire, probably arguing that, if it can learn about such activities, other governments already know of them. Even if some parts of the press were disposed toward discretion the problem would remain formidable. Voluntary press restraints would have to be accepted by virtually the entire newspaper, magazine, radio and

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television industries or they would quickly break down. Legislation, whether regarded as desirable or not (and even ignoring the Constitutional problems) is impossible to achieve in the present climate, and it would be unwise to count on improved prospects in the future.

There is one change that could be made to diminish these difficulties. The U.S. Government in the past almost automatically and immediately denied any charge that a particular event had resulted from a U.S. covert operation. Sometimes this ended the matter, but too often enough evidence came to light to strip the denial of its credibility or even to force the United States to admit the truth, thus getting itself into the worst possible position. Gradually the Government has shifted from a policy of virtually automatic and instant denial toward one of refusing to comment on such charges. Refusing to comment should become a firm policy—whether the charges are true or false—and the Government should make clear from the outset that this is now the basic information policy. A policy of refusing to comment would not be easy to initiate and maintain, especially if an accusation was causing a furor in a foreign country, but it would in time substantially improve the public position of the U.S. Government regarding covert operations.

Many critics and some supporters of CIA have suggested two other changes involving American intelligence activities which they think would substantially improve the situation. One is to divide CIA, separating the clandestine service from the intelligence research and analysis function. The other involves the creation of a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence to oversee the activities of CIA and perhaps the intelligence components of other government departments as well.

The arguments for and against a division of CIA are intricate and complicated. The arguments in favor are: (1) the organization that produces finished and evaluated intelligence conclusions which influence policy should not be the same organization which often executes the policy decided upon—even though these functions are organizationally separated—lest the possible bias of the operators affect the judgments of the analysts; (2) given the present reputation of CIA as a vast manipulator of events, its reorganization probably would ease public concern at home and abroad; (3) a separation of functions would lessen the alienation between much of the academic-intellectual community and youth

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on the one hand and the intelligence agencies on the other, and would ease recruiting problems; (4) a reorganization along these lines probably would make it easier to improve the cover of clandestine officers and increase their capability to act secretly.

Equally weighty arguments can be advanced against dividing CIA. These are: (1) CIA's ability to secure money from Congress has been due in part to the variety of tasks it performs, which has given it a broad Congressional constituency. It is questionable whether the part of CIA responsible for research and analysis could secure its present level of funding if it were separate from the clandestine services, while the latter might suffer a similar fate after an operational failure had become known; (2) the Director of Central Intelligence cannot be a strong independent force as the President's principal intelligence adviser and continue to be responsible for coördinating the intelligence activities of the U.S. Government unless he heads a broadly based organization; (3) it would be difficult to devise a different organizational cover for the clandestine service which would be any more secure; (4) CIA's capability in the scientific field is an important asset, and any division of the Agency probably would divide this group and weaken its capabilities; (5) operators and analysts each benefit from the other's substantive knowledge and experience.

On balance, the benefits of maintaining CIA as it is now organized presently outweigh the advantages of splitting it, but it would hardly rank as a disaster if it were divided.

The case for creating a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence rests largely on the view that such a committee would ease Congressional and public concern about CIA activities. Advocates argue that the present subcommittees of the military and appropriations committees in the House and Senate do not really influence and supervise those activities in the way Congress should and would if there were a Joint Committee solely involved in this task. On the other hand, such a committee should logically be responsible for all intelligence organizations and activities, and the Armed Services committees are unlikely (to put it mildly) to relinquish their jurisdiction over military intelligence. A formal Joint Committee would also create additional pressure on CIA to adopt a cautious and bureaucratic approach in a field where imagination and flexibility are important qualities. Finally, the creation of a formal Joint Committee probably would reduce

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the willingness of foreign intelligence services to pass intelligence to, and coöperate with, CIA, because of their fear that such relationships would become known and create domestic political problems. These disadvantages seem persuasive, and to date a majority of Congress has reached the same conclusion.

Moreover, it is misleading to suppose that organizational structures or executive-legislative relations are the basic problem involved in covert operations, for changes in these areas would not touch the central issue. This is the question of policy: under what circumstances should the United States resort to covert operations? It would be immensely useful if a set of rules or even guidelines could be developed, but this is probably impossible unless one is willing to decree an absolute prohibition of specific kinds of operations, and few Americans want their Government to be this rigid. Even Senator J. William Fulbright, in an article which attacks many of CIA's activities and points out the corrosive effect they can have on American values, says that in times of supreme emergency such a rigid rule cannot be applied. "We are compelled, therefore, to lay down a qualified rule, a rule to the effect that the end almost never justifies the means, that our policy must almost always be open and honest and made in accordance with constitutional procedure."[5]

Thus we cannot escape reliance on human judgment, and our judgment will depend on how we view our place and responsibilities in the world. This will involve us in painful dilemmas, for the United States is trying to do two quite different things simultaneously. It is trying to adhere to certain principles and values which often seem in conflict with the means employed to protect its security and advance its interests. The decisions we make in the field of intelligence will ultimately reflect the interaction between our estimate of the danger we face and the values we hold. American leaders will need a sense of proportion, a combination of boldness and caution, a thorough knowledge of men and nations, and the uncommon quality of common sense. Finally, they should have the vision and strength of character to think in terms of years and even decades rather than weeks and months. These are difficult qualities to come by, but unless they are possessed in large measure by American leaders the United States will be unable to conduct a successful foreign policy in any area.

[5] Senator J. William Fulbright, "We Must Not Fight Fire with Fire," *The New York Times Magazine*, April 23, 1967.

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RUSSIA ENTERS THE MIDDLE EAST

By Walter Laqueur

ONCE again the Middle East seems fated to become the main danger zone of world politics. During the last decade the East-West détente has prevented a head-on collision between the superpowers there, but many signs point to impending changes. As the Soviet Union reaches strategic parity with the United States, there is growing temptation for it to assert its strength in an area so much nearer Moscow than Washington. The Western withdrawal from the area will be complete with the British departure from the Persian Gulf. From the Soviet point of view the Middle East is a vacuum and seems the least risky area in the world in which to expand the Soviet sphere of influence. The Russian drive to the south which began in the eighteenth century seems at last likely to achieve fulfillment.

The Russians' strengthened position in the Middle East has come about not by coercion or infiltration but by invitation. The Soviet Union was officially asked to become a Middle Eastern power and was willingly offered the facilities it wanted by the governments of Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Yemen. No country has been taken over and communist ideology has not spread widely. Success has been due not to the activities of the local communist parties nor to loans and credits, nor to a very cunning diplomacy, but fundamentally to the internal ferment in the Arab world. In many respects the Soviet Union was an ideal ally for the radical Arab leaders, but ultimately it became a leading Middle Eastern power because it was geographically near, militarily strong and relatively rich. For these reasons it is idle to speculate whether the Soviet advance could have been prevented. Arab enmity toward Israel played an important role, but it was an aggravating circumstance, not the decisive factor. Soviet inroads made in Southern Arabia and Algeria, in Sudan and Somalia, have shown that the Arab-Israeli conflict was not a precondition for Soviet successes.

II

The communist parties played a relatively minor role in these developments. During the last decade, communists (or fellow travelers) have been members of governments in Iraq and Syria,

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Egypt and the Sudan. But the communist parties there have not derived lasting benefit; as yet they are nowhere legal—with the sole exception of Israel. Nowhere in the area has communism been able to capture the leadership of the national movement. In Turkey and Iran the internal situation favored the growth of radical left-wing movements, but for obvious historical reasons close identification with the Soviet Union was a liability.

Communist ideas have become popular in the Middle East, but the Soviet brand of communism has lost much of its earlier appeal. The Soviet monopoly in anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism disappeared; every self-respecting radical leader in the Arab world subscribes to these doctrines. But this does not necessarily induce him to join the communist party; he can with equal justification be a member of the Neo-Ba'th (in Syria) or a left-wing Nasserist, or look to China, Jugoslavia or Cuba for inspiration. The orthodox communists have remained somewhat suspect despite their demonstrative patriotism. They are bound by the rules of the game (such as Soviet unwillingness to risk a nuclear war on behalf of the Arab world) and cannot compete with the ultra-radical slogans of Maoists and Castro-Debrayists who outflank them on the Left. The position of the communist parties is further weakened by the inevitable ambiguities of Soviet policy toward the Arab world. It was not easy for a communist in an Egyptian concentration camp to defend the "objectively progressive character" of Soviet help given to President Nasser. It was even more difficult for an Iranian Communist to explain to the militants that it was perfectly proper for the Soviet leaders to fete the Shah while the Tudeh Party was denouncing him as a criminal and traitor and demanding his overthrow.

Such contradictory situations exist in almost all Middle Eastern countries, greatly contributing to the internal splits which have plagued the communist parties there throughout their recent history. The Tudeh Party in Iran split in 1965, when the advocates of a Stalinist-Maoist line seceded. Those who remain are gravely handicapped in their activities by the economic boom and the growing friendship between Tehran and Moscow. The leaders of the Turkish Labor Party have denounced Soviet economic assistance to the Demirel government, arguing that in return for aid the Russians can impose conditions which are "more to their own advantage than to that of the Turkish working class." They have also sharply condemned the Soviet occupation

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of Czechoslovakia. The Iraqi Communist Party, once very powerful, has for years been in a state of disarray. Factional struggles have not been limited to ideological exchanges. There have been kidnappings, and rival factions have attempted to seize each other's printing presses. In Israel the communist movement is split into the pro-Nasserist RAKAH and the pro-Israeli MAKI. In Syria, Lebanon, the Sudan and Yemen pro-Chinese factions which insist on "positive neutralism" between Moscow and Peking compete with the orthodox communists. It is a dismal picture from the communist point of view, but it would be premature to conclude that orthodox communism is finished in the Middle East. For while the communists have failed to make headway, the parties in power have not been much more successful. A revolutionary situation continues to exist in several countries.

From the Soviet point of view the Middle Eastern communist parties are of only limited use. Moscow can rely on them slightly more than on Nasser and the Neo-Ba'th, but this is a question of degree, not of principle. The conflict with China and, more recently, the Czech crisis have shown the Soviet leaders that they can no longer take the loyalty of many communist parties for granted, whereas client states, such as Syria and Egypt, have given them full support. Fear, "material interest" and political dependence make for more loyal allies than ideological conviction; this is the obvious lesson of the last decade.

The Arab communists can have no illusions about their prospects in the years to come. It is not impossible that they might come to share power in one Arab country or another within the framework of a "national front," but past experience has shown that these are not likely to be lasting successes. The communist parties have no chance to become mass parties unless they adjust much more to specific local conditions. This means (to give but a few examples) that the communists would have to pay more than lip service to Islam and Arab nationalism, that they disavow dialectical materialism, and that they give up any idea of nationalizing agriculture. It means, in other words, that the communists cease to be communists and transform themselves into nationalist-socialists. This is by no means impossible; in some countries, such as Morocco, they have already gone a long way toward it. On this road they might eventually succeed, provided they could overtake the many competitors who have already staked their claims to a similar course.

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III

In an interview in 1959 President Nasser said: "I am certain that no communist will, whatever happens, influence Arab nationalism. On the contrary, the ideas of Arab nationalism will finally and forever prevail." Since then Nasser has gone a long way. A decade later he seems to have decided that he has no choice but to tie his fate to the Soviet alliance and to become absolutely dependent on it. The decision cannot have been easy; it had been his great aim to restore real independence to Egypt, and for a while, during the late fifties and early sixties, he appeared to have succeeded. But he had always wanted to accomplish too much in too little time: industrialization and a social revolution in Egypt, supremacy among the Arabs, a leading role in Africa, a campaign in Yemen and the liberation of Palestine.

After the Six Day War, Egypt urgently needed economic aid. Above all it needed arms for which it could not pay. Nasser admitted as much after Egypt had been rearmed: ". . . we have so far paid not one penny for the arms we obtained from the Soviet Union to equip our armed forces. Actually, were it a question of payment, we have no money to buy arms." There was no chance of receiving the aircraft and the missiles free of charge from anyone but Russia. He was of course aware that by cutting his ties to America he had weakened his bargaining position vis-à-vis Moscow. But he was no longer concerned about the price that would eventually have to be paid. He still maintained in a speech last July that there were no strings attached: "Why does the Soviet Union give us all these things? . . . I wish to tell you frankly and clearly that the Soviet Union has never tried, not even in the times of our greatest trials, to dictate conditions to us or to ask anything of us. . . . For hours we went on asking, but they did not make one request of us. Even when I told them I felt ashamed that we were making many demands while they had asked nothing from us . . . they told us: We adopt this stand on the basis of our ideology. . . . We have nothing to ask."

The Soviet leaders had nothing to ask because there was hardly anything Nasser did not volunteer. After his state visit to the U.S.S.R. in July 1968 he welcomed the presence of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean, the "new shield of the progressive Arab states." His old friend, Tito, whom he had seen on his way back from Moscow, disapproved of Moscow's Mediterranean ambitions and warned him of the dangers of total dependence, but

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Nasser, plagued by illness and overwhelmed by the enormous difficulties facing him, talked in apocalyptic terms about a new war. He has made concession after concession to the Russians, purging the army and the state apparatus of all people considered by Moscow to be undesirable. Many of those around him have found it difficult to square these concessions with what used to be Nasser's fiery attachment to Egyptian sovereignty and independence. But Nasser is now under greater pressure than ever. His pride has been deeply wounded; everything is now to be subordinated to the coming war against Israel.

Although the Russians decided to reëquip the Egyptian army, they cannot have held many illusions about Egypt's immediate military prospects. Yet if Soviet power is to be asserted in the Middle East, sustained support for Egypt seems in retrospect to be almost inevitable. The Russian endeavor to make Egypt a showcase for Soviet-style socialism was clearly based on a miscalculation; the country was too poor and was ill-suited for such a régime. But Egypt's weakness was in some ways an asset, for it made the country permanently dependent on the Soviet Union. A defeated country is more likely to remain a loyal client than a victorious and prosperous one. With loyalty at a premium in the communist world, this is not a consideration to be ignored.

Nevertheless, after the June war the question whether Nasser was expendable must have occurred more than once to those responsible for Soviet Middle Eastern policy. Moody, unable to fulfill his promises, he surely appeared at times a major liability to his Soviet protectors. But no other Egyptian leader, certainly no member of the "Russian party" in Cairo, enjoyed the same prestige in his country, let alone in the Arab world. Nasser was the only charismatic leader, and miraculously his prestige was not irremediably damaged by his defeat—or so it seemed.

Ideologically, Nasser was truly uncommitted; he belonged to the generation which in the case of an Axis victory would have turned with equal ease to fascism. He was a radical nationalist, not a socialist, let alone a Marxist. He could argue in his defense that Egypt's desperate poverty left him little freedom of choice, that America made all kinds of conditions that were offensive to Arab patriots, that Egypt's interests clashed everywhere with those of the West—in Africa, on the Arabian Peninsula, in Israel. The Russians regarded him as a chosen instrument; for the Americans he was at best an unfriendly neutral. The United States

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wanted him to concentrate on economic construction at home, not to intervene in Africa, not to make war against Israel, not to manufacture rockets and nuclear weapons. It tried to restrain him in all the things that were dear to his heart, whereas the Russians have been in every respect more sympathetic.

But what if, owing to Nasser's impetuosity, yet another situation developed over which the Russians had no control? There have been Soviet warnings against "rank demagogy and adventurist exhortations," usually attributed to Chinese influence in the Middle East. The Soviet generals have asked for and received a far greater say in Cairo than before the war; perhaps they hope that the presence of 3,000 Soviet military experts and instructors will be a stabilizing factor.

IV

If arms supplies are added to economic credits, Egypt ranks first in the world among the recipients of Soviet aid. Yet in coming years its role in Soviet Middle Eastern strategy is almost certain to decrease. Soviet attention is turning increasingly to other countries of the Middle East. Since 1965 a determined Soviet effort has been made to neutralize Turkey and Iran. Mr. Demirel and the Shah have been honored guests in Moscow. With the détente, the conviction grew in Ankara and Tehran that the military danger from the north had passed and that the Soviet Union had given up its old annexationist aims. Turkey has used the opportunity to devote more attention to Cyprus, while Iran is now preoccupied with the future of the Persian Gulf. Both countries have been disappointed with the lack of Western support for their national aspirations, but they have not been very successful in enlisting Soviet support either. If it should come to an open conflict in the Persian Gulf the Soviet Union intends no doubt to play the role of honest broker, invoking the spirit of Tashkent; it certainly would not support Iran against the Arab countries.

Above all, it has been Soviet policy to impress on Turkey and Iran the great benefits that would accrue to the two countries from closer economic relations with the Soviet Union. Soviet credits totalling $500 million have been extended to Iran, and aid to Turkey has also been far in excess of previous years. During the next few years trade between Iran and the Soviet Union is scheduled to quadruple, but even so the Soviet Union will provide only

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12 percent of Persia's imports by 1974. At present, the Soviet Union as a trading partner ranks only seventh on the list; the West and Japan will remain the chief customers for Iran's oil for a long time to come. These facts ought to be mentioned from time to time, for there is a tendency to overrate the political importance of the Soviet trade offensive in the Middle East. The Soviet Union is not a great power in terms of world trade, and its share has not been increasing in recent years. Trade with the Soviet bloc plays a growing part in the economies of many Middle Eastern countries, but nowhere, with the sole exception of Egypt, is it of decisive importance.

Traditional Turkish and Persian suspicions of their powerful northern neighbor have not altogether faded away. They reappeared with the build-up of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and with the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Both governments are eager to have as much Western aid and protection as possible, but they also realize that Russia has finally succeeded in outflanking the Northern Tier as a result of her advance in the Arab world, and that they have to adjust themselves as well as they can to this new situation. The change in the foreign policies of Turkey and Iran thus stems not from resentment against the West so much as from the shift in the balance of power in the area. There remains a great deal of uneasiness, even of fear. Present Soviet behavior is unexceptionable and Moscow has solemnly declared that it will strictly adhere to the principle of noninterference. But Turkish and Iranian leaders have suspicious minds—not without reason—and they fear that if the Middle East should become an exclusive Soviet sphere of interest, their freedom of action would be reduced, at the very best, to that of Finland or Afghanistan.

While the emphasis in Soviet relations with Turkey and Iran is mainly economic, Soviet political and military help has been the great attraction for the Arab world. For historical reasons, anti-Western feeling tends to be more intense in Arab countries, and the inclination toward extreme political solutions far more pronounced. Ideological affinity has also played a certain role; for the last few years Syria's ruling Neo-Ba'th has had regular "ideological exchanges" with the Soviet Communist Party. But the Neo-Ba'th wants at the same time to retain its independence in the battle for leadership in what was once the communist camp. Moscow regards the régime which came to power in

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Damascus in 1966 as the closest to its heart of any in the Middle East. But though Syria has a special relationship with Moscow, the volatile character of Syrian (as of Iraqi) politics is not disregarded. The "mass basis" of the Syrian régime is exceedingly narrow and, vehement denials to the contrary, ethnic and religious factors as well as personal ambitions continue to play a decisive role in Syrian politics.

Iraq comes third in the list of Russia's partners in the Arab world. Economic ties have been strengthened in recent years and the Soviet Union has shown particular interest in the development of the Iraqi oilfields. Political relations have been checkered. The rise and fall of the Iraqi Communists have affected relations between the two countries, and the failure of successive Iraqi goverments to give autonomy to the Kurds has been another bone of contention. Recently the Soviet Union has made efforts to improve relations by closing down the Iraqi Communist radio station which operated from Eastern Europe. The present Baghdad junta has reciprocated by supporting the Soviet Union on Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet investment in Yemen and South Arabia is small by global standards. However, the dispatch of Soviet arms and ground crews after the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops has played a decisive role at a critical moment in the recent history of the Yemen. Some Western experts had argued that South Arabia was too distant and unimportant for Soviet involvement but they were proved wrong. The Soviet Union is definitely interested in South Arabia as a land bridge to East Africa and as a gateway to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, even though the importance of Aden is very much reduced while the Suez Canal remains closed. Soviet interest in gaining a foothold in Aden and Arabia stems from geopolitical reasons not dissimilar to those that first induced Britain to establish bases there. This may explain the Soviet support given in the past to Imam Yahya and his successors against the British, and more recently to the Yemeni Republicans against the Royalists. When the People's Republic of South Yemen was founded in 1967, it was hoped in Moscow that the new state would be able to give decisive help to the hard-pressed Republicans in Sana. But within a few months the new republic found itself in grave difficulties. An economic crisis, incessant revolts and the defection of the left wing of the official party (the NLF) brought the new state to the verge of

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collapse. In the civil war the Soviet Union supports the South Yemen government against the ultra-left rebels who wish to establish full communism in the caves of Hadramaut. Moscow has probably been correct in suspecting Chinese influences behind these schemes; the endeavor to forestall the Chinese in Arabia has no doubt been one of the motives behind Russian activities in the area.

The Arabian civil war is likely to continue for a long time and the whole area may relapse into well-merited obscurity. The main danger as seen from Moscow is that it may be drawn in more deeply there than it wants to or than the importance of the region warrants. This is the general dilemma facing the Soviet leaders in the Middle East: their hands may be forced if something untoward should happen to their protégés in South Arabia, or Syria or Egypt. Building spheres of influence has a momentum and a logic of its own; unless the Soviet Union is ready in an emergency to exert its full power it will face at the very least a loss of prestige.[1]

The Soviets faced a similar situation during and after the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 when the Arab governments expected more Soviet help. The Arab countries will undoubtedly have the continued support of the Soviet Union against Israel, but it is less clear how far exactly the Soviet Union is likely to go. The Soviet enmity against Israel has deep roots and is not likely to diminish. It is not just the fact that Israel has been a major obstacle to Soviet policies in the Middle East or the Soviet belief that the Arabs have the bigger battalions; emotional factors, too, are involved beyond the traditional Bolshevik dislike of Zionism. The communist leaders now regard Jews (not only Zionism) as a troublesome element much as nineteenth-century European anti-Semites did. The anti-Jewish drive during Stalin's last days, the anti-Semitic measures taken more recently in Poland and the whole tenor of the Soviet press campaign create the impression that communism has begun to jettison in theory as well as in

[1] I am not dealing here with the growing Soviet interest in Middle Eastern oil, mainly because the subject is too complex to be treated in brief. It has been axiomatic during the last decade that in view of the rapid development of the Soviet oil industry (and the relatively slow growth of the consumption of oil products in the Soviet bloc) the Soviet Union does not need outside oil. A projection into the future of present trends in Soviet-bloc oil production and consumption shows that these assumptions can no longer be taken for granted. Nor does the Soviet Union wish to restrict its highly profitable exports to the West and Japan; Soviet interest in Middle Eastern oil will be substantially higher in future but there is no reason at present to believe that it will be a decisive factor in determining Soviet policies in the area.

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practice one of its basic ideological tenets—"proletarian internationalism"—as far as the Jews are concerned. The Israeli victory of 1967 was an enormous aggravation to the Russians, especially to military leaders. The Soviet appraisal of the situation was based on the conviction that Israel was a mere puppet and would not dare to fight. After the Six Day War the Soviet leaders had to revise their image of the Jewish state.

Soviet policy vis-à-vis Israel does not apparently aim at the destruction of the state but through threats and political pressure to make it give up its gains and to isolate it politically. Direct Soviet armed intervention seems unlikely, both in view of the Soviet wish to prevent a head-on clash with the United States and because for a number of years the Soviet Union will not have a long-range non-nuclear task force of sufficient strength. But it is not at all certain that the Soviet Union will be able to restrain its allies, even though its military command has demanded a far greater share of control than before as a precondition for rebuilding the Egyptian army. A decision seems to have been taken not to strengthen the Arab armies to such an extent that they will be tempted to attack Israel prematurely. Instead, the Soviet Union has tried to persuade the Arabs that they should first overcome their internal weaknesses, that Israel as a result of the difficulties of occupation will find itself in increasing political isolation, that, generally speaking, time works for the Arabs and that rash adventures should be eschewed. While not rejecting guerrilla warfare against Israel in principle, the Soviet leaders are not optimistic about its efficacy.

The Soviet arguments, however, are by no means generally accepted by the Arabs: American setbacks in Viet Nam have strengthened Maoist-Castroist tendencies and there is again a growing impatience especially among the younger generation. As a result, Arab leaders find themselves under renewed pressure to act against their better judgment: to go to war before attaining military superiority. The belief that time works for them is not as widely accepted now as before June 1967; Egypt and Syria, Iraq and Jordan are not likely to make striking economic and technological progress in the near future. Arab unity is as distant as ever, the internal situation is unsettled, the hold of the radical governments brittle.

In these circumstances the feeling of frustration in the Arab world is rising, and the Soviet Union is under increasing pressure

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to help more actively. Arab leaders argue that Chinese influence is bound to increase and that anarchy may prevail unless decisive action against Israel is taken in the near future. There are various possibilities, all involving certain risks. Unless Moscow is able soon to prove to its Arab allies that political pressure against Israel is effective, it will face a crisis in its relations with the Arab world. If on the other hand the Soviet Union should decide in favor of military intervention (for instance in the Suez Canal area) an even more dangerous situation is likely to develop. Israel is unlikely to be overawed by the presence of a Soviet division and a few missile-carrying vessels. The Soviet Union would have to bring into action more substantial forces, but such massive intervention will not be easy for logistic reasons for some years to come. It would also cause the immediate escalation of a local conflict into something far more menacing. In this quandary the Soviet leaders will probably try to enlist American help but a deal with the United States presupposes a general détente and the chances for this are not now, to put it cautiously, as good as they were.

V

The future of the Middle East largely depends on the direction taken by Soviet policy. The Soviet Union is now essentially a conservative society with a superstructure of revolutionary ideology and phraseology. The appeal of Soviet Communism is almost nonexistent beyond the borders of the Soviet state; but the Soviet leaders still feel that they have to extend their spheres of influence and *cordons sanitaires*. Once a sphere of influence has been established, the imperial power is tempted to look for yet another one to enhance its security further. Current Soviet foreign policy is more similar in inspiration and character to that of Ivan Kalita and Ivan the Terrible than to Lenin. At the same time, the Soviet leaders cannot dissociate themselves entirely from communist ideology for this would gravely undermine the legitimacy of their rule. In view of their rivalry with China, if for no other reason, they will keep up a revolutionary posture and pursue a militant foreign policy.

The paradox of Soviet development is that while militarily the country has become so much stronger during the last twenty years, politically it is far weaker than it was under Stalin. The political weaknesses, the many conflicts inside the Soviet bloc

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and within the Soviet Union are not, however, conducive to a policy of détente; there is many a historical precedent for an escape into action, even into hyperactivity, in such conditions. Centrifugal and disruptive forces have been at work in both East and West, but here the symmetry between the position of the superpowers ends. For while in America this has strengthened the trend toward neo-isolationism, in the Soviet Union it has had the opposite result. At least one influential group of Soviet leaders, perhaps the majority, believes that the rot which has been afflicting the communist world must be stopped: Soviet power has been reasserted in Eastern Europe and it will be demonstrated, though perhaps in a less dramatic way, elsewhere. There are at present obvious limits to further Soviet action in Central Europe, for any intervention in Germany would result in a head-on collision with NATO. The Middle East is an area of less importance but also of fewer risks. Western Europe has vital economic interests in the area but its influence there is now almost nil. There still is the American presence, and the Kremlin has a great respect for it. But the American commitment in the Middle East is not as clear as in Western Europe and the Soviet Union will probe its extent and limits.

The countries of the Middle East will be able to resist a superpower only if they are united and internally stable. On both these counts the Middle East scores very low. Peace and stability in the area are as far away as ever. Economic progress in Iran and, to a lesser degree in Turkey, has been impressive, but, as their starting point was very low, these countries will need decades to catch up, and their economic progress will not by itself solve their political and social problems. It is doubtful whether the Middle Eastern monarchies will survive for very long for they are too much out of tune with the *Zeitgeist*. They are not necessarily less efficient or more corrupt than the revolutionary régimes, which have shown that they are stronger on propaganda than on action. A transition from monarchy to military dictatorship will not by itself solve many problems.

No solution is in sight for the crisis of the Arab world. At present the conflict with Israel overshadows its deeper problems. There is growing bitterness and frustration which will turn sooner or later against the governments of the day that have promised so much and have been able to fulfill so little. Even an Arab victory over Israel, a very distant possibility at present, would im-

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mediately create new problems; the struggle between "conservatives" and "radicals" (and between the radicals themselves) would enter a new and more intense stage, for there are many candidates for ruling Palestine and Jordan. Both Islam and communism are losing ground, democracy seems unattainable, a planned economy has not worked wonders, and Arab nationalism is no longer a guide for the perplexed in the modern world. This breakdown of long-established beliefs and the absence of new ones to replace them are gradually resulting in a crisis deeper and more intractable than the transient political problems plaguing the area. It seems to lead toward despair coupled with a groping for ultra-radical solutions, incessant changes of government, and stagnation and decline. One day, no doubt, this vicious circle will be broken by a new movement of national and social renaissance. Today no such savior is in sight and the drift toward anarchy continues.

There may be no cure for the Middle Eastern sickness but there are ways to alleviate it. Middle Eastern conflicts flourish in the limelight and they begin to wither when ignored. However, the area will not be ignored during the years to come and it is an unfortunate by-product of the Soviet advance that it aggravates most of the problems of the region. The real importance of the Middle East is limited. It has been said about Viet Nam that it became important only because America decided to send troops there. The same applies to the Middle East; the Soviet advance into the Middle East gives it a significance it would not normally have. But the domination of the Middle East by the Soviet Union would profoundly affect the global balance of power. The Soviet Union may be deflected from its preoccupation with the Middle East by increasing unrest in Eastern Europe, by the growing threat of China or by internal problems, such as the struggle for power within the Soviet leadership. But all this is more likely to contribute to instability than to peace. The permanent Middle Eastern crisis will in all probability be further aggravated and the whole area will be one of the main zones of conflict in these years of growing turbulence in world politics.

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OUR FOREIGN AFFAIRS MACHINERY: TIME FOR AN OVERHAUL

By Lannon Walker

RECOMMENDATIONS for fundamental reforms in the organization and administration of foreign affairs have been made by high-level committees and task forces on the average of every two years since World War II. Despite the near unanimity of diagnosis, little has been done to deal with the serious problems uncovered; they are still with us, unsolved and debilitating.

Today, the nation may at last be compelled to face up to these problems. The advent of a new Administration, both popular and Congressional disenchantment with the results of America's involvement in the world over the last two decades, and the growing sentiment that we must put our domestic house in order as a matter of first priority, all suggest that the country can no longer afford the inefficiencies which too often have characterized its foreign programs in an era of rising budget curves.

The solution to these problems is not simply "new policies." Foreign affairs are the result of a dynamic interaction among domestic politics, the budgetary process, the foreign policies of other nations, the constraints imposed by the organization of our foreign affairs and the abilities of the people who make up and run that organization. The objects of reform, thus, become the hierarchy within which decisions are made, the linkages between our objectives abroad and the budget, the way information is handled or mishandled, the manner in which people are organized and their talents developed; these are managerial rather than policy problems.

The reform agenda for 1969 is already apparent. The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has proposed another public commission to take a fresh look into the foreign affairs process. A group of Republican Congressmen has recommended that a new Hoover Commission be appointed to reëxamine the entire structure of the Federal Government. The Brookings Institution and the Institute for Defense Analyses, the campaign task forces and other groups have been examining these problems for months past. And so have the professionals in foreign affairs, the men and women most intimately acquainted with the

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strengths and weaknesses of the institutions they serve. Their own recommendations are a matter of public record.[1]

So political pressures and ideas for reform have again converged. Only the President, however, has the power to begin the process of change. He must begin immediately after January 20, taking full advantage of those precious "hundred days," or run the risk of being captured by the pressure of other crises as well as by the inertia of the system itself. What should the new President and his Secretary of State be looking for? What are the key problems, solution of which will give them the leverage they require if they are to take control of foreign affairs?

There are two basic problems facing the new Administration: one is organizational, the other involves people.

II

The foreign affairs community today is an "antiorganization." In the years after World War II, successive administrations created new agencies to meet new problems, while established agencies sent representatives abroad for the first time in response to the growing commingling of domestic and foreign affairs. There are, for example, 23 agencies crowded under the umbrella of the American Embassy in Paris, each persuaded that it represents the national interest, many often at cross-purposes with the activities of an agency down the hall. In mid-1968 there were reportedly 56 agencies represented at one or more posts abroad.

This proliferation of foreign affairs agencies and programs since World War II has not provided past Presidents, and will not provide the new President, with the organizational benefits normally associated with decentralization. On the contrary, because the structure has no effective central planning mechanism, because there is no integrative catalyst—other than the President himself—because there is no method for assuring that all resources, all relevant data, insight and expertise are brought to bear on a given problem, the next President will often find himself listening and reacting to the most persuasive (and sometimes merely the loudest) of his advisers.

It will be protested that the system has worked. But at what price? The decentralization of agency budgets—as one example—has led each agency and each program to cry "wolf" at budget

[1] "Toward A Modern Diplomacy," American Foreign Service Association, Washington, D.C., 1968.

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time, although in fact the total resources allocated to foreign affairs over the past twenty years should have been sufficient to carry on the nation's business abroad. Instead, opportunities were missed in important bilateral relations, surpluses going to waste in one area while crucial needs for the same goods and services were unfulfilled next door. It is not that the nation's resources have not been properly allocated—they haven't been allocated, distributed and used in a rational way at all. How can the nation do a better job, with fewer resources?

It is neither possible nor advisable to shoehorn all of our programs abroad into a single Department of Foreign Affairs. The disruption of people and the distortion of many legitimate interests would be too great a price to pay for the resulting symmetry. It *is* possible, however, to get at the real problem—which is not the existence of many agencies with many functions, but rather the way in which their efforts are marshalled in a manner consistent with the national interest.

This organizational dilemma adds up to a crisis of leadership. Or to turn it around, all of these problems could have been solved through effective leadership. Between the end of World War II and the mid-1960s, Presidents attacked the question of leadership in foreign affairs in a variety of ways. During the 1950s there was an attempt to center the coördination of policy and operations in a large staff organization centering on the White House. In the early 1960s the process was radically decentralized, reflecting the desire of a young and energetic President to involve himself in the details of foreign affairs. Neither experiment worked because large staffs insulate the President from advisers, because the President cannot make all decisions himself, and because neither the White House staff system nor personalized leadership attacks the problem of interagency coördination at the operational levels.

The current attempt to resolve the leadership crisis in foreign affairs began in March 1966 when the President ordered the Secretary of State to "assume responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coördination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas. . . ." In addition to this delegation of authority, the President's directive created three levels of organization for interagency decision-making in Washington—at the individual country level, at the regional level and at the Cabinet level of government—all centered in the Department of State.

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The theory behind this new organization was that the Government needed a central mechanism which would coördinate programs, resource allocation and planning on an interagency basis. The highest level of the new structure, known as the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), was to ensure that problems were identified before they became crises, to devise plans for a rational allocation of resources and generally to provide leadership for the foreign affairs community. The SIG system in Washington, added to President Kennedy's decision in 1961 to give the Ambassador abroad clear authority to manage all agencies and programs in his country, should have closed the decision-making circuit and given the President a flexible tool for attacking the major inefficiencies of the system. Its forerunner, the placing by President Eisenhower of coördinating responsibility for foreign military and economic policies in the hands of his energetic Under Secretary of State, was working well before President Kennedy abandoned the concept. But the SIG has not yet worked.

It has not worked because the leadership of the Department of State did not *make* it work. The reasons for this failure of leadership are complex. The Under Secretary of State, in addition to his duties as Chairman of the SIG, has had to act as alter ego to the Secretary, testify before the Congress, speak to the American public, attend diplomatic receptions, receive foreign visitors and attend high-level meetings and conferences abroad. And what time he has left has been spent with the inevitable crisis. The Under Secretary simply does not have the time to do the hard-nosed managerial work that would be required to make the SIG system work. With insufficient impetus from above, the lower levels of leadership in the SIG system, the Interdepartmental Regional Groups, have not been fully tested.

To make the system work will involve giving the Secretary of State something he has never had: (a) the ability to produce alternatives to the recommendations of his line subordinates; (b) the ability to plan systematically and to communicate policy objectives to the other agencies in foreign affairs; (c) the ability to ensure that the resources appropriated for foreign affairs are sensibly allocated among often competing programs; and (d) the ability to monitor agency activities to ensure their consistency with policy.

Giving him these capabilities will alter the process of foreign affairs. It will give meaning to the statement by a distinguished

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public servant that: "The executive function of the Office of the Secretary of State is to see to it that the foreign policy of the United States operates in all its essential parts. . . . This 'general manager' function includes, but is by no means limited to, administration; its primary concern is with the management of substantive policy and its execution." [2]

The Congress complains that the agencies in foreign affairs are overstaffed. The Congress is right. But it is also wrong. It is right in the sense that too large a proportion of the human resources are concentrated on too small an aspect of foreign affairs. Too many people devote their working hours to France, or cultural relations with Africa, or commercial problems in Latin America. Too few people, however, are concerned with the nation's global preoccupations. Too few reflect the Secretary's responsibility to advance the national, as opposed to the regional or the agency interest.

There is nobody available—and it is not the function of the Policy Planning Council—to dig systematically into a staff paper and offer to the Secretary a set of alternatives from which he can choose. Yet choice is one of the very few sources of power available to the Secretary of State, or even to the President.

There is nobody available to the Secretary of State to see to it that agency budgets reflect his policy decisions. Yet "if what management is all about is making and implementing decisions, then the budget is perhaps the most essential management tool." [3]

These considerations suggest that we need to correct the imbalance between the responsibilities the Secretary of State bears and his ability to discharge those responsibilities when the power inherent in information and money resides elsewhere. The responsibility itself is properly centered, and the best way to correct the imbalance was recommended six years ago in the report of the Herter Committee, which argued strongly for the creation of a position, to be called the Permanent or Executive Under Secretary of State, subordinate only to the Secretary and his immediate deputy. It should be the duty of the Permanent Under Secretary to give his superiors the interagency staff capability they do not now possess. He must, among other things, make the SIG work.

[2] Paul H. Nitze in "The Secretary of State." New York: The American Assembly, Columbia University, 1960, p. 5.

[3] Melvin Anshen, "The Federal Budget as an Instrument for Management and Analysis," in "Program Budgeting," David Novick (ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, p. 3.

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Specifically, the Permanent Under Secretary should discharge four principal functions:

He should manage the Department of State and its missions abroad; this is a responsibility no Secretary of State in the postwar period has had time to assume.

He should see to it that staff papers emanating from within the Department and from the other agencies in foreign affairs are not merely special pleading for particular interests or, when they are, that the alternatives are provided and the implications of each choice clearly spelled out.

He should compel the agencies in foreign affairs to engage in joint, systematic planning in the light of *national* objectives.

And he should ensure that resources for foreign affairs are allocated in the light of those objectives and that planning.

While the case for a single budget in foreign affairs is persuasive, Congressional opposition to the concept is still strong; for the moment, we shall have to behave as though there were such an animal. Had we done so over the past twenty years, there might not have been surpluses in one agency and shortfalls in another, or missed opportunities because of bureaucratic rigidity. Indeed, the nation might have found that the funds appropriated for programs abroad were quite sufficient to do all that really needed doing; and we might thereby have avoided much of the current Congressional revulsion to the foreign-assistance program.

The new President must be very clear about the implications of giving the Secretary of State this kind of interagency staff capability. Doing so will alter most of the existing power relationships within the foreign affairs community. Agency heads will argue bitterly against it. When they advance their arguments, the President must recognize them for what they are: the importunings of men who are losing unrestricted license within their fiefdoms—the complaints of those who are being harnessed to larger, national interests.

The Assistant Secretaries of State, too, carry crushing burdens. Rushed from crisis to crisis, they rarely have time to think ahead, plan or manage. When they do, it is too often on the basis of fragmentary information or informed instinct. In only one bureau of the Department of State has there been any real experiment with systematic analysis of policy alternatives, or of relative costs and benefits. The results have been encouraging. They argue for further strengthening of the Interdepartmental Regional Groups

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(IRG) chaired by the regional Assistant Secretaries and supported by small but potent staffs, and for highly qualified Country Directors capable of coördinating programs across agency lines. The SIG-IRG-Country Director system exists. It needs only to be given tools and marching orders, then put to work.

There is one other function for which the Permanent Under Secretary should assume responsibility. Although the agencies in foreign affairs are beginning to attack the problems posed by the information and communications explosion and are beginning to put the computer to work, the effort is halfhearted. It lacks the commitment of top management. And yet, at a time when newspaper editorials published abroad are frequently available in Washington before they come to the attention of embassy personnel in the capital concerned, it no longer makes sense to devote uncountable communications to duplicating what is known. By the same token, most important economic indicators are available in published form, and the advantages of having them summarized and reported electronicly by an embassy abroad are certainly outweighed by the contribution such communications make to the two million copies of embassy messages which are distributed all over Washington each week. Unless we break these outmoded habits, adding computer facilities to the information circuit would be akin to feeding pastry to a fat man.

What is needed, rather, is high-level commitment to an interagency attack on the information problem. The agencies in foreign affairs urgently require answers to such questions as: What information is relevant at various levels of decision-making? Who reports what and why? Where is information stored and how? What is the most efficient method of making it available to users?

III

One of the most perceptive students of governmental organization has said in these pages that: "The plain fact is that good policy demands *both* good men and good machinery. And although it may be true that good men can triumph over poor machinery, it is also true that they are more effective when they work with good machinery."[4] Assuming that the ideas advanced above will move the Government in the direction of good machinery, what can be said about good men?

[4] Senator Henry M. Jackson, "Organizing for Survival," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1960, p. 447.

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It can be said that there are lots of them in foreign affairs and that their talents are squandered scandalously.

It need not have been so. The farsighted professionals and members of both Houses of Congress responsible for the Foreign Service Act of 1946 had different intentions. They looked forward to consolidating the principle established in the mid-1920s that a single professional service should represent the United States abroad, a service responsive to the needs of all the agencies in foreign affairs, open to new ideas and talents, and self-improving. Subsequent events have confounded their dream.

As new agencies mushroomed in response to the growth of American involvement in the world, so did new foreign services created to staff them. And as the traditional diplomats of the Department of State saw their hard-won empire being whittled away by trespassers from Washington, they retreated behind a narrow definition of diplomacy, as fearful of competition as were the "battleship admirals" and "horse-cavalry colonels." The Department and its Foreign Service forfeited an extraordinary opportunity to reach out and draw in the new professionals in foreign affairs.

The existence of many foreign services has inevitably led to interservice competition, even hostility. None of the services is free of petty parochialism. None can be fully credited with serving the national, as opposed to the agency, interest. Differing regulations, assignment policies and perquisites have bred petty jealousies abroad. And agency barriers have become so impenetrable that productive exchange back and forth is all but nonexistent.

As a result, the economists in the Agency for International Development and information specialists in the United States Information Agency have not been able to deepen their understanding of the political constraints on American activities abroad. And the political specialists of the Department of State have often acquired only the haziest idea of the opportunities for advancing American interests inherent in the programs of AID and USIA. Ironically, the near-monopoly of ambassadorial appointments enjoyed by Foreign Service Officers of the Department of State contributed to its sense of éliteness at a time when its real power in foreign affairs was on the decline. The inaccessibility of such positions and the absence of career status have contributed to a widespread sense among officers of AID and

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USIA that they are, if not actually second-class citizens, at least so regarded by the "senior service." And the experience of the officers in each of the services who are appointed to high executive positions is often pathetically, even dangerously, narrow.

There have been other serious problems, which are particularly evident within the Foreign Service of the Department of State. One, related directly to the growth of competing services arising out of new ideas and new techniques, has been an overwhelming hostility to anything novel. The old ways, by definition, were the best. Another is that in a system threatened with irrelevance and in which the really good jobs are increasingly rare, the race goes to the loner who travels fast, who best manipulates the guild structure for personal ends, who has a friend who can get him out of the unpleasant job. And the collective well-being has gone glimmering: the old esprit de corps is still being invoked, but by the mid-1960s nobody was making a serious contribution to it.

Professionals have concluded that this state of affairs is due in large measure to the erosion of the concept of a unified Foreign Service of the United States. When the Government set out on the meandering paths of separate personnel systems, without a common guiding principle, without a controlling mechanism, it planted the seeds of systemic competition and distrust. The result has been sterile arguments about élitism versus operational effectiveness, and growing irrelevance to the national interest.

As the original concept of a career service designed to serve first the President and then all foreign affairs agencies was progressively eroded, the institutional safeguards which had been provided by the Act of 1946 were destroyed as well. The Board of the Foreign Service had statutorily independent status, much like the Civil Service Commission, to assure common personnel policies and the rational utilization of personnel resources, as well as to safeguard the system from political abuse. The Director General, also independent, was supposed to administer the Foreign Service of the United States. As the concept of a single service broke apart and its remnants retreated behind agency walls, the Board of the Foreign Service, through successive amendments to the Act of 1946, came to serve only a meek advisory role to the Secretary of State. In fact it meets rarely, to fulfill certain formalistic requirements in the promotion process. The Director General today is a title without a function. With-

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out these safeguards, the Foreign Services have drifted without purpose and have been opened to political abuse.

Is such a system worth saving? Or should the new Administration simply scrap it and start again? The consensus of the professionals in all of the principal agencies is that the present system is not worth saving—but that the system embodied in the Foreign Service Act of 1946 is.

The old dream of a single Foreign Service of the United States is still grand. A single service would substitute a unifying for a divisive influence in the conduct of our foreign affairs. It would provide a base sufficiently broad to make sensible personnel planning worthwhile. It would offer job opportunities attractive to the most competent of young Americans and satisfactions to their elders which have not been fully present for years. In broadening the experience of the unusually talented, it would help to create a badly needed reserve of executive talent. And it would at long last lay to rest the sterile argument about whether the nation requires "generalists" or "specialists" in foreign affairs by admitting that both are essential.

Comprehensive legislation setting up a single "Foreign Service of the United States" is not necessary. Enough authority is available now to begin to act as if there were a single service. Several things *are* necessary, however. One of them is to revitalize the Board of the Foreign Service, give it statutory independence, and make it a truly independent mechanism which assures common personnel policies across agency lines in recruitment, training, assignment, promotion and selection-out.

But much more is required than the benefits of flexibility and wider opportunities for assignment and training. The new Administration needs to attack the main failures of the present personnel system and to begin to change the environment and attitudes of the professionals. To prosecute such a reform program in an innovative and imaginative way, the Director General should become the executive agent of the revitalized Board of the Foreign Service. He must use the most modern personnel techniques, including a computer model of the personnel systems with which to test various assumptions and proposed changes in personnel policy. With such a model, the agencies in foreign affairs could, for the first time in twenty years, make decisions on a rational basis about such critical variables as skill requirements, recruitment, training quotas, promotion and egress rates.

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IV

Why should a new President concern himself with these problems? The answer is simple: he must ultimately rely on the professionals for the conduct of the nation's foreign-affairs business. At the same time, he requires of those professionals and of the system they serve: (a) that they reserve the most important decisions for him, bringing problems to him before they become crises and providing him with the relevant facts and advice—the present system is not good enough in this respect; (b) that they be flexible, imaginative and efficient in using scarce national resources abroad—the present system is none of these things; and (c) that they produce from within their own ranks the best talent for the critical jobs—they do not now.

The system and the people will produce if the new President understands that reform is not accomplished by the submission of reports, by comprehensive legislation or by delegations of authority. Real reform requires, first and foremost, the will to change and the commitment to clearly enunciated goals on the part of the President and his top appointees in foreign affairs. The President must appoint reformers if he wants reform—and he must fire them if they do not produce. The reformers already have available to them all the resources and legislative authority that they require. The options are not the poles of unordered decentralization on the one hand and total integration on the other. The options, rather, are centered on the practical, yet revolutionary, middle ground of flexibility and innovation—of integrated planning and decentralized operations.

If the new Permanent Under Secretary and the members of a revitalized Board of the Foreign Service perform their tasks well, they will accomplish three crucial things: they will make the present system work in the most efficient way; they will free the President and the top leadership of the foreign affairs community to concentrate on the really important issues; and they will lay the groundwork for a new system for the conduct of the President's foreign policies.

And, finally, the new President will have a chance to redraw the circle in such a way as to involve the Congress and the American people more significantly in foreign affairs—and make the professional more sensitive to both. There is no reason why the foreign affairs community should be exempt from the drive to-

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ward institutional reform that is so clearly moving the country; constructive change in foreign affairs is as crucial to our national health as is the reform of our domestic priorities and institutions. The goal should be ever-improving communication between the professionals and the American people. This, indeed, appears to have been the dream of Representative Wayne Hays, who offered a bill in 1965 which would, among its other provisions, have offered extraordinary opportunities to increase contacts between the professional and the citizen in business, academia and the private foreign-affairs organizations.

As the line between public service and private preoccupations narrows, it must become increasingly possible to trade information and experience back and forth. An automated data system, compatible, in its non-sensitive aspects, with business and university information requirements, would constitute an enormous step in the right direction. So, too, would a systematically enlarged consortium of talent regularly exchanged between the public and private sectors. Each would profit—in the literal sense —by providing its best employees with new experiences.

By the same token, the attitudes which both the Executive Branch and the Congress bring to their monologues on foreign policy must change. The desultory conversations which the diplomat substitutes for "consultation" must be replaced by honest dialogue extended across a widening series of topics. The shoe is clearly on the diplomatic foot to provide an earnest of its intent to develop shared information and reactions. It will be up to both Houses of Congress, however, to undertake the internal reforms of their own which will enable them to play a more vital role in foreign policy decision-making. At the moment, that role is limited to winning minor arithmetic games in budget season—games which focus on "the going rate" and are no substitute for asking tough questions, compelling clear answers and representing the public's interest effectively.

There will be voices speaking across the political divide against any change in the status quo. Yet the new Administration must hear this signal from the professionals. Reform cannot take place without Presidential commitment. Neither can reform happen without the wholehearted support of the people affected by it. This year, the professionals in foreign affairs are ready—even eager—for reform.

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POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT IN VIET NAM

By David E. Lilienthal

VIET Nam has become more than a small country in Southeast Asia. It has become a symbol of a new kind of American involvement in world affairs and a focus for intense and bitter divisions throughout every facet of American society. Few issues have produced a greater flow of books, articles, speeches, journalism and TV reports and commentaries. This stream of words has been devoted almost exclusively to two subjects: the conduct of the war, with speculations about appropriate military strategy and prospects, and the political and moral issues of the position of the United States and its allies. Whether the people of Viet Nam prosper or become permanent economic and political cripples or dependents, and how they may construct a viable nation after the fighting ceases, are issues that are rarely discussed. Yet the answers to such questions may determine the future even more than the direct outcome of the war itself. Whether the sacrifice of lives and treasure has been wasted, what lies ahead for Southeast Asia as a region, and indeed, the future standing and influence of the United States in the Pacific Basin will depend largely on the skill—or lack of it—with which the postwar economic development and reconstruction of Viet Nam, both South and North, are planned and carried out.

The task of postwar planning, of creating a design and a strategy for the transition from a wartime to a peacetime footing, and of making an objective assessment of the prospects of South Viet Nam's economy in the years ahead has been assigned to a Joint Development Group, an organization composed of a private American company, Development and Resources Corporation, and a group of Vietnamese professionals. The Joint Group has been engaged on this assignment for nearly two years. In January 1969, the Vietnamese people and their leaders will be presented with a comprehensive report and a work-program for 1969 and 1970 dealing with virtually every aspect of these postwar prospects and how to begin to turn them into realities.

This is not a detached planning exercise dealing only in the abstract with an uncertain future period; much of it is linked to development that is starting now. Experience indicates that economic development programs and action for South Viet Nam

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are both feasible and necessary even during the war. Based on the work we have been able to accomplish, we perceive a clear though little recognized relationship between political accommodation and stability on one hand, and economic stability on the other. That relationship is simply that successful civil economic plans and development, even when begun in wartime, can themselves serve as fundamental bases for evolving political settlements. It also is clear to us that the *process* of postwar planning and the *process* of program implementation are substantively as important as the plans themselves. Central to those processes is the real participation of the Vietnamese, not a course of action imposed from the outside or masterminded in the United States.

It needs to be understood that the conditions under which this work is going forward are difficult in the extreme, and unique. We are working in a war zone, where the whole country is the zone of war. We are dealing with a new Government and a completely new legislative body, not with a long-established independent government and a long habit of governing. We are dealing with untested provincial officials. We are dealing with Vietnamese economists and other technical people with only limited experience, most of it in a colonial setting or during a period of war.

Despite the difficulties, the work of postwar planning, involving many programs that are beginning now, has shown that the "postwar," in a very real sense, already exists. The Joint Group's involvement, however, remains separate from the military and paramilitary activities (the so-called pacification program) of the Vietnamese and United States Governments. Moreover, the Joint Group's activities are distinct from the work of the large American AID Mission, which deals principally with day-to-day problems.

When the Governments of Viet Nam and the United States decided late in 1966, at the Manila Conference, to prepare specific plans for the postwar and long-term civil development of Viet Nam, it was agreed that the task should not be undertaken by existing government agencies but by a new group that could function without the constraints of past commitments, policies or programs. The resulting Joint Development Group, established in Saigon early in 1967, is comprised mainly of private Vietnamese citizens, headed by a distinguished man of affairs, Professor Vu Quoc Thuc, in partnership with senior staff of a private American development company. Today there are 55 resident

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Vietnamese in the Group; a resident American staff of six is regularly supplemented at any one time by up to six additional senior staff from the Corporation's U.S. headquarters. Although Professor Thuc has very recently joined the Cabinet of President Thieu as Minister of State, most of the Vietnamese hold no posts in the Government. The Group is being financed jointly by the United States, through a contract administered by USAID, and by the Government of South Viet Nam.

In the group on both sides are economists, engineers and managers, as well as specialists in agriculture, industry, finance, transportation, forestry and other fields. Some are working on the problems of refugee resettlement and manpower training; others are concerned primarily with such technical problems as water control, rice production and public utility reconstruction and extension. But there is one thing that the Joint Development Group is not: it is not a group with a Vietnamese façade and the American members doing the actual work, but a full partnership in every sense of that word, with a division of labor to match particular skills.

The members of the Joint Development Group, Vietnamese and American, occupy the same offices, removed from the headquarters of the Vietnamese and U.S. Government establishments in Saigon. This we think important, but equally important is effective communication and interaction with numerous Vietnamese ministries and with a broad range of private interests.

II

Professor Thuc and the writer, as co-chairmen of the Joint Development Group, made an initial report to President Thieu the day after the new Government was installed in November 1967. Our "call to action" stressed the specifics of the task in the immediate future and did not minimize the difficulties in carrying out the early stages of a plan for civil development in the midst of the war. The planning is now going forward in both the public and the private sectors of the economy, in areas such as highways, ports, utilities and other sectors of the infrastructure needed to support the private economy, and in the whole range of social services such as education and public health and medical services, conceived in terms of Viet Nam's own resources. The objective is not primarily to create a comprehensive national plan, certainly not at this time. Instead of a grandiose and con-

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ventional "five-year plan," we prefer a more pragmatic approach —in other words, to examine some of the more critical and specific problems of the transition from war to peace, such as unemployment, and to identify opportunities for immediate action.

While excellent non-bureaucratic working arrangements have provided ready access to the President and other top officials of the Government of South Viet Nam, many programs, such as refugee resettlement in the Central Highlands or the relocation of rural and town dwellers in the Delta in preparation for flood control and irrigation works, require the active support of local leaders and of private groups. Accordingly, the Joint Group often discusses project plans with leaders of such groups as the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Catholics and Buddhists to obtain their understanding and criticism.

The basic philosophy, and a central objective even more important than the process of planning, is to stimulate the Vietnamese to devise and carry out plans themselves. The importance that both the Vietnamese and their American associates attach to this is evident from the Group's organization and operating methods. We seek to avoid sterile planning by foreigners and to ensure as far as possible the close participation of the Vietnamese in actual programs and problems of civil development. This is made trebly difficult by the shockingly inadequate compensation paid our Vietnamese associates.

III

The Joint Development Group is focusing on two central streams of activity. First is the civil development planning going forward in every major sector of the Vietnamese economy:

1. *Economic Policy.* The Group is now considering a range of policies and procedures to deal with such postwar fiscal problems as income and employment growth, stability of balance of payments and the stimulation of savings and investment.

2. *Manpower.* Estimates are being made of the size and distribution of the labor force, the civil skills available in the military establishment and the possible future need for allocation and absorption of the labor force in the postwar period. Training and education programs are being planned to support the reëmployment of the labor force during the period of transition from war to peace.

3. *Agriculture.* Recognizing that agriculture will continue to predominate in the postwar economy, a varied agriculture development program is under way, ranging from feasibility and research studies directed toward agricul-

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tural diversification (from duck feathers to cinnamon bark) to a broad review of the capability of the land, soil and climate of the whole country.

4. *Forestry.* The emphasis is on practical ways to increase the flow of raw material to the nation's forest-processing facilities. Later studies will be directed toward a comprehensive forest policy for Viet Nam, but today the urgent need is for building materials in the reconstruction effort.

5. *Industry.* Planning for industry is closely linked to the agricultural effort; definitive appraisals are in progress for an integrated forest-products industry and for fertilizer. A whole range of commodities and industries that may be profitably developed domestically are being analyzed, as are incentive programs for stimulating private investment and financial institutions to assist the investment process.

6. *The Problems of Saigon.* Metropolitan Saigon, with roughly 20 percent of the population of South Viet Nam, continues to grow under the stimulus of migration from agricultural regions of people seeking security and the jobs and better incomes that urban life affords. Even more than in the many other major burgeoning cities of Southeast Asia, because of the war the effects of this growth are reflected in desperately overloaded utilities, shockingly inadequate social services, shortage of housing and limited ability to function as an efficient urban complex. The Joint Group, with other agencies and private citizens' groups, is seeking to identify the key issues in the future growth of Saigon and what, specifically, and piece by manageable piece, can be done to make it a more livable city after the war.

7. *Infrastructure.* A principal emphasis here is the planning for conversion to civilian use of the prodigious and extensive port, highway and utility systems which have been created for military purposes.

8. *Social Services.* The Joint Development Group is reviewing fundamental questions of education and public health, the objective being to determine the levels of these social programs which can, realistically, be afforded and supported by Viet Nam in peacetime.

Opportunities exist to initiate some of the foregoing programs immediately and staff effort is directed to getting these under way in the very near future.

High on such a list is the design of a water-control system in the Vietnamese Delta of the Mekong River. Schedules call for the beginning of construction of this system early in 1970. Land-survey and soil-boring crews began work in the Delta in November 1968 to secure information for the design of what probably will be the largest single development in Viet Nam and one of the largest agricultural programs ever undertaken. In this effort we have been working with the Mekong Coördination Committee Secretariat in Bangkok, which under United Nations auspices has been assembling basic data on the unified development of the river basin as a whole. Viet Nam has participated in this multinational effort, so that the Delta project will be an integral

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component of a future Basin-wide program. By its present action in the Delta, however, Viet Nam will soon be the first of the four riparian nations to utilize the main stream of the Mekong. The Delta project, by controlling floods, extending water use in irrigation and improving cultivation practices, will at a minimum double the production on nearly five million acres of land. The first stage, now in an active engineering design phase, will probably require a five-year construction period, encompass up to one million acres of land and cost in the order of $50–$80 million for basic flood control and drainage work.

The second major objective of stimulating Vietnamese activity is realized in the process of planning itself. Studies of a variety of special problems are entirely in Vietnamese hands. For example, in 1967 the Vietnamese mounted a survey of rural areas, conducting interviews in 634 villages, to assess popular aspirations as a basis for a future rural development program. In the past year, this research ranged from inventories of sawmill facilities for the production of sawn timber for refugee housing, to setting priorities for the improvement of national highways. This work is providing opportunities for the Vietnamese, young men and women as well as the more experienced, to participate in the planning and implementation of programs.

IV

As the work of the Joint Development Group proceeds, the wealth of South Viet Nam is becoming apparent. One of the Group's reports emphasizes this:

> For several years well over a million men on both sides have been fighting in the country, but physical destruction is minimal and, in spite of many pressures, the economic wealth of the country in physical facilities has increased.
>
> South Vietnam has a system of modern ports that will not require major renovation and is capable of expansion; an agriculture that is diversifying, that is beginning to benefit from the potentials of new types of rice and that has a basis for absorbing other technological improvements; an industrial structure that has not seriously suffered and that has investment funds available when the risk-reward calculation is favorable; and a labor force that has acquired useful skill.
>
> In economic terms, Vietnam does not have a large debt or debt service burden, and its foreign exchange reserves are sufficient to finance six months of imports even at inflated import levels.
>
> By many measures South Vietnam is in an enviable position in relation to

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the experience of other countries at the end of a war, including Korea more than a decade ago. There are serious problems in the number of refugees, the dependence on United States aid, and distortions in the economy, but overall, economically the country is fortunate.[1]

These structural strengths, however, cannot obscure the terrible seriousness of the problems that will beset Viet Nam at the end of twenty years of war. Construction and other activities by the United States and the allies have accounted for perhaps a quarter of the country's income and have employed 140,000 people at the peak. The phasing down of such activities will cause economic pressure to create jobs and income. The need to resettle refugees, rehabilitate agriculture, provide for urban housing and control the economy to avoid serious inflation or deflation will all add to the difficulty of making a smooth and successful transition. The demobilization of military manpower and the shifting of employment out of military-related activities alone mean that the economy will have to find jobs for a large number of people, including refugees, and will require investment and foreign exchange. All sectors and all social classes will be affected to some degree, for men for the army have been drawn from them all. By a rough calculation, in the first 18 months or two years 500,000 people must find new jobs or shift from one to another. We believe that this is feasible. This judgment, based largely on extensive observation of the average Vietnamese citizen's extraordinary adaptability, resourcefulness and quickness to learn new skills, is shared by American construction contractors in Viet Nam and by outside labor experts.

Employment in agriculture is the safety valve. Not only will the agricultural sector absorb much of the manpower and provide necessary food, but it will form a major source of export earnings. Of all the programs presently under consideration by the Joint Group for the long-run development of agriculture, that dealing with the Mekong River Delta is the most advanced and easily the most significant. Other less extensive opportunities for agricultural diversification are being examined—for example, in the five northern provinces, on the north coastal plains, in the provinces around Saigon and in the Central Highlands where there may be opportunities for small-farmer forestry in combination with traditional crops and animal production.

It is implicit in such agricultural development that major

[1] Dr. F. T. Moore, "Economic Policies in the Transition to Peace and After," Working Paper No. 23, Saigon, 1968.

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population shifts may be needed. For example, the coastal strip north of Qui Nhon has more people than it can support, while there are under-used lands in the Highlands (on the Darlac plateau, for example) and in surrounding areas that appear favorable for settlement and development. But the incentives for people to move there from the overpopulated areas are still lacking; and the memory of forcible migration to the Highlands under President Diem is a deterrent. The need to protect the tribal rights to the land of the non-Vietnamese hill people has not yet been adequately considered. Nevertheless, a major shift of agricultural population from the north coast into the Highlands, and secondarily into the Mekong Delta, appears to be virtually the only way of improving the lot of the people involved in a permanent way. The process of opening up these lands to settlement will be costly and tedious, but the long-run benefits may appear to the Vietnamese to be worth the price.

Among agricultural programs many people automatically give "land reform" the highest priority. Often land reform is equated with the breaking up of big units into small ones and the passing out of land titles. In the writer's opinion, based on years of non-academic and non-political experience in the realities of food production, the slogan of land reform has, in this sense, scant reality. In Viet Nam, even if all landlords with more than, say, 100 acres were suddenly dispossessed and the land redistributed in small plots, the total numbers affected would be small. The difficulties facing land reform are of a different nature: the fragmentation of land into plots (or single furrows) so impossibly small that no decent living can be made from them; the insecurity of farm tenure and the exorbitant rents; the inability to get fertilizers and seeds on realistic terms and in steady supply; and the lack of equipment. The real problems have to do with the size of efficient productive units and the necessity of raising farm incomes above subsistence levels. In short, the problem of land reform in Viet Nam is to reconstruct and modernize agriculture.

The major burden of insuring an orderly and efficient transition to peace falls, of course, on the Government. Several kinds of governmental programs are required. First, we estimate that the Government needs to provide between 100,000 and 150,000 jobs, primarily on public works programs. Plans are being made so that these may be set in operation quickly when peace comes. As an example, up to 75,000 men might be employed in forestry

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projects, including planting fast-growing industrial trees, rehabilitation of forests, building small roads, small dams and diversion ditches. Such works can be started quickly, will use large numbers of unskilled workers with simple and inexpensive tools and can be expanded or contracted without serious disruption. Moreover, being largely rural projects, they can hold part of the labor force away from urban areas. They might also provide temporary jobs for refugees. Similar opportunities may also exist in road building and housing. With such prospects the target figure for employment on public programs does not appear exorbitant.

But the private sector must share in the task; it might be counted on to supply from 50,000 to 75,000 new jobs in manufacturing and construction, according to current estimates. It seems likely that there are private investment funds available that simply await favorable circumstances in the economy. The Joint Development Group has established working arrangements with agencies such as the Viet Nam Development Bank, the Industrial Development Center and the commercial banks, which in conjunction with the private sector are available to prepare the way for the mobilization of private investment. Such programs in the public and private sectors can be expected to stimulate a secondary effect in commerce, trade and services, where employment is closely linked to the levels of national income and manufacturing, construction and government activities.

V

The public and private investments required for development will over-strain the resources of Viet Nam, even though transfers can be made from defense to public works. The Joint Development Group has recommended that taxes and other sources of revenue be maintained and increased where possible, but it seems inevitable that even heroic measures will not provide sufficient domestic resources to fill the need; the gap must be filled by external aid. A development program requires foreign exchange to purchase raw materials, capital goods and consumer goods which cannot be produced efficiently at home. Viet Nam has always had a deficit in its balance of commodity trade and has relied on private and official capital flows to maintain its balance of payments. The recent levels of imports, swollen by wartime demand, provide little guidance as to what may be required in the future. The Joint Development Group has addressed itself to this whole

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question of the cost of postwar development and of finding the sources of the needed capital. Its first estimates were prepared for President Thieu's use at his talks with President Johnson in Honolulu last July. Recent forecasts suggest that for the economy to make the adjustment to peacetime and to grow thereafter will probably require an average of $500 to $600 million in imports annually over the next ten years, or about 15 to 20 percent of projected levels of the gross national product. At the peak figure in 1963, Viet Nam's exports amounted to about $80 million a year. It is estimated that within five years exports could double and continue to rise to $200 million or more. The increase will come not only from traditional exports but from new commodities such as pulp, wood products, processed seafood and special agricultural products. For example, Viet Nam produces the highest grade of cinnamon bark in the world; export earnings from it alone could be on the order of $10 million annually.

After the initial transition period, import requirements should slacken, but there will still be an annual gap of $300 to $400 million in the commodity balance of trade. Even if, as seems indicated, private capital will be attracted to the country, from $250 to $350 million per year will still be required in aid. Some of this might be in the form of soft currencies, but about $200 million annually will be needed in hard currencies. Since annual averages are often deceptive, it is better to say that aid on the order of $2 billion spread over a ten-year period will be needed.

VI

In spite of the difficulties described, the prospects for rehabilitation and growth in Viet Nam in a peaceful environment are favorable. Although comparisons between countries are not fully trustworthy, Viet Nam should be able to show sustained growth at a rate at least on the order of Thailand's, which has been about 6 percent annually. That, however, will require both the help of other nations and its own effective action. If external aid is forthcoming, and if Viet Nam adopts the appropriate policies for growth, it is reasonable to expect that the country can achieve economic independence within ten years (and possibly less), at which time aid can cease. Such a performance would exceed that achieved by most recipients of aid.

Economic independence of this kind will be greatly welcomed by the United States, which has carried a disproportionate share

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of aid throughout the world. It will be no less welcomed by the Vietnamese who understand that their goal of political independence cannot be achieved without it.

The United States has made a commitment in the war; it has doubly made such a commitment to peace and to the support of efforts to maintain conditions of peace. This is not a burden which the United States can or, I believe, will shoulder alone. It must be shared among many, not the least being those nations in the Pacific Basin itself. The American pledge to support the development of Southeast Asia needs to be matched by others who have been involved directly or indirectly in the events of the past years—as allies, as economic beneficiaries of the war (notably Japan) and, indeed, as critics. Ally and critic alike have a responsibility to help find a viable and lasting path of development for Viet Nam and for Southeast Asia as a whole.

The corollary to the need for external aid in achieving economic independence is the need for South Viet Nam to adopt appropriate policies of growth. Understandably, after 20 years of war, during the last few years of which large numbers of foreigners have been prominent and influential in the country, various forms of xenophobia have appeared, inspired by a sense of nationalism and pride of culture. In the economic field, this has created a preference for import substitution rather than export promotion, for the public sector to assume responsibility over wide areas of economic activity and exercise tight controls over the private sector, and for direct controls rather than competitive market processes. In general, this attitude looks inward and is conservative rather than outward-looking and expansive.

It is clear, even now, that Viet Nam cannot successfully make the transition to a peaceful footing if such autarchic policies are dominant in its economy. Ultimately, they meet neither the need for efficiency in the use of resources nor the requirements of social justice. If carried to an extreme, they would make it difficult if not impossible for Viet Nam to attain or enjoy economic independence. Long-continued economic dependence on foreigners would make a tragic travesty of the sacrifices made in the cause of political independence.

Although South Viet Nam can most certainly develop as an independent nation, its future course and prosperity are tied in an important sense to the development of its neighbors in Southeast Asia, including Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and North Viet

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Nam. Regional integration could bring extra benefits to all. But a regional instrument is needed to start the process, to erase any lingering memory of French-dominated Indochina and to forge new relationships between the present sovereign states. The development of the resources of the lower basin of the Mekong River provides this opportunity. By this means the four riparian countries can slowly learn to negotiate, to compromise, to coöperate and in the process secure very considerable benefits for each and all of them. For ten years the United Nations has been working through the Mekong Coördination Committee in Bangkok to realize these aims; the effort has met with only limited success thus far, but when peace comes to Southeast Asia the chance for results will substantially increase.

Opportunities for regional coöperation also exist in trade and commerce, monetary and clearing-house agreements, pooling of facilities in research and development (and possibly higher education), and interconnection of transportation and communication systems. In addition, there are other immediate and quite specific opportunities for economic intercourse between South Viet Nam and its neighbors. An example is the movement of Cambodian logs downstream to the centers of the Vietnamese Delta where timber is lacking. The economics of this traditional movement and the conditions under which it might be reëstablished are now being studied by the Joint Development Group. Similarly, Laotian timber could be used in a proposed industrial complex of forest products under consideration at DaNang. This will necessitate reopening an existing highway from Laos over the divide of the Annamese Range.

Perhaps the most productive opportunity for economic liaison is the one least considered. That is with North Viet Nam. In the formulation of long-term strategies for growth in the South, it is hopelessly unrealistic in an economic sense to exclude the complementary functions of the North; nor does it seem impossible to achieve the necessary coöperation in human terms. This has nothing whatever to do with the unification of the two countries, which may be a generation away; the questions concerned are purely *functional,* such, for example, as the respective industrial roles of Saigon and Hanoi. Even more immediate and more tangible relationships will become practicable when the war ends, such as reopening the main highway between Saigon and Hanoi, reëstablishing traditional exchange of agricultural produce, espe-

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cially rice, and possibly extending it to include woodpulp, tropical fruits and fibers in return for northern minerals and manufactures. Finally, there are other kinds of exchanges, of a human sort. Many times people in Saigon speak of their divided families and their longing for personal news from their original homes in the North, and similar expressions are heard in Hanoi. So simple a measure as a resumption of direct postal service should have priority on the lists of both sides.

On May 23, 1968, in what was called the "Tokyo Statement," leading Asian figures, prominent among them important Japanese intellectuals, agreed upon this statement: "The cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam will call for a large coöperative international effort of reconstruction and rehabilitation." If the spirit of this resolution is followed, a significant step will be taken to turn some of the postwar prospects for development, peace and stability in Viet Nam into reality. To this end, we propose the early formation of an informal working conference of the countries that are the most likely source of postwar aid and assistance, with the aim of establishing a mechanism for developing a future program of multinational aid. The United States, Japan and other Pacific countries should obviously be included in the group. The initiative in convening the conference could most appropriately be taken by the Asian Development Bank. Such an informal consortium should not confine its attention to South Viet Nam alone. The problems of North Viet Nam and its need for aid in developing the Red River and rehabilitating its industry and natural resources should also be included. If, as we have estimated, $2 billion of aid is needed for South Viet Nam, the total required for both North and South Viet Nam will be substantially larger.

Writing of Viet Nam in a recent issue of *Foreign Affairs*, the editor of this journal concluded with these words: "In the final accounting, the United States will be judged by its behavior when the fighting is over." Much the same accounting should be applied as well to the behavior of others "when the fighting is over": South Viet Nam; North Viet Nam; members of the international community which have been supporting one or the other of the combatants, or have been critical of them; and Japan, which is so deeply concerned in Southeast Asia's future.

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A NEW ATLANTIC ROLE FOR CANADA

By Roy A. Matthews

WITH the success of the Liberals in the Canadian general election of last June, a forceful new Prime Minister (elected leader of his party only a couple of months earlier) received a clear mandate for political action. Attracted by the swinging style and obvious intellectual calibre of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, observers in other countries have been taking a greater interest than usual in Canadian affairs. And they have naturally been especially concerned to know about the new administration's views on international issues.

Mr. Trudeau has provided several examples of his thinking on foreign affairs, the most definitive appearing in a policy statement issued by the Prime Minister's Office in May, during the course of the election campaign. It was stated there that Canada planned "to recognize the People's Republic of China government as soon as possible and to enable that government to occupy the seat of China in the United Nations, taking into account that there is a separate government in Taiwan." The Canadian authorities would "explore new avenues of increasing our political and economic relations with Latin America, where more than four hundred million people will live by the turn of the century and where we have substantial interests." By way of "reflecting in our foreign relations the cultural diversity and the bilingualism of Canada," Ottawa intended to "strive to develop a close relationship with the francophone countries." And so on.

The Canadian position in the Atlantic community was given only a rather guarded reference in the May statement. The Canadian military presence in Europe, and "the whole range of our economic, political and cultural ties" with the European countries would, it observed, be subjected to detailed examination by a special "task force." In earlier verbal comments, however, Mr. Trudeau had argued that Europe "no longer needs us" militarily, as it used to, and that "our natural area of defence is in the North American continent." On the other hand, he had also expressed support for a free trade area of "the whole Atlantic region," if it could be brought about through the mechanism of the multilateral tariff negotiating system.

The observation about defense raised quite a storm of contro-

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versy in Canada, and not a few ripples elsewhere. And the reactions grew more intense later in the summer, when the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia suggested a renewal of the threat of war in Central Europe. The reference to a trading alignment among Atlantic countries aroused less concern, but it was received with much interest in academic and business circles.

The task force on Canada's relations with Europe is now hard at work, and is aiming to produce first drafts on its report within a few weeks. The operation is an internal one (though some outside the government will ultimately be drawn into it) and, since it is not yet possible to say what recommendations will emerge, this article will give a purely personal assessment of the problems; but it will make an evaluation of past history and contemporary events such as must lie behind any attempt to gauge the requirements of Canadian foreign policy in the Atlantic area today.

II

Canada's participation in what we describe, rather vaguely, as the Atlantic community has two principal aspects: the political-strategic, and the economic. The former of these roles is expressed primarily, of course, through its military contribution to NATO —plus its more localized role in NORAD, the North American Air Defense Agreement. The economic involvement, on the other hand, has not advanced so far toward a true community. However, in all the postwar discussion of measures to promote closer economic links between the Atlantic countries, the accent has been mainly on trade arrangements; and the framework within which such arrangements have to be made is GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Therefore, it seems most profitable to concentrate on an examination of Canadian attitudes toward these two international instrumentalities, NATO and GATT.

In broad terms, it can be said that there are two basic political issues in Canada: the problem of the country's relationship with the United States, and the problem of the relationship between English-speaking and French-speaking Canada. The first of these difficulties is evident enough. Canada, a nation of twenty million people, lies on the doorstep of the immense, rich, strong and dynamic United States of America, the leader of the Western world. Its history, ethnic composition and general "way of life" are sufficiently similar to those of its giant neighbor to provide little

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natural insulation against influences from the south, such as to some extent preserves Mexico's identity from a similar "cultural infection" from across the border. Since Canadians therefore tend to have much the same aspirations as Americans, and every opportunity to check at first hand how close they are coming to the U.S. performance, the price a Canadian electorate will be prepared to pay for national sovereignty cannot be very great. As a consequence, governments in Canada are, in effect, engaged in a constant attempt to minimize the economic cost of political independence. In a general way, they also endeavor to draw the attention of the public somewhat away from things American and toward Canada's own interests and achievements. However, because these domestic features are always overshadowed by comparison with the U.S. equivalent, it has long been the custom to seek to redress the balance by stressing the importance of links with, and events in, other nations outside the North American continent.

GATT and NATO are both very relevant to these traditional Canadian government attitudes. The first offers an opportunity to reduce trade barriers, one of the more important factors contributing to the gap between Canadian and American living standards, which averages between 25 and 30 percent. And the attempt to liberalize trade is made on a multinational basis, a method that has seemed to Canadians less likely to endanger their country's sovereignty than would a lowering of tariffs vis-à-vis the United States alone.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has a rather similar appeal. Among all the extra-continental relationships that might be suggested to provide Canada with the necessary additional foreign-policy dimension, the most obvious is that with the nations of Western Europe, ancestral homeland of the vast majority of Canadians. The inclusion of Canada and the United States within an Atlantic grouping that embraces West European countries has thus appeared to Canadians a particularly congenial arrangement. Although NATO's purposes are essentially military, and in this respect relatively unattractive to a people with a pacific tradition, the idea of defending the European wellsprings of Canadians' cultural heritage has been viewed sympathetically, at least until recent years, by almost everyone in Canada.

Turning to Canada's second major political problem—the achievement of a satisfactory basis for Canadian-*Canadien* re-

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lations—one finds a situation in many ways more subtle and complex, but not dissimilar. Both problems have the feature of asymmetry. Just as Canada as a whole has to find a satisfactory accommodation on a continent dominated by the overwhelmingly powerful United States, so the six million or so French-Canadians are faced with a challenge to their cultural survival from fourteen million English-speaking Canadians (and, at one remove, another two hundred million English-speaking people south of the border).

GATT and NATO are not as obviously relevant to the French-English situation within Canada. Nevertheless, their reference to the wider world, multilingual and multicultural, has given some promise of helping Canada to transcend parochial domestic squabbles. For young intellectuals at least—and these are the people most interested in such matters—international organizations with headquarters in Geneva and Paris or Brussels, using English and French as their main working languages, help to show that there is for Canada a political context larger than North America, and that the French tongue has considerable usefulness far beyond the confines of "La Belle Province."

III

So much for the background. How have postwar events in fact affected Canada's goals?

A major feature of U.S. foreign policy for the past twenty years has been (as it still remains) to promote the integration of all Western Europe, which would then form the eastern "pillar" of an Atlantic partnership between a United States of Europe and the United States of America. This aim found a ready response in most of continental Europe, where it was apparent that only through unification could the relatively small countries of the Old World hope to compete with enormous nations like the United States and the Soviet Union. Initially, it was less popular, of course, in Britain, which was convinced that it had a maritime, rather than a continental, destiny and felt that its connections with the United States and the Commonwealth gave it an opportunity to hold its own against the giants without full integration into the European union.

What is less well known, although far more obvious, is that the "two-pillar" idea was very far from ideal for Canada. A partnership between a United States of Europe and the United

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States of America was likely to leave Canada as the "Outer One" —or as a minor appendage of the American pillar. Neither of these prospects was much relished by Canadians. On the other hand, the broader international objectives of Canadian policy favored British inclusion in a unified Europe, to add strength and political stability to a part of the world which two generations of Canadians knew mainly as a battleground. So long as Britain remained aloof from the European experiment the issue did not arise. But in the early 1960s, when the British decided to seek membership in the EEC after all, Canadians faced a real problem of accommodating to a trend of events that ran counter to long established (if poorly comprehended) national policies.

As noted earlier, one of these policies has been the encouragement of extra-continental relationships to offset partially the manifold influences from the United States; a primary alternative relationship has been provided by the Commonwealth connection. Greatly though the Commonwealth has declined in the Canadian scheme of things—both as a symbol and as a basis for political and economic arrangements—it has continued to be valued, in a vague way, as a counterweight to the American involvement in Canadian life. In specific economic terms, this principle gave rise to the "British preference" tariff system, which was clearly incompatible with EEC membership. The Canadian Government offered all kinds of objections to this threatened loss of trade, but as events turned out, there was no need to worry. The French lowered the boom against British membership in 1963 and once again the problem of Canada's stance in Atlantic economic affairs receded. This time, however, Canadians concerned about their country's international economic position did not relax; they began to think hard about where their interests lay and what changes in policy should be made to conform to the new situation. When the British tried again for EEC membership four years later, Canada accepted the event calmly enough, for in that interval an extensive reappraisal had been launched. While it was (and still is) very far from complete, Canadians had already gained an increased sense of direction in their external economic policy.

What did this reëxamination show? More than anything else, it revealed a number of simple facts which had long been recognized by experts but were only poorly appreciated by the general public. One of these facts was the changed orientation of Can-

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adian trading relations. Whereas in the 1920s and 1930s the United States took about 40 percent of Canada's exports, Britain 40 percent, and the rest of the world 20 percent, in the 1950s and 1960s the proportions altered to approximately 60 percent, 15 percent and 25 percent respectively. Clearly, the policy of encouraging extra-continental economic relationships as a counterweight to trade with the United States was unlikely to succeed if it remained focused primarily on Britain.

Another point which became obvious was the ineffectiveness of tariffs in fostering the development of an autonomous domestic industrial complex and thus strengthening Canada's independence of the United States. Not only had the tariff failed to prevent the rise in Canadian dependence on U.S. markets to its current level of 60 percent of all export trade—and an even more startling growth in Canada's reliance on American sources of supply to 70 percent of total imports—but it had positively encouraged U.S. businesses to establish plants in Canada, thus augmenting the growth of American ownership of Canadian industry. By the mid-1960s almost one-half of Canada's manufacturing sector was owned or controlled by U.S. interests, a situation which many observers considered far more dangerous to the country's political sovereignty than was the orientation of its foreign trade.

Along with these second thoughts about the efficacy of the tariff in achieving economic autonomy, however, was the recognition that it had almost certainly helped speed up the process of industrialization, which had put Canada into the front rank of modern, dynamic Western societies. The question now was whether protection remained necessary or was in fact preventing what had become a mature and technically efficient manufacturing sector from shedding the constraints of undue fragmentation and inadequate scale, which inhibited full economic efficiency.

IV

Turning to defense policy, feelings about NATO have also changed. Like Americans, Canadians see it as part of a broad military strategy, in which the joint effort for the protection of Western Europe contributes indirectly to the general defense and well-being of North America. But though Canada has from the start been a willing participant in European defense, for reasons that are evident enough, NATO has never been viewed as immediately relevant to the problem of Canada's security at

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home. Also, Canadians have been less able than Americans to look upon their involvement in European defense as crucially significant. Whereas the presence of the very large U.S. contingents in Europe has clearly been vital in providing a credible deterrent to aggression from the East, the Canadian army brigade and small naval and air units have seemed hardly likely to tip the scales in NATO's favor in any European war.

Even so, for a long time Canada did not seriously waver in its wholehearted support of NATO. The reason was that, once again, the broad defense alignment between a group of Atlantic nations seemed to be more healthy politically than a purely continental system of partnership with the United States, in which the Canadians played a very subordinate role. In fact, of course, the continental arrangement existed too, in NORAD, but the involvement in NATO contributed that other dimension so important to the Canadian feeling of political balance.

In the mid-1960s, however, the Canadian views of NATO began to alter somewhat. The evidence of changing attitudes among the European members as to the usefulness of the Alliance, at least in its prevailing form, increased Canadians' doubts about the value of their own role in Europe. Revived European pride, not limited entirely to France, made the presence of non-European troops and military installations seem less welcome than they were after the War. And the immensely enhanced U.S. capacity for airlifting men across the Atlantic in a few hours suggested that, in fact, such a physical presence might no longer be critical to Europe's defense.

Canada's contribution to NATO thus came more and more to appear to the public as a symbolic gesture of solidarity with allies and no longer as an operation that could be justified in military terms. The official view in Ottawa remained that Canadian forces in Europe were necessary, both to maintain the solidarity of the alliance and to hold on to the "second dimension" in Canadian foreign policy. But popular opinion swung noticeably away from the uncritical support that had been the rule ever since the end of the War, and it is perhaps noteworthy that the eight squadrons of F-104 aircraft that Canada provided to NATO in the early 1960s had been allowed to diminish, "as a result of attrition," to six squadrons by the end of 1967.

At the same time that the commitment to NATO was coming under scrutiny, a similar hard look was being taken at the North

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American aspect of Canadian defense policy, which is obviously closely related to any broader Atlantic military strategy. The odd feature about North American defense is that, with or without an alliance, any attack on Canada would necessarily be considered as an attack on the United States. And the corollary of that situation is that, by defending themselves, the Americans are bound incidentally to defend Canada. Therefore, many Canadians reason, why not leave the protection of the whole of North America to the vast U.S. military machine and employ Canadian armed forces (which can contribute only a mite to a joint defense effort) in some more significant and useful activity?

For many Canadians, the joint defense system with the United States had seemed worthwhile so long as a Soviet bomber threat required radar and other facilities on Canadian territory, as well as use of Canada's airspace by American fighters and antiaircraft missiles. Canada could hardly countenance the idea of U.S. military installations on Canadian soil without any involvement by its own forces. Nor could it afford to envisage the prospect of Russian bombers being engaged over Canadian cities by U.S. planes or rocket artillery, while the Canadian air force was busy elsewhere. By the mid-1960s, however, it was generally believed that ICBMs and not bombers would be the principal means of any Soviet attack on the North American continent, and this prospect began to create doubt about the need for far-north radar barriers, Bomarc sites or the use of Canadian airspace by U.S. fighters. The validity of Canada's contribution to NORAD came to be questioned more widely than before.

Such feelings have continued to spread, so that by now the Canadian involvement in both NATO and NORAD is not to be taken for granted. Needless to say, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has given pause to critics of defense policy, but it remains to be seen whether it will really change the course of the debate. On the whole, Canadians seem to consider the Czechoslovakian development as only a temporary setback to the process of gradual détente between Russia and the West, rather than a fundamental obstacle to the reconciliation of cold war differences. If that is so, it implies merely a postponement, and not a change, in any plans for overhauling the Canadian position in the Atlantic defense system.

There is no significant evidence, it should be stressed, that Canadians favor a pacifist, or even a strictly neutralist, policy.

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The most general feeling is that Canada is morally bound to assist in the defense of the Western world, in one way or another, to approximately the same proportional extent as its friends and allies. Moreover, those for whom morality is less important than self-interest suggest that American good will, which is worth a great deal to Canada in bread-and-butter terms, would clearly be jeopardized by a Canadian refusal to contribute its share to the common load. The argument centers on the form of the Canadian contribution and, specifically, on the merits of a larger participation by Canada in military and other functions in the Third World as opposed to full involvement in the strategic arrangements of the great powers.

The rationale for Canadian concentration on the Third World is as follows. Rightly or wrongly, the United States is distrusted in many Asian, African and Latin American countries simply because it is big and powerful. In addition, all the larger European nations, as well as Japan, are suspect because of their imperial or neo-imperial behavior in the past. This problem provides an opportunity for a few countries that are not powerful or ex-imperial, but are wealthy enough to have some resources to spare, to fulfill an especially useful function in the underdeveloped and uncommitted regions of the world. Canada, like Switzerland, the Scandinavian nations and a handful of others, has become very active in this type of endeavor. There have been Canadian contingents in virtually all the peacekeeping forces and international supervisory operations since the War—Indochina, Palestine, Kashmir, Yemen, Gaza, the Congo, Cyprus.

It is certainly arguable that such contributions may have done more for the peace and stability of the world over the past twenty years than have the Canadian military activities at home and in Europe. By extension it has been suggested that Canada could engage in more such operations if its available forces were committed primarily, if not exclusively, to peacekeeping—first, because there would simply be larger numbers of men and matériel to devote to that purpose, and second, because the measure of nonalignment implied would presumably make Canadian servicemen that much more acceptable in the Third World. The further point is made that American good will would not be sacrificed by a switch from the conventional contribution to Western defense if the burden the new role imposed on Canada were approximately comparable to that borne at present.

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V

What are the implications of this analysis for the future shape of Canadian policy in the Atlantic area, and to what extent will these same implications be drawn by the current official foreign-policy review? Dealing with the second question first, it seems likely that the present government review will produce very little in the way of changes in Canada's international economic or defense policies. The new Prime Minister and his cabinet have been too short a time in office to have fully thought through these major issues, and the public service is still largely in thrall to the philosophy of the previous administration. However, within a longer time-horizon—perhaps five years—the new ideas and attitudes that are now taking shape will, I believe, have begun to be translated into policy.

The most striking feature of the Canada of the 1970s will be, in my view, a readiness on the part of Canadians to accept, and even welcome, the fact that their country is not quite "a nation like the others." There will be a recognition of the very special relationship with the United States and a greater willingness to seek ways to exploit this unique position rather than to worry and complain about it. What this will mean is, first, an increasing determination to choose the nature of their manifold links with their southern neighbor instead of simply accepting the accidents of events. The Canadian Government, backed by private interests, will launch a rigorous and far-reaching "cost-benefit analysis" with respect to the relationship, designed to weigh the options and arrive at an optimum proportion of independence and of interdependence. Where this analysis indicates that a particular feature of Canadian life has a high "sovereignty content," the policy will emphasize independence more strongly than before. But where the benefits of continental integration appear great and the adverse effects slight, there will be a preparedness to enter more fully into the American orbit.

A major result of this cost-benefit analysis will be the conclusion that Canada has little to fear, and a great deal to gain, from a closer interlocking of certain aspects of the two countries' economic systems, particularly as it can be achieved through elimination of trade barriers. Enhanced industrial effectiveness, gained through a "continental rationalization" of manufacturing operations on each side of the border, will come to appear irresistibly

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attractive, because of its potential for increasing Canada's wealth and thus lessening the real political restraints imposed by the difference in Canadian and U.S. living standards. Or, to put it another way, such an alignment will appear not only relatively free of adverse consequences for political sovereignty, but capable of permitting Canada to pay a higher price for independent policies desired in other sectors.

Among the sectors in which more independence will be sought, in my view, is overall foreign policy—including defense. A degree of disengagement would permit Canada to shift its military investment into peacekeeping activities of a kind that would give Canadians a sense of adequate national involvement in the world's problems—as their present major defense functions do not. Such a policy, while fostering a feeling of national purpose in Canada, will in no way aim at hurting the interests of the United States. Indeed, I suspect that the U.S. Government, which has come to recognize the limitations which its position places on it in certain types of international situations, will increasingly rely upon the sort of special role that a freer agent like Canada can perform.

The implications of such a general philosophy for Canadian economic and military policy in the Atlantic area are fairly simple in principle, though far more subtle in practice. If the crucial factor in Canada's economic prospects comes to be the freeing of impediments to trade with the United States, relations with all other trading partners will seem much less important. And because Canada will be more and more ready to perform a particular military role on the world scene, its interest in defense alliances will obviously be greatly reduced.

To be specific, in regard to trade I would envisage that the efficacy of GATT, in Canadian eyes, will appear by the 1970s to hinge on its ability to provide a mechanism whereby Canada can mutually eliminate tariffs with the United States in a manner appropriate to its particular requirements. The obvious means to that end is a free-trade area (as permitted under Article 24 of the Agreement) with the United States. However, quite apart from Canadian attitudes toward such a widespread integration with the American giant, there is not much likelihood of U.S. interest in a purely bilateral scheme, which would provide only minor benefits to American industry and would be prejudicial to Washington's frequently proclaimed belief in multilateral trading arrangements. A more feasible method of achieving the

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same objective would be some form of free-trade area among a broad group of industrialized countries—a concept that would seem politically more comfortable to Canadians and might well have the appeal in Washington that a U.S.-Canadian alignment does not.

Such an idea has been advanced in recent years under the name of NAFTA—a North Atlantic Free Trade Area. The proposition, which was first formulated by the Canadian-American Committee in 1966, and has found many of its strongest supporters among Canadians, has been viewed in some quarters abroad as essentially anti-EEC. It is not seen that way in Canada, where the concern is to use an approved GATT technique, the regional free-trade arrangement, to move rapidly, and under conditions bound by treaty, to full freedom of trade with a major group of countries—hopefully including the Common Market.

It was this type of scheme to which Prime Minister Trudeau was apparently alluding when he referred to a free-trade area of the whole Atlantic region brought about through the medium of the multilateral tariff negotiating system. In fact, like many of his off-the-cuff remarks, it was intended more as an expression of personal interest than as any kind of prescription for government policy. There is no likelihood at all that Canada will embrace NAFTA in the short term. Ottawa is keen on various ideas for multilateral free trade in individual product sectors. And it would like to develop some special deals with the United States in particular areas of the economy. But the Government is nowhere near ready—and business is, on the whole, equally unprepared—to go for an across-the-board free-trade plan.

However, over the longer term the prospects for Canadian support of something like NAFTA seem very good. More of the kind of success in exports that Canadian secondary industry has been enjoying in recent years—a tripling of exports of "end products" (excluding food items) which jumped from less than one-sixth to almost one-third of Canada's total shipments abroad between 1965 and 1968—will convince manufacturers of their ability to compete internationally without tariffs. Thus I would speculate that by the mid-1970s Canada will be an ardent promoter of a broadly based free-trade arrangement, the core of which will be some sort of Atlantic economic unit.

But the whole purpose of such increased economic links with the United States and Europe, it must be repeated, will be the

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maximization of industrial efficiency so that Canada will be able to afford—and Canadians prepared to finance—more independent action in other aspects of foreign policy. And crucial to this aim, I think, will be a degree of disengagement from military alliances. Thus, while the desire not to contribute to a centrifugal trend in NATO at a critical time will keep Canada committed to a European presence for the balance of the 1960s and perhaps into the 1970s, I would doubt very much whether Canadian forces will remain in the European theater over a longer period. Moreover, I expect that Canada's involvement in the defense of North America will be greatly revised within the next five years, and that the operation of the joint U.S.-Canadian system in NORAD will be completely reorganized.

My reasons for these forecasts will be clear from the earlier analysis. However, there is one rather slippery assumption in the argument: namely, that Canada can find an alternative purpose for its military contribution sufficiently useful and significant as to persuade the other Atlantic countries—and particularly the United States—that Canada is fulfilling its international obligations. If they are not so satisfied, they will be disinclined to coöperate with Canada economically and in other ways. And the trouble with peacekeeping in this connection is, of course, that there has not until now been enough demand for it to keep a fair-sized army busy. Thus, if Canada concentrated its main efforts in this direction, it might not spend enough on its military budget to appear to be pulling its weight.

Part of this problem can probably be overcome by two developments: the effective increase in the scope for Canadian peacekeeping—including conciliation commissions, larger supervisory forces in problem areas and so forth—that might be expected to occur as a result of a more "detached" foreign policy; and by an attempt, already foreshadowed by the huge increase in Canada's foreign-aid program (at a time when that of most countries is shrinking), to mesh peacekeeping efforts into overseas development assistance, and to suggest that the two together should be considered as complementary aspects of a Canadian "peacemaking" function. This concept is evidently embodied in the Government's sponsorship, recently announced, of an imaginatively conceived "Canadian International Development Centre," which is intended to undertake basic research of a unique scope and diversity into the problems of the Third World.

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Evidence that this might be the mix of policies ultimately adopted by Canada was offered in the much publicized speech of the Prime Minister on November 8. He suggested that the threat of open racial conflict in the United States, along with somewhat similar dangers arising from the tension between affluent palefaces and darker-hued poor people on the world scene, represent a more valid subject for Canadian concern than does the possibility of military attack on the West by the Soviet Union or China. A few days later, a NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels was assured, after much urging, that Canada would guarantee to maintain its contribution to the Atlantic Alliance over the following twelve months; but these developments have been widely interpreted as heralding a major change in the Canadian defense posture at some not-too-distant date.

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JAPAN: EYE ON 1970

By John K. Emmerson

THE United States and Japan approach a changing relationship. Japan wants the continued nuclear guarantee of the United States but is restive at the protracted American control of Okinawa and the irksome problems arising from American military bases in Japan. The natural desire of a leading industrial nation for a more "independent" foreign policy, including what is vaguely expressed as "autonomous defense," appears to be steadily growing. At the same time, the United States, under a new Administration and in a post-Viet Nam period, can be expected to reassess its responsibilities overseas, particularly in Asia. The simultaneous meeting in Japan of these forces for change could, if the gears mesh smoothly, produce a healthy transition toward a sounder, more mutually responsive Japanese-American relationship. On the other hand, misunderstandings or misplaced expectations on either or both sides could block such a happy result and damage the interests of both countries.

There is a timetable. In June 1970, when the security treaty becomes subject to notice of intent to terminate, political action is threatened by the Left. A goal for the opposition and a deadline for the government, 1970 symbolizes Japan's most important and most discussed foreign policy issue today. In essence it is the problem of Japan's security. To understand it, one should look at Japan's current "mood," its effort in self-defense, the security treaty itself and the problem of Okinawa.

II

The year 1968 marked the 100th anniversary of the accession to the throne of Emperor Meiji. The Japanese take pride in the achievements of the Meiji era but in spirit seem somewhat closer to the pleasures of the long Tokugawa peace than to the militancy of the Meiji period which followed. In fact, an all-pervading "peace mood" is the strongest element in the state of the Japanese mind today. The Japanese "peace constitution," which in its Article 9 prohibits the maintenance of "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential," is today supported almost unanimously by the Japanese people (91 percent in a recent poll). In

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fact, the Japanese Socialists attribute Japan's postwar peace and prosperity to Article 9 rather than to the security treaty with the United States.

The Japanese devotion to their peace constitution is reinforced by a "nuclear allergy," a psychological result of the national experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The government recognizes this popular feeling and seeks to influence it; the Left finds endless opportunities to exploit it.

The Sato government has declared its nuclear policy to be built on three principles, namely, that Japan shall not possess, manufacture or permit the entry into the country of nuclear weapons. This is one of the few government policies approved by all political parties. Still, the Prime Minister has refused to go so far as to support an opposition-sponsored Diet resolution endorsing the three nuclear principles. He explained that he would feel uneasy to have the Diet thus "bind the Japanese people forever."

The Left has made the most of the "nuclear allergy," particularly in connection with the visits to Japanese ports of American nuclear-powered naval vessels. Demonstrations reached new heights during the call at Sasebo of the aircraft carrier *Enterprise* in January 1968. A furor again erupted in May when a slight degree of radioactivity was discovered in Sasebo waters after the visit of a nuclear-powered submarine. Although the United States, after full investigation, announced that the submarine could not have been responsible, public concern was not allayed. As a result of these incidents, all port calls of American nuclear-powered naval vessels were discontinued for the time being.

The inconsistencies between the "nuclear allergy" and the facts that Japan plans to build its own nuclear-powered ship and that nuclear energy will undoubtedly become a chief source of Japan's electric power by the end of the century, are still lost on many Japanese. To them the presence in a Japanese port of a nuclear-powered warship conjures up the spectre of possible Japanese involvement in war; this fear is a strong element in the peace mood of the nation today.

Many Japanese have observed the war in Viet Nam with a sense of fear that the pressures of escalation and Japan's close ties with the United States might implicate their own country, particularly if Chinese-American hostilities should result. Peace talks in Paris brought a sense of relief to the Japanese and for

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many of them Viet Nam became a faraway issue, a "fire on the other side of the river."

Peace is not only a mood. The Japanese recognize that their advance to the top ranks of the world's industrial powers has been measurably assisted by the fact that under 1 percent of GNP has been spent on defense, a percentage less than that of any other nation of consequence. The Japanese obsession with economic advance has led to Japan's being labeled an "economic animal" and to the stereotype of the Japanese abroad as the "transistor radio salesman." Twenty-three years of peace and security have provided the environment for the achievement of Japan's "economic miracle."

The most popular "ism" in Japan today is "my-home-ism," which, along with "my-car," "my-room" and the many "my" words so prevalent in the present-day Japanese language, symbolizes the feeling of cozy satisfaction in achieving one's wants. "My-home-ism" is a kind of selfish concentration on getting for oneself as many of the good things of life as possible. The Japanese work hard and now play hard. The resulting "leisure boom" has produced a major industry; in 1967 Japanese families spent 37 percent more on leisure activities than they did in 1964. In the rush for comfort, pleasure and a better life for the "salaryman," "my-home-ism" excludes worry about the world's troubles and responsibility for doing something about them. Many Japanese critics deplore it as selfish indifference unbefitting a country assuming the rank and status of a great power.

Prime Minister Sato recognized the appeal of "my-home-ism" during the election campaign of last summer. Inspired by Herman Kahn's prediction that the 21st century will belong to Japan, he painted a rosy future for the Japanese—peace and prosperity ahead, with continuously rising standards of living, surpassing Europe and by the end of the century even the United States.

As a natural result of developing confidence and as a kind of reaction to "my-home-ism," a new nationalism is growing in Japan. Defeatism has given way to pride in country, and economic single-mindedness no longer fully satisfies. This spirit is not the property of any party or ideology. While it contains no nostalgia for the militarism of the past—although the Socialists warn that it does—it envisages a country with the ability to defend itself, at least to a certain degree. "Autonomous defense" is a popular phrase in Japan; no one has clearly defined it and its significance

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may change in the future; today it seems to mean: "We ought to do more about defense, but not too much, and of course we still need the American security guarantee."

The new nationalists will not be satisfied with a purely economic role for Japan, particularly in Asia. They can be expected to urge greater diplomatic activity to acquire international influence more commensurate with Japan's economic power.

Leadership of the new nationalism has yet to emerge. Several younger politicians belonging to the Liberal Democratic Party and known as the "New Right" would like to speed the changes and break out in new directions. Given the strength of tradition, the rigidity of the political system and the present trend of voting patterns, there is little likelihood of sudden change. One can surmise, however, that over the coming years, as the postwar generation gains influence and its members come into positions of power, the peace mood and "my-home-ism" may lose some of their pervasiveness while the concept of Japan as a great power becomes a national ideal.

III

The purpose and role of the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) are clearly set forth in the defense concept approved by the National Defense Council on November 29, 1966:

> The basis of our national defense is to prevent aggression before it actually occurs by maintaining a security structure with the United States and by maintaining an effective defense force by Japan herself. Furthermore, Japan will, with her own capability, cope with an indirect aggression and a small scale direct aggression and any armed aggression on a larger scale will be repelled with the cooperation of the United States. In this case, strategic defense operations will be primarily conducted by Japan.

Thus we see that Japan's Self Defense Forces are organized to cope with conventional threats of moderate scale while the United States maintains the nuclear deterrent.

Probably no other country in the world maintains armed forces whose constitutional legality is open to challenge. Japan's Self Defense Forces exist in spite of Article 9 of the constitution. The principal political parties opposing the government consider the SDF unconstitutional and Japan's Supreme Court has never passed on the question. General MacArthur stated in 1946 that in Article 9, Japan "surrenders rights inherent in her own sovereignty." However, successive Japanese governments have taken the position that the constitution does not and can-

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not take away from Japan the inherent, sovereign right of self-defense. It is on this interpretation that Japan's defense structure is built.

Revision of the constitution was a live issue a few years ago, but no Japanese government would propose it today. Not only does the party in power, the Liberal Democratic Party, lack the necessary two-thirds majority in the Diet to amend the constitution, but popular support for changes, particularly in Article 9, is totally lacking in the country. Many LDP leaders personally favor revision, but the hazards of saying so were proved in February 1968 when the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry in the Sato government was forced to resign after a casual remark to some journalists suggesting that Japan's constitutional restrictions on military power hampered its diplomacy. Prime Minister Sato has publicly stated the position of the government by describing the "pacifism" of Article 9 as the "flesh and blood of the Japanese people today."

Interpretation rather than revision has been the constitutional road followed by Japan, and in this manner most legal blocks to the development of a competent defense force have been circumvented or removed. Along the way it has been established that Japan will not engage in offensive warfare nor possess offensive weapons. Yet Japanese defense experts note that technological developments are making it more and more difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive weapons. Although it is accepted that Japanese forces are not to be dispatched overseas to engage in combat, successive government spokesmen have agreed that Japanese bombers must be allowed to attack enemy bases should this prove the sole available means of defense. Similarly, from the time of Prime Minister Kishi, Japanese governments have asserted the constitutionality of "defensive" nuclear weapons. However, these would still face legal prohibition by the Atomic Energy Law which provides that nuclear power must be used for peaceful purposes only.

A live question is whether the SDF may legally join in a United Nations peacekeeping force. Engagement in combat overseas in a Korean or Congo-type U.N. operation would be out of the question. On the other hand, participation in U.N. actions of a non-combat nature, such as supervising armistices or inspecting elections, while not violating the constitution, might conflict with laws establishing the Defense Agency and the Self Defense

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Forces. Still, it seems likely that, should a United Nations presence be established in Southeast Asia after the Viet Nam war, Japan's urge to coöperate would be strong enough to overcome legal obstacles.

Japan ranks approximately twelfth in the world in defense expenditures. Budgets have increased annually but have represented progressively smaller percentages of GNP and national income. Expenditures for 1967 were a little over $1 billion, or 0.91 percent of GNP and 7.44 percent of the national budget.

The Third Defense Build-up Plan began in 1967 and runs through 1971. The emphasis of the plan is on the qualitative improvement of the Self Defense Forces through research and development, the modernization of equipment and the production of equipment in Japan. Primary attention will be given to "coastal water defense capability, vital area air defense capability, and mobile capability by various means." Equipment to be acquired under the present plan includes destroyers, submarines, helicopters, Nike-Hercules missiles modified to carry only nonnuclear warheads, and fighter aircraft. The plan also calls for an increase of 8,500 men in the Ground Self Defense Forces, bringing total authorized ground strength to 180,000 by the last year of the plan. SDF personnel at present number about 275,000 including land, sea and air forces.

The Self Defense Forces are competent and well equipped; their problems lie more in manpower than in matériel. No military conscription means no reservoir of reserves. Entering volunteers are sometimes too few to meet requirements and, after receiving valuable technical training, many men resign to take profitable jobs in private industry. This turnover, highest among ground forces, has the educative advantage of spreading SDF experience through the population but is naturally detrimental to the efficiency of the forces.

More important, the SDF, an organization which cannot even call itself "military," has developed no ideology and little sense of purpose. For these reasons, coupled with a lack of prestige and popular support in the past, morale has suffered. In the words of one commentator, "National support is worth more than a hundred jets." Fortunately for the SDF, its image has improved markedly in recent years. Public opinion polls now show majority support for the continuation of the Self Defense Forces, but, it should be noted, "at their present level."

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IV

In their communiqué issued November 15, 1967, after meetings in Washington, President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato declared "it to be the fundamental policy of both countries to maintain firmly the Treaty of Mutual Coöperation and Security between the United States and Japan in order to ensure the security of Japan and the peace and security of the Far East."

"Automatic extension" of the treaty, or "automatic continuation," as the Japanese Foreign Office prefers to call it, would require no specific action by either government: the treaty would become subject at any time after June 23, 1970, to termination upon one year's advance notice by either party. While the Japanese government would thus become vulnerable to continuing opposition proposals for abrogation, a Diet confrontation like that in 1960 would be avoided. Another procedure, amendment of the treaty to extend its validity for a specific period of years, would not only invite a Diet struggle possibly more violent than that of 1960 but might well inspire amendments when submitted to the United States Senate, in view of American criticism that this so-called "mutual" treaty in fact imposes one-sided commitments on the United States.

The Liberal Democratic Party interpreted the successful retention of a majority in the House of Councillors elections last July as popular endorsement of the security treaty. In fact, the Japanese voters probably based their choices at the polls less on their judgment of the treaty than on their concern over prices, housing and other problems of daily life, and in response to the local appeals of individual candidates. Recent public opinion polls reveal fair support for continuation of the treaty, but the percentages of "don't know" answers are large. There is obviously a considerable body of opinion favoring a "weakening" of the security relationship although "outright termination" receives only small minority support in most of the polls. Most Japanese probably expect the treaty to continue in effect although many do not understand its contents or significance.

The Socialist and Communist parties propose an end to the treaty in 1970. The Socialists alone favor unarmed neutrality; the unpopularity of this policy may have been one element in the resounding defeat which they suffered in July; in fact, in a poll of Tokyo Socialist Party members, 47.7 percent rejected unarmed neutrality in favor of "self-defense power" for Japan. Even the

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Communists admit that in certain future circumstances, Japan might have to take defense measures "in a military sense." The other two opposition parties, the Democratic Socialists and Komei-to, are prepared to accept a revised security treaty for a limited period of time: the former advocate an arrangement whereby American forces would no longer be stationed in Japan, but would return in cases of emergency; the latter proposes "gradual dissolution" of the treaty, with final termination during the 1970s.

Three aspects of the treaty problem deserve attention. First, it should be noted that the basic effect of the treaty is to guarantee the security of Japan through American nuclear forces, or, in popular language, the "nuclear umbrella." At the same time, the parties to the treaty both subscribe to "a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East" and the treaty provides that American bases in Japan are to be used not only for the defense of Japan but also to defend "the peace and security of the Far East." Furthermore, the Japanese government has consistently maintained that there is an inseparable relationship between the defense of Japan and the peace and security of other parts of Asia. Yet it is doubtful that this concept is fully accepted by the general public and it is under constant attack from the opposition. In this vein, on August 9, 1968, in the budget committee of the House of Representatives, a Socialist member argued that because application of the treaty to the "Far East" brought apprehensions to the Japanese people, the "Far East" clause should be eliminated in 1970. Foreign Minister Miki replied that the government had no intention of proposing such a change.

As the war in Viet Nam has expanded, the use of the Japanese bases has appeared to be less related to the defense of Japan than to events in Southeast Asia. For example, visible increases in air traffic, repair operations and hospital usage are widely publicized by the Japanese information media. At the same time, American use of the bases for direct combat operations in East Asia is limited by the agreement which requires prior consultation with the Japanese government, not only before major changes in the deployment and equipment of United States forces in Japan can be made, but also before bases can be used to launch combat operations outside Japan. The phrase "major changes in equipment" is understood as referring to the introduction of nuclear

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weapons. The "prior consultation formula" does not apply to the bases in Okinawa.

A second aspect of the treaty is that, for obvious Japanese constitutional reasons, it places no reciprocal obligations on Japan to come to the defense of the United States. Instead, Japan provides bases and facilities for the use of American military forces. The Japanese government recognizes that the bases are a small price to pay for the American security guarantee and are themselves an essential element in Japan's own defense. Among left-inclined Japanese, however, the bases are frequently seen as an indemnity, first exacted from an occupied Japan and which, instead of offering protection, act as a kind of dangerous lightning rod to attract retaliation from enemies of America and to embroil Japan in unwanted conflict.

Japan's rapid urbanization and the mounting pressures of population have intensified the problems of the bases, a good number of which are unfortunately located in the densely populated Kanto plain surrounding Tokyo and Yokohama. American military installations now number some 149, contrasted to more than 2500 in 1952. Most of the facilities used at present are inconspicuous and generate no trouble, but the few large air bases present problems of land use, noise, incidents and accidents. American and Japanese authorities coöperate closely in seeking to prevent or ameliorate these problems and have achieved notable progress. In continuing and speeding up the process already under way, additional bases can be eliminated, relocated or transferred to the Self Defense Forces, and American personnel can be further reduced. In the cases of relocation and transfer to Japanese control, heavy expenses are involved, and the Japanese government is not always ready and willing to assume these extra financial burdens. Needless to say, bases are exploitable political issues and the opposition parties and Japan's hyper-active mass media keep them vivid in the public mind.

A third element in the treaty problem is the fact that the Japanese in general feel no immediate external threat to the security of their country. The government is reluctant to specify such a threat or to designate any country as a potential or hypothetical enemy of Japan. Although Mr. Sato subscribed to language in the joint communiqué with President Johnson which referred to the "present intransigent attitude" of Communist China, the Prime Minister has stated before a Diet committee

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that he would "neither affirm nor deny" that China had aggressive tendencies. He has denied repeatedly that Japan looks upon Peking as a "hypothetical enemy."

Although few would doubt that Japan's defense strategy is directed against mainland China and the Soviet Union, the Japanese do not now fear attack from either of these nations. Peking's rapid progress in developing nuclear weapons surprised and sobered many Japanese and jarred some of their genial assessments of China. Japanese military analysts predict the successful Chinese production of ICBMs in the early 1970s; yet many Japanese have accepted Peking's arms program as largely defensive in character and have believed Mao Tse-tung when he promised never to be the first to use a nuclear weapon.

As for the U.S.S.R., the Japanese were encouraged by the constructive steps in Soviet-American relations and were themselves intrigued with the possibility of trade and economic cooperation, particularly in Siberia. In fact, Soviet-Japanese negotiations for the development of Siberia have so far made little concrete progress, although trade between the two countries has increased. The Soviet government has continued to refuse discussion of Japan's claims to the "northern territories." The invasion of Czechoslovakia produced a profound reaction in Japan and reawakened the deep suspicions and mistrust of Russia, traditionally strong among the Japanese. The result was a heightened wariness toward the Soviet Union which has not, however, translated itself into a sense of direct threat.

American visitors to Japan are often surprised at the seeming complacency of many Japanese toward an external communist threat. Especially one would expect that the Japanese might worry about a possible attack in Korea across the 38th parallel. Although recently increasing attention has been directed toward Korea, serious concern is rarely expressed. A public opinion poll taken in Tokyo in March 1968 attempted to discover whether the Japanese felt any "sense of crisis" and, if so, for what reasons. Results showed that about half of those polled did feel a sense of crisis; however, only 6 percent of these believed the danger came from a possible attack on Japan by a communist nation; 51 percent attributed their uneasiness to the "possibility of becoming embroiled in conflicts through coöperation with America's Asian policy."

If, as expected, the Liberal Democratic Party maintains its ma-

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jority into 1970—there is the possibility that the House of Representatives may be dissolved and an election held in 1969—the automatic continuation of the security treaty can be expected to take place in 1970 without serious disruption of Japanese life. If an election should be held, the government would consider a victory a mandate in support of the treaty. Although the Left will stage demonstrations and may attempt a general strike in 1970, most competent observers believe that, barring an unforeseen resurgence of opposition strength, the anti-treaty movement will not succeed.

However, if a solution is not soon found for the problem of Okinawa, this issue could dominate all others, stimulate the forces opposing the treaty and cause serious difficulties in 1970.

V

The problem of Okinawa is a problem of *when* and *how* rather than of *what*. All are agreed—Americans, Japanese and Okinawans—that the Ryukyu Islands belong to Japan, are part of the "homeland" of Japan, and will be returned to Japan. The governments concerned have also been agreed that the military bases on the islands will be retained by the United States for a considerable time in the future. Reduced to its essentials, the problem is *when* can the United States turn over to Japan responsibility for administering the islands and *how*, or under what conditions, can the United States maintain the bases.

At the time of Prime Minister Sato's visit to Washington in November 1967, both countries agreed to "keep under joint and continuous review the status of the Ryukyu Islands, guided by the aim of returning administrative rights over these islands to Japan. . . ." Since then, Sato has expressed his conviction that agreement on a date can be reached "within two or three years." Undoubtedly the Prime Minister has had 1970 in mind. But fixing a date is not a simple matter of the calendar. The United States maintains that agreement on the use of the bases must be an integral part of the reversion process and cannot be postponed until after the transfer of administrative rights.

The use of the bases poses tough political problems for Japan. If the United States is permitted to continue to maintain the bases without restrictions, as at present, while the "prior consultation" formula continues to control bases in Japan, Okinawans will charge discrimination. Already they have shown their

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sensitivity. When in the past B-52s have taken off from bases in Okinawa to bomb North Viet Nam, the clamor from Okinawans, as well as from Japanese, has been loud and strong. The use was legal and the Japanese government could not protest; still the bases were on soil of the acknowledged "homeland" and national feelings were aroused. Needless to say, the value of the Okinawan bases has gone up as the war in Viet Nam has intensified, and while the war continues the United States can scarcely be expected to agree to restrictions.

There are three ways in which the base problem could be resolved at the time Japan assumes administrative rights. The first would continue the status quo, according the United States unrestricted use of the bases, including the possible presence of nuclear weapons. Presumably this would be most satisfactory to the United States. A second arrangement would place the Okinawan bases under the same restrictions that obtain for American bases in Japan; in other words, the "prior consultation" formula would be operative and no nuclear weapons would be allowed. This would be supported by public opinion in both Japan and Okinawa. A third solution would be to ban nuclear weapons from the islands but grant the United States "free use" of the bases in all other ways; for example, military units could be sent directly into combat without prior consultation with Japan. This would probably be politically more acceptable in Japan than continuation of the status quo but would be open to the charge that sending forces into combat without Japanese knowledge or consent could involve Japan in American conflicts. Thus far Sato has been noncommittal on the future of Okinawan bases, taking a position he calls the "clean slate."

The victory of the candidate supported by all opposition parties in the first direct election of the Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Islands held on November 10 has injected a troublesome note in the calculations of both Japan and the United States. The outcome was not only a defeat for the Liberal Democratic Party and its Okinawan counterpart; the victor's obligations to his supporters, who include Communists and Socialists, could complicate the smooth exercise by the United States of its administrative authority over the islands. Certainly the vote indicated Okinawan impatience and added urgency to the search for a solution of the Okinawa problem.

Resolution of the Okinawa problem will require hard decisions

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by both sides. The Japanese government must evaluate for itself the contribution that the Okinawan bases make to Japanese security as well as to that of South Korea and Formosa, neighbors whose relations with Japan are of critical importance to Tokyo. Japan must above all calculate the effect on Communist China of a weakening of the American deterrent on Okinawa through a change in the status of the bases. In the light of these judgments and of political factors in both Okinawa and Japan proper, the Japanese government must determine what arrangements for continued American use of the bases are desirable and acceptable. At the same time, the United States government, in reëxamining its military bases around the world, must strictly evaluate the strategic importance of Okinawa, considering the situation in East Asia, technological developments and the fundamental American interest in maintaining the solidarity of the Japanese-American relationship.

Given the urgency and the stakes on both sides, it seems imperative that Japan and the United States rapidly achieve an agreement on the terms of a return of the administrative rights to Japan and the future status of the bases. If an understanding on the timing and conditions of a solution is not reached before 1970, the problem of Okinawa could seriously corrode Japanese-American relations.

VI

In a post-Viet Nam Asia, a changing relationship between Japan and the United States must be based on a realistic understanding of what each country can and cannot do and on the political determinants in both Tokyo and Washington. Regardless of the kind of strategy the United States chooses to pursue in East Asia, an effective American military presence in either Japan proper or Okinawa can be maintained only with the full support and cooperation of the Japanese government. Furthermore, the Japanese government operates within a democratic system and is subject, in spite of its Diet majority, to the pressures of public opinion and the opposition parties. A national consensus on foreign policy does not exist in Japan and the Sato government has thus far failed to instill among the Japanese people much feeling of concern or responsibility for the security of Asia. However, the spirit of nationalism is growing and national attitudes are changing.

What, then, can we expect of Japan?

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First, the security treaty will continue in effect after 1970. Japan will continue to recognize the value of the American security guarantee and the paramount importance of the relationship with the United States.

Second, Japan's defense establishment will not suddenly or drastically exceed its present strength, but will gradually expand over the coming years. No change is likely in the role of the Self Defense Forces, although the return of administrative rights over Okinawa will add to their responsibilities and duties. It is conceivable that some way may be found to participate in a United Nations peacekeeping force, particularly in the wake of a Viet Nam settlement.

Third, Japan will continue to develop the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. While a few voices suggest that to become a great power Japan must make its own nuclear weapons, sentiment against them is now so strong that no Japanese government would consider such a step. True, there is satisfaction and pride in Japan that, if the political decision were taken, a nuclear weapon could be made speedily and efficiently. However, without a complete change in the mood of the nation, plus a combination of unexpected internal and external events, a reversal of present nuclear policy could scarcely occur. In a decision to build the bomb, the Japanese would not fail to consider the effect on Japan's neighbors. Many have already foreseen that a nuclear weapons program, necessarily aimed at China and carried out in competition with China, would seriously complicate Japan's diplomatic efforts to develop relationships in Asia.

Fourth, it is natural that Japan should in the future pursue its so-called "peace diplomacy," the principal objective of which is to reduce tensions in Japan's immediate area through efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China. Particularly with regard to China, the difficulties of maintaining a firm position in Taipei while trying to develop profitable exchanges with Peking are obvious. Certainly the principal obstacles lie in Peking. Nevertheless, Japan will undoubtedly persist in trying to build a friendly relationship with mainland China without, however, sacrificing the Japanese stake in Taiwan. For the long run, this would seem to be in Japan's interest.

Finally, Japan will not replace the United States in Asia. Japan will continue efforts to expand trade and investment and to increase its economic stake in Taiwan, Korea and in Southeast Asia.

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It is also likely that over a period of years Japan will develop a political influence in Asia. Growing trade and aid and participation and leadership in regional organizations such as ASPAC (Asian and Pacific Council) and the Asian Development Bank seem certain to lead Japan toward greater concern and responsibility for the political as well as the economic stability of East Asia. However, Japan will not assume security responsibilities outside of the country nor enter pacts of a military nature. A military role in Asia for Japan is out of the question for a long time to come, and, indeed, if it were to develop, would destroy many of Japan's constructive economic accomplishments in Southeast Asia. In spite of warnings on the Left, there is now no sign in Japan that militarism will rise again. Japan, in its peaceful, prosperous, "my-home" mood, is not about to undertake spectacular adventures.

Through the close consultation posited by partnership, Japan and the United States should be able to work out the changes in roles and positions that altered events require. In this dialogue, Japan will have to understand the difficulties which beset the United States—the imperatives of our domestic problems and our balance-of-payments difficulties. The implications of the growing deficit in our trade balance with Japan will have to be appreciated. In the total context of the problems facing both of our countries our respective roles in Asia must be projected and evaluated. If indeed the urge for greater autonomy in defense and diplomacy is real in Japan, then a new role, not to replace the United States, but to complement American activities in Asia, should be possible. In such a role, Japan could assume greater responsibilities for defense of the country and at the same time, through expanding aid to the developing nations, contribute in areas where American aid and activities may diminish.

Japanese-American relations are at a point when talk of partnership is not enough and taking the other for granted evades reality. Each nation acts in its own self-interest, but in the modern world of entangling communications and relationships, no nation acts alone. Therefore, Japan and the United States, though their premises and perspectives may occasionally differ, must each be sensitive to the urgencies of the other. To an important degree, the stability and prosperity of East Asia depend upon the compatibility and coördination of action of these two leading industrial powers.

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THE U.N. AND HUMAN RIGHTS

By Morris B. Abram

THE Human Rights organs of the United Nations have been —to use a typically American term—great on production but poor in distribution. Since the adoption of the Charter in 1945, making the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms a purpose of the organization, the members have produced a cornucopia of papers proclaiming principles and goals which almost no state dares contradict publicly, but which few observe conscientiously, and which fewer still embrace to the point of allowing their practices to be inspected.

Twenty years after its adoption, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remains a declaration universally praised but seldom taken by nations as an across-the-board program for domestic practice. Nations applaud the recent award of the Nobel Peace Prize to René Cassin—a drafter of the Declaration and leader of the campaign for its adoption—but much of this recognition is to compensate for the guilt felt by many who do not practice what Cassin preaches.

The year 1968—designated by the United Nations as the International Year for Human Rights—has not been a good year for U.N. activities in that area. The international conference held in Tehran last spring was heralded as a major forum for review and planning, yet, in large measure, it became an exercise in acrimony, focusing on Arab anti-Israel grievances and the problems of Southern Africa. A few weeks earlier, the Human Rights Commission had turned down the idea of examining the condition of human rights in Greece and Haiti—a proposal of its own Sub-Commission on Discrimination. And several months before that, a committee of the General Assembly had amended the text of the Commission's draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance, rendering it completely unacceptable to most of the religious communities of the world, as well as to a great many states.

Why have things developed this way? Why has it not been possible for the world organization to make the crucial transition from an agency engaged in defining principles of human rights to an effective instrument for implementing those rights which have been, on paper at least, universally agreed upon?

The U.N. Charter assumes that human rights are a common

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concern of the international community, that their denial impedes the stability necessary for peaceful relations among nations, and that it is possible to set minimum standards—and implement these—because all people do share basic aspirations and values. These assumptions have been affirmed, expressly or by implication, in many important governmental agreements as well as in statements by influential international non-governmental bodies. Last spring, the Tehran Proclamation asserted that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "states a common understanding of the peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human family. . . ." And from Uppsala, Sweden, in July 1968, the World Council of Churches declared: "Nations should recognize that the protection of fundamental human rights and freedom has now become a common concern of the whole international community, and should therefore not regard international concern for the implementation of these rights as an unwarranted interference."

The assumptions I have noted are complex and give rise to intricate questions. One could debate, for example, the degree to which the world's people actually share common goals and values in the sphere of human rights, or a common concern for the human rights of others. Indeed, it is the wide disparity that still exists between reality and goal, both as to shared standards and shared concern, which is largely responsible for the U.N.'s slow progress in the matter of implementation.

II

Even among the nations which originally constituted the United Nations—principally white, Christian, European, American and British Commonwealth nations—there were significant differences in values and outlook. They included the communist nations of Eastern Europe and the capitalist nations of Western Europe and America. They were both developed and underdeveloped nations. These differences sharpened when the cold war shattered the big-power anti-Nazi alliance, and they multiplied when a large number of new states in Asia and Africa—nonwhite, non-Christian, culturally different and economically underdeveloped—were admitted to the U.N.

These new nations were concerned with raising their people from the depths of poverty, with holding together diverse racial, tribal and religious elements, with eradicating massive illiteracy,

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with acquiring an elementary technology. They were preoccupied with issues of colonial domination and white discrimination against colored peoples. The immensity of their problems inclined them to favor a strong role for the state, and—pragmatically if not ideologically—many of them were *not* interested in the agenda of the dominant Western members, which emphasized the "traditional" liberties. The communist states, which by ideology rejected Western ideas of freedom, found in the Afro-Asian preoccupations and emphases golden opportunities to further their foreign policy objectives, and the Afro-Asian agenda and the communist objectives correspond in many respects in matters of human rights.

Paper agreements notwithstanding, the U.N. members are obviously still a long way from real agreement on common standards of human rights. Their commitments to the concept of international concern for human rights, whether in terms of a concern for conditions in other lands or of willingness to accept scrutiny by others of conditions within their own countries, are also limited and conflicting.

It is unfortunately true that most people are not strongly moved by deprivations of human rights in other lands, unless they identify with the victims for reasons of family, race, religion or national origin; their concern is also limited by the feeling that "we have troubles enough of our own." For governments, too, a concern for the human rights of other people is secondary to their own national interests. Governments avoid criticizing other governments for fear of alienating them or for fear of retaliation. Criticism is usually voiced as an adjunct to a military or political conflict.

The reluctance of states to accept criticism from other states need not be belabored. In our own country, Southerners resent Northern meddling as intensely as the Soviet Union rejects critical foreign comment regarding its internal policies. When issues involving human rights within national borders come up in the U.N., few states hesitate to invoke Article 2 (7) of the Charter, which prohibits the organization from intervening "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."

Undoubtedly, if international conflicts and tensions subsided, member nations would be willing to pay more than lip service to the principle of international concern, and prospects for imple-

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mentation—for applying general standards to concrete situations—would be immeasurably improved. But, even then, many practical difficulties would remain.

For example, since the United Nations cannot consider *all* alleged violations of human rights, what criteria should be used to determine which are most important? Should the U.N. deal only with those violations for which governments are responsible, or also with those which persist in the face of governmental disapproval and good-faith efforts to alleviate them? Should it concern itself only with sins of commission or also with sins of omission? Should it consider only violations existing in small and weak nations, or also in large and powerful ones? In today's world, to get down to concrete facts, which issues beside the violations in Southern Africa ought the U.N. to take up?

Again, if there were a greater degree of international trust, one could be more optimistic about the U.N.'s capacity to deal impartially and objectively with allegations of violations. But, in the present climate, can the member states be relied on to form their judgments independently of ideological or political selfish interests? At the last session of the Human Rights Commission, one representative of a "nonaligned nation" told me candidly: "We'd like to condemn the Soviet Union for its repression of intellectuals; we'd like to condemn the United States because of Viet Nam. We cannot afford to do either, so we'll support a condemnation of Israel for reprisals against Arab sabotage."

Yet the U.N.'s record of accomplishments has been in many ways remarkable. During the past two decades standards have been set. Taken together, the various international agreements—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the declaration against colonialism, other specific declarations and proclamations, the omnibus covenants on human rights, and a variety of specific conventions—constitute, in effect, a worldwide code of human-rights morality and law. Goaded by U.N. programs of education and promotion, the conscience of the world has been awakened. And any balance sheet of the U.N.'s human-rights contributions should also contain the impressive work of specialized agencies, including WHO, UNICEF, FAO, UNESCO, ILO and the High Commissioner for Refugees.

But the United Nations simply has not yet accomplished much in regard to providing the necessary mechanisms for dealing with violations of human rights in particular countries. Indeed, no

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state has yet ratified the legally binding Covenants, the most important of the conventions. The United States has not even ratified the Conventions on Forced Labor and on the Political Rights of Women, let alone the Covenants. Neither the United States nor South Africa is rushing to ratify the Convention on Racial Discrimination. Some of the very states whose people are most in need of international safeguards are least likely to ratify the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. And many states, in ratifying particular conventions, will do so with reservations vitiating significant substantive and implementing provisions.

Ratification apart, the implementation measures in most of the conventions (other than those of the ILO) are of limited significance. Some provide none; others, only governmental reporting. None provides a mandatory right of an individual to make a complaint. And in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, even the right of a state to file a complaint is optional.

What about the efforts to develop implementation on the basis of the Charter's express or implied powers? The record in this respect is mixed: relatively good in the field of colonialism and racial discrimination, especially in Southern Africa; poor with regard to most other issues.

The U.N. Charter gave the Trusteeship Council express authority to supervise human rights in trust territories, and after 1960 the General Assembly established a Special Committee on Colonialism. These bodies considered—often and in great detail—questions of human rights in specific trust and other dependent territories. The Assembly also established a Special Committee on Apartheid which focused energetically on the Union of South Africa. But with few, mainly early, exceptions (such as forced labor in Eastern Europe), the U.N. bodies have failed to give detailed attention to other charges involving denial of human rights in specific countries.

The fact is that, ever since 1947, the Human Rights Commission has been expressly prohibited, by a rule which is still in effect, from considering specific human-rights complaints. All it could do with "communications" regarding such complaints was to file them after referring them to the governments involved for whatever comment they might wish to make. During the past twenty years, periodic efforts to repeal this self-denying rule, or to circumvent it, have all failed. The most recent attempt was made about two years ago, when the Economic and Social Council gave

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the Commission authority to consider serious situations revealing "consistent patterns" of human-rights violations, including racial discrimination and segregation "in all countries," especially dependent territories. But last spring, as pointed out above, an effort to use this new authority to deal with situations beyond Southern Africa was quickly stalemated. The dispute in the Commission, which focused on the ambiguous terms in the governing resolution, actually involved the larger question of whether the Commission can make the critical transition from a study and drafting role to become an instrument of implementation. It is a dispute which will not be easily resolved.

III

In the face of the West's disillusionment over the one-sidedness of the U.N.'s actions and African bitterness over Western reluctance to coöperate more fully with their goals and programs for Southern Africa, can there be any progress toward U.N. implementation of its human-rights standards? Much depends on the general political atmosphere among the member nations.

As Secretary-General U Thant pointed out, in his opening address at Tehran:

> . . . in the absence of international or internal peace, chances of genuine respect for human rights are slight. . . . The pattern of history before the establishment of the United Nations, and unfortunately also since . . . has shown the extent to which preoccupations for the life and well-being of the individual give way to requirements of military imperatives. Violence breeds violence. Fear breeds fear. Restraints of those who possess force disappear in situations where the use of force is openly encouraged.

But beyond the truly crucial requirement of peace, the member nations must come closer to one another in terms of their human-rights values, and must take more seriously than they have their paper commitments, including those made in the Tehran Proclamation.[1]

This means, for the West, more conscientious coöperation in solving the economic problems of the poorer nations, and in helping them develop their economies and raise their living standards. It means more committed Western coöperation with efforts to

[1] The U.S.S.R., which had abstained from the vote adopting the Universal Declaration, and 28 African and other new states, not U.N. members in 1948, joined in this Proclamation, which states that the Declaration "constitutes an obligation for the members of the international community."

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end the vestigial colonialism in Southern Africa, even at the risk of embarrassing certain Western business interests. And it means energetic participation in efforts to eliminate white racism, not only in South Africa and the territories it controls, but within the Western countries themselves. For the communist and many Afro-Asian nations, it means greater acceptance of the civil and political freedoms of traditional concern to the West.

Although Americans have long cherished the concept of free speech, press, religion and assembly, they were unaccustomed to, and seriously questioned, the notion that individuals also had the "right" to a job, to leisure, education, medical care, housing and social security. Despite the "Four Freedoms," which included "freedom from want," some Americans still do not understand that the Universal Declaration's economic and social rights, like our own Constitution's political safeguards, are not luxuries, but necessities for a free and viable society.

The communist and certain Afro-Asian countries, on the other hand, in looking on economic well-being as the key to all human problems, have shown little care for the civil and political freedoms. They will have to be persuaded that economic achievement is not enough, and that even the well-fed and well-housed need freedom of speech and press, freedom from invasion of privacy and various political safeguards.

The contemporary race struggle, in our own country and elsewhere, parallels in its dangers those posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the growing disparity between rich and poor within and among nations. The world's colored races have become increasingly aware of their numerical majority and increasingly bitter at their continued status of social, economic and political inferiority. If catastrophe is to be averted, the domestic and foreign policies of all the Western nations must give top priority to the elimination of white racism, both inside and outside their borders. This goal must be pursued on a continuing, long-range basis, and not merely as a reaction to individual crises. As the overriding issue of our time, the struggle for racial equality provides us with our greatest responsibility and our greatest opportunity.

At the same time, the nonwhite nations must recognize that decolonization and the eradication of apartheid in Africa are not the only human-rights issues meriting world attention. They must be prepared to give ear to other problems in other lands which

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concern deprivations of human rights. And they must also be prepared to broaden their concept of discrimination to encompass more than racial issues alone.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proscribes distinctions "of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." Few would question that race is the most critical human-rights concern of our time and that it warrants priority attention by the U.N. But there are other manifestations of "discrimination" based on ethnic or national origin, or on religious and political opinion, and these must not be ignored.

Even the race issue is far from the simple black-white confrontation some would have it appear. There is racial prejudice against the Chinese in most of Southeast Asia, and black men fight black men in the Congo. The blood-drenched civil war in Nigeria is a clash between different black tribes. Indians are excluded from jobs in Kenya, mulattoes are oppressed in Negro Haiti and the black Sudanese of the South are in rebellion against the Arabs of the North.

In addition, ethnic conflict, often with religious overtones, is rampant in many parts of the world. In India and Pakistan, the struggle between Hindus and Moslems shows no sign of abatement. Mountain tribesmen are discriminated against in Viet Nam. Armenians are still bitter and mistrustful of the Turks as the Turks are of the Greek majority in Cyprus. In the Soviet Union, Jewish culture is suppressed and anti-Semitism is periodically revived as an instrument of domestic and foreign policy. All these are human-rights issues which should be of concern to all the U.N. members if they are sincere in their international commitments to human rights.

What, then, should be the U.N.'s goals for the near future? Some nations, the Soviet Union among them, insist that responsibility for implementation must be left with the separate states, but most agree that some form of international implementation is needed, and a few go so far as to call for the establishment of judicial procedures toward this end.

Obviously, the more "coercive" the implementation procedure suggested, the more reluctant individual states will be to accept it. Therefore, though a world court of human rights is a desirable goal, I believe it is unrealistic to press for it in the present climate of international relationships. Institutions or procedures which

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emphasize fact-finding and quiet negotiation, and, as an ultimate recourse, exposure to the glare of world moral opinion have, I believe, a better chance of acceptance.

Despite the harsh realities of power politics, world opinion *is* a force to be reckoned with. Governments *do* devote much time and energy, both in and out of the U.N., to defending and embellishing their own human-rights image and demeaning that of others. At the 1968 session of the Human Rights Commission, the Soviet Union took pains to expunge from the record statements by the American delegate critical of its practices with respect to freedom of information; a year earlier, it secured the withdrawal by the Sub-Commission on Discrimination of a document containing data critical of its practices. Two or three years before that, world opinion obliged the Soviets to withdraw from circulation an anti-religious tract with crude anti-Semitic overtones which I, as U. S. representative, had exposed in the Sub-Commission. In 1966, when Burundi was faced with charges of brutality against labor officials and political opponents, its government responded swiftly to an ILO request for an explanation, to avoid having the issues placed on the agenda of the Human Rights Commission. And the vehemence with which the government of Greece defended itself, at last year's Commission session, against charges of human-rights violations also showed some concern for world opinion.

How, then, can this concern be harnessed? One proposal, which has been endorsed by the Human Rights Commission and is now before the General Assembly, calls for the establishment of an international Ombudsman or High Commissioner for Human Rights. The High Commissioner would have the authority to place human-rights matters on the agenda, so to speak, of the international conscience. He would function as observer and fact-gatherer, as an intermediary away from the public spotlight and, in extreme cases, as the U.N. agent who would expose abuses to the glare of world opinion. He would also highlight positive accomplishments and experiences in individual countries which might serve as a model for others.

Situations vary, and so would the High Commissioner's role and contribution. He might not be able to move the authorities of South Africa or Southern Rhodesia to a more positive stance on racial issues, but he might well be able to influence other governments, with respect to problems of lesser magnitude or of a

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different nature. Not all human-rights violations are so deeply ingrained that virtual overthrow of a régime or dominant class, or radical change in the legal or social order, is the only solution. Neglect, oversight or inertia, or passions roused by temporary conflicts of interest, are often at the base of many abuses, and in such instances governments and peoples may prove gratifyingly responsive to the High Commissioner's overtures.

The U. S. Government supports the concept of a High Commissioner, not only because of its intrinsic merit, but also, let us be frank to say, because he is unlikely to expose anything unsavory about this country which our own mass media have not already revealed. Furthermore, this country cannot very well ask the U.N. to focus on oppression elsewhere without also being willing to withstand its searchlight on our own practices.

But whether the High Commissioner proposal is adopted or not, it is clear that the present situation in the U.N., with its nearly exclusive focus on the issues of Southern Africa, cannot continue indefinitely. Sooner or later, the procedural precedents developed by the General Assembly in dealing with colonialism and with South Africa, including the right of private petition, hearings, investigations, fact-finding missions, special rapporteurs, expert working groups, and so on, must be extended to the general field of human rights.

Above all, the growing tendency to politicize U.N. bodies dealing with human rights must be checked. As the Swedish delegate to the Tehran Conference observed, in commenting on the sustained attack by the Arab delegates against Israel:

> Human rights are nothing but politics. But when the work of a certain organ becomes increasingly mixed with the elements of problems that are being, and should be, in the first place, discussed elsewhere . . . then there is . . . the risk that the work of the United Nations as a whole will suffer. . . . The result may be in fact a reduction of the Organization's authority and—in the long run—a deterioration of confidence in the United Nations on the part of public opinion.

This means that U.N. bodies concerned with human rights must make every effort to avoid involvement in the political conflicts that from time to time occupy the organization and that are the primary concern of its political committees. Institutional devices such as the appointment of a High Commissioner for Human Rights, or committees of independent experts, can help to depoliticize the human-rights process. But even more impor-

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tant is the willingness of the member states to subordinate any short-term political advantage they might achieve by deflecting the human-rights machinery to the longer-term common interest of all nations in building an international system to assure human rights.

IV

Attention has been focused here on the role of the United Nations, but there are other agencies of international coöperation. Regional intergovernmental organizations—whose members are closer to one another in terms of geography, racial and ethnic origins, political ideals and cultural values than are the U.N. members—are playing an increasingly important role. The Council of Europe, which has established the most advanced human-rights system to date, including a right of individual petition and a regional court, provided a model for the promising system of the Organization of American States. The Organization of African Unity has also taken beginning steps toward a regional system, and other regions may one day follow suit.

Moreover, the pre-U.N. practice of "humanitarian intervention" by individual states—as voices of conscience and not as military intruders—must retain its relevance, so long as intergovernmental institutions are incapable of performing their human-rights role effectively. The need will continue for non-involved states and non-governmental agencies to raise their voices and exert their influence in behalf of persecuted and disadvantaged groups in other countries. Recent events in connection with relief to Biafra offer a striking example of such initiatives.

As long as the individual states continue to resist any international programs which they consider threatening to their own sovereignty—and this seems likely to be true for a long time—the examples set by the states within their own borders will probably exert more influence on other states than any steps the U.N. is likely to take in the immediate future. This places a grave responsibility on the major powers, and especially on the United States, which has always been the most vocal spokesman for human rights in the international arena. Unless we succeed in solving our own racial and other problems of human rights—and unless we speak the same language in the U. S. Senate that we use in the Human Rights Commission and other international

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forums—we will find we are forfeiting the leadership and respect we once enjoyed.

No longer can the United States expect to participate in the drafting of conventions without ratifying them. We do not, of course, have to accept every convention drafted by the U.N. or other international agency. But where the provisions of particular conventions are in harmony with America's own principles and consistent with its own laws and practices, it is our responsibility to ratify them and give them the support they deserve.

As for our posture in the U.N. we, too, must resist the temptation to tailor our attitudes toward human rights in other nations to conform with our current foreign policy toward those nations. For if we exempt our allies and satellites, and limit criticism to our foes, we can hardly object when others follow our example. Dare we adopt a policy under which we cease to blink at the transgressions of our friends in the area of human rights? It would entail some risk of offending certain of our "friends"—but it might win us others. And if we really mean the U.N. to protect human rights, there is no alternative.

The U.N. effort in behalf of human rights is part of the centuries-long drive toward an expanding human community endowed with rights and freedoms. We who are still seeking to implement the protections guaranteed to all citizens in the U.S. Constitution can hardly be impatient with the U.N.'s progress. And, as the Australian delegate observed at the Tehran Conference, "If the last twenty years may be called the stage of definition, the next twenty may prove to be the stage of implementation."

Internationally, as at home, the sin is not that it takes so long, but that we don't always do all that can be done to speed things up.

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SOUTH AFRICA: ARE THERE SILVER LININGS?

By Edwin S. Munger

SOUTH Africa is possibly the most controversial of countries. Its defenders acclaim its political stability; others ask at what price in civil rights. Its economic boom is the pride of its advocates; its economic inequality is the target of its critics. "Separate Development" of ethnic groups is presented on one hand as an enlightened solution to racial tensions; on the other hand it is condemned as not only racist but unworkable.

South Africa's critics not only condemn the present situation as unjust, they show even greater concern over the dangers of today's policies projected into tomorrow. Lord Caradon, Britain's Ambassador to the United Nations, has long pointed to southern Africa as a time bomb with a shortening fuse. Former U.N. Ambassador Goldberg sees South Africa as a racist cancer which could infect the whole planet and lead to World War III. Such alarming predictions are not the conclusions of this author. The projections in this article, based upon contemporary domestic developments and trends in foreign policy, point to the possibility of a relatively peaceful transition to a more just South Africa.

Essential to our understanding is some acquaintance with Prime Minister John Vorster. When he succeeded Dr. H. F. Verwoerd two years ago, Vorster was considered a man of iron by his party, and with reason. He had been jailed for alleged subversion for two years at the Koffiefontein Camp during World War II; he had broken up the Communist Party, defeated widespread sabotage rings and instituted "preventive detention," "bannings" and "exit permits." No doubt he would continue to defend Dr. Verwoerd's "granite" stand. Vorster's ascension to power dismayed all the varying shades of opposition in South Africa and the world outside, which had observed the procession of Nationalist Prime Ministers, each successively further to the Right—Malan, Strijdom, Verwoerd—since the party came to power in 1948. The logical culmination seemed to be Vorster, who had the toughest image of any cabinet minister. *The New York Times* dismally concluded that "the South African Nationalists in fear have turned over the reins of government to the most extreme, most ruthless, most totalitarian of their party

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leaders." *The Times* of London saw Vorster as having a "hard and intimidating reputation" and as the "head gaoler" who can "simply batten down the hatches and hope to ride out the storm. That would be the purest form of isolationism."

Today, the hard image of Vorster within South Africa has been tempered by the moderation, pragmatism and outward-looking flexibility he has displayed in his two years of office. This "reversal" has rankled the right-wing politicians. In August 1968, the antagonism within the National Party between the *verligtes* (enlightened) and the *verkramptes* (cramped or narrow ones) burst into an open struggle in which the Prime Minister resolutely fell in with the "enlightened" and used his power to dismiss *verkrampte* cabinet minister Dr. Albert Hertzog. Two other ministers were also dismissed on grounds of incompetence. There had been no equivalent action in the history of the National Party. When some young right-wingers circulated a "smear" pamphlet against Vorster's "liberal" moves, they found themselves dropped from party membership. In Pretoria, heartland of the right wing, which had captured the local party machinery, the rightist coup was reversed at an open meeting of the party.

What are the differences between *verligtes* and *verkramptes?* In general the *verligte* elements favor immigration (including Catholics, Greeks, Portuguese), participating in integrated sports abroad, receiving black diplomats in South Africa, programs to encourage the exchange of people with other countries, friendship with English-speaking South Africans, a feeling of comradeship toward "our brown Afrikaners" or Coloured people, the policy of Separate Homelands compared with *baasskap* (mastership), not barring professors, because of religious beliefs, from teaching in state-supported universities, and more open discussion and debate of issues rather than decisions made by closed groups. The *verkramptes* fear change, including television and ecumenical movements among churches, and, in a good many instances, are inclined toward a conspiracy theory of history. John Vorster defines being *verlig* as "using one's common sense in a modern world," and in solving local problems in an international context. What is causing change in South Africa is not, as often believed, the rise of *verligtes* in opposition to the Government, but the movement of the National Party to a *verligte* position on key issues, leaving those who have long stood for *baasskap* outside the party or a minority within it.

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After 1948, when the National Party came to power, its opponents and overseas critics kept predicting it would split and possibly the progressive elements would join with the United Party. To view the enlightened versus narrow-minded developments of 1968 as portending a hoped-for split is to misread present political dynamics. The *verligtes* now control most key party positions and it is *they* who may be joined by progressive elements in the United Party. Meanwhile the conservative whites of both parties criticize Vorster for being too radical.

That John Vorster has undergone a metamorphosis is doubtful. A sounder speculation is that the image of him in the minds of his supporters and opponents was incomplete, partly as a result of identifying him with the Transvaal rather than the Cape Province. He was born at Jamestown in the Cape, received his education in Cape schools and entered Stellenbosch University near Cape Town, where every previous South African Prime Minister had received his education. He married into an old-time Cape family and began his legal practice in Port Elizabeth in the eastern Cape. An influence on his thinking was Paul Sauer, later to become the senior cabinet minister and wise old man of Cape Nationalist politics. Vorster declined a safe seat in the Cape Province and decided to make his home in the Transvaal, a superior power base for an aspiring Afrikaner politician. However, his roots are in the Cape, and if there be a kernel of truth in the tradition that the Cape generates a milder Afrikaner political climate than the Transvaal, the present John Vorster is a child of his environment.

The most dramatic changes of the last two decades were made within the National Party during the jolting months of last August and September; and the effects are seen in Afrikaans universities, literature and press. Students at Stellenbosch University are actively seeking contacts with English-speaking universities for the first time. Within the "Akademie," fountainhead of Afrikaans cultural efforts, a struggle between its *verligte* board of distinguished Afrikaner scientists, lawyers and businessmen, and a *verkrampte* staff has ended with the resignation of the latter. A similar struggle had a similar outcome at the new *Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit* in Johannesburg. Despite the key role of right-wingers in founding the university, the faculty is 10 to 1 *verlig*, and its head, Gerrit Viljoen, is a brilliant Latin scholar whose educational innovations can hardly be classed

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"conservative." The enlightened spirit finds expression in the whole *sestiger* (men of the sixties) literary movement and the emergence of the Afrikaans novel from rural sentimentality to involvement in the dynamism of urban life at home and abroad.

Changes in news media have both fostered and reflected the strength of the *verligtes*. The Cape-based *Nasionale Pers* has been successful with its Transvaal Sunday paper, *Die Beeld*, whose moderate approach on many issues would have been very unpopular three years ago; it was unsuccessfully attacked at Nationalist congresses in September. The *Transvaler* has moved from the right to a politically neutral position within the party. *Dagbreek* now supports Vorster's pragmatism where it once supported Verwoerd's obdurateness. Only *Die Vaderland*, the Johannesburg afternoon daily, gives much support to the Nationalist right wing, whose major voice is the small *Hoofstadnuus* in Pretoria. The relatively enlightened and highly literate *Die Burger* of Cape Town, which was considered pernicious for engaging in intra-party fights against both Verwoerd and Vorster, has now established an amiable rapport with the Prime Minister. Even the English-language press has shifted from steady condemnation to occasional support of the Prime Minister. These developments are conspicuous to South Africans but not to the outside world, which is unaware of any reason to make a reassessment.

II

But however striking have been the recent political changes within the National Party and Afrikanerdom, they have not been transmitted to levels affecting the average African. Political opportunities legally available to the Bantu-speaking peoples of South Africa within the so-called white areas have not increased in the last twenty years, and they have further declined in the last few years. Arrests and convictions of members of the "illegal" African National Congress and the Pan African Congress continue to take place, particularly around Port Elizabeth and the eastern Cape. Robert Sobukwe, the one African political leader who has served his sentence under the law, remains in detention on Robben Island. The Communist Party and nearly all of its front organizations are banned and their underground activities crushed. A new proclamation in the Government *Gazette* bans meetings of more than ten people in African areas without special

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permission, excepting sports and religious gatherings. Most members of the Government, including the Prime Minister, resist any relaxation of such draconic control on the grounds that it would invite another "freedom struggle" (as from 1948–1966) in which the Communist Party would again manipulate and agitate black nationalists and labor movements to violent action. Most white Nationalists believe that Africans seeking political rights are "communists." Banning of white activists has been no less severe, as it was predominantly white groups that were responsible for the sabotage of property and killings. Restrictions have even been extended to the legally acceptable Progressive Party, barring it from operating across color lines.

If you ask a cabinet minister bluntly what legislation affecting the Bantu has been passed in recent years which offers them more and not less opportunity, he is hard pressed to give examples. He mentions the new town councils for Soweto and elsewhere, and provisions whereby "white" capital can be invested in the Bantustans, in almost direct reversal of Verwoerdian principle. Finally he resorts to describing a "new spirit of administration." It is true that there are more African police in sole charge of African areas, a new politeness toward Africans by government officials, and the concession allowing Africans to buy liquor. But the hard, legal facts of African life in the urban areas of South Africa and on the white-owned farms do not present either a new or a creditable picture.

The administration is concentrating its efforts on promoting "separate development" of "nations" (as ethnic groups are often referred to in southern Africa). In the Prime Minister's initial speech, he specifically mentioned the Coloured, Indian and Bantu peoples in a way "not to indicate political equality but equality as human beings," to quote an Afrikaner foreign editor. And he is proud to have met with more representatives of the various ethnic groups than any previous Prime Minister in a comparable period of time.

The showcase of "separate development" is the Transkei. Its present autonomy was hastened by two years in advance of the planned date through the influence of the late Dag Hammarskjöld upon Prime Minister Verwoerd. An application for its admission to the United Nations may be made surprisingly soon. The Xhosa are steadily taking over key positions held by whites, so that the African Minister of Agriculture complains privately

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that Africanization is proceeding too rapidly to maintain efficiency. Meanwhile, the African opposition within the Transkei has tempered its opposition to the Bantustan idea. Transkeian Chief Minister Matanzima who, before he took office, described his people to the author as "the victims of the white man for 300 years," often presses fresh demands on the Government for more territory and autonomy.

The development of other Bantustans has been much slower. There was a revival of effort in the past year to unite "Zulustan," bedeviled by tribal differences stemming from the nineteenth century, and to tackle the thorny problem of the white-owned sugarlands which the Zulus claim. In South West Africa, the Ovamboland Legislative Council has held its first meeting, and one for the Okavangos is also coming into operation. In Vendaland, in the northern Transvaal, the South African army made a strong attempt to mollify local tribal authorities during a recent anti-guerrilla exercise in the area. South African military authorities say openly that the success or failure of guerrilla incursions from the north rests upon the disposition of the local inhabitants. Progress has also been made with the Tswana, on the Botswana border. But overall, the program of "Separate Homelands" has not made much headway and will require massive exertion if it is to provide "separate freedoms" for those Africans —perhaps half of the total population—who might eventually live within enlarged Bantustans.

The South African economy as a whole is in dire need of skilled labor and supervisory talent and cannot grow if it is saddled with an uneducated and untrained black proletariat. Everywhere employers complain about the lack of skilled labor, regardless of pigmentation, and everywhere regulations, including the stiff new Physical Planning Act, are circumvented. But much economic progress can be made legally. An example is the recent gains by Africans through the extension of the principle of "equal pay for equal work." The increase in wages paid by industry and the movement of Africans into skilled jobs—on the Durban docks, in textile factories, in defense plants—are measurable facts. In Soweto, the huge complex of black suburbs southwest of Johannesburg, living standards have improved visibly. The terrible shanties and burlap-sack shelters of the 1940s and 1950s have been replaced with modest but substantial housing. A recent private survey indicates the average number of wage earners

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per African family in Soweto to be 2.2 persons, and not 1.3, a figure established in 1956 on which many estimates of living standards are based. In the last five years the average length of residence in Soweto has increased from 5.8 to 8.2 years and income from $81 to $100 a month; but the incidence of infant mortality has also climbed. House rent is $10 a month.

The booming economy has produced material and social payoffs, as seen in the larger number of well-dressed Africans and a new economic mobility. The change from white to Coloured postmen is an undeniable fact to housewives in affected white areas. To make up for the growing shortage of white drivers, the Johannesburg bus line may or may not decide to hire "non-whites" but the economic pressure to do so is offsetting the fear of white bus drivers that they will lose social status if "non-whites" perform the same tasks. Barring a general slump or a loss in the value of gold, the Afrikaner may not have to choose between the "volk and the Volkswagen." One can foresee, without being too idealistic, that economic pragmatism and political flexibility will one day allow the Afrikaner businessman to have his Mercedes while the African, who is now paid to drive a truck, will have the Volkswagen.

A crucial question is how the present political structure will adapt itself to these changes. Will it facilitate the liberalizing social trends that are resulting from a booming economy? At first the South African Government may implement only measures to improve facilities in African areas and broaden social privileges, but without showing any inclination to make radical political and social changes. The new town councils, for example, will continue as long as they do not lead to political confrontations. But the prospect for African representation in a central legislature is dim. The United Party proposes eight African representatives, but this would clearly be an inequitable stopgap. The expansion of representation by votes in the "homelands," analogous to Italian workers in Germany sending home their votes, although not a wholly satisfactory solution, relieves some political pressures. Indeed many Basutos who are long-time residents in South African cities do vote in Lesotho with a sense of pride and participation. But what is essential is to find a mechanism whereby decisions affecting a man's home, his child's school and his conditions of work are brought within his political competence. What is most likely under present National Party rule is

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that the Bantu will participate in decisions affecting all of present-day South Africa through a multinational body in which ethnic groups might participate as separate "nations."

Such a suggestion is not unimaginable to the Afrikaner, whose struggle under British colonialism has left him with a regard for self-determination, which he can violate only with a sense of guilt. There are also more immediate concerns. The separation of African families arising from the myriad of regulations has its accompanying evils: divorce, adultery, illegitimacy, juvenile delinquency and the general breakdown of stable family life. A commission of the main Dutch Reformed Church once again in 1968 criticized these results of controls over the movement of Africans.

The doctrine of apartheid, one should note, has no ideological basis. The race-hate literature found in a few South African bookshops issues mainly from the United States and Great Britain. Indeed, the key expression has evolved from "apartheid" to "separate development" and is now "separate homelands." None of these is a defined principle or historic pronouncement derived from religious contexts. Actually, the more rigid the policy seems on the surface, the more flexible it becomes in practice. But the pragmatism involved is not obvious since all policy changes are justified as somehow representing a continuation, not a break, of existing policy. When Prime Minister Vorster announced that Maoris would be accepted as part of the New Zealand rugby team next year, he referred to a visit of a Maori player in the 1920s and suggested that he was only carrying on a traditional policy, whereas, in fact, his action was a *volte-face*.

III

In its relations with other African countries South Africa has demonstrated more flexibility than formerly. Most observers predicted that the South African "victory" in the South West Africa case before the World Court would lead to isolationism and an inward-looking "laager" mentality, meaning the way the whites lived behind their circle of covered wagons. Now it is clear that it was the sense of relief from the possibility of concerted world action against South Africa which created the psychological climate for freer discussion and has permitted the National Party's new foreign policy.

The new openness is reflected in the civilities displayed toward

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African leaders by the administration despite murmurings among the South African electorate. One such incident was the admission of the Botswana President, Sir Seretse Khama, to the Johannesburg General Hospital, normally reserved for white patients, for treatment of a serious liver ailment. The hospital not only extended its medical facilities but its personnel accorded special VIP hospitality to Seretse's English wife. Protests at the National Party Congress in Pretoria were met resolutely by Prime Minister Vorster, who claimed he acted on his own personal responsibility and forbade anyone to make a party issue of it. The action was in marked contrast to Prime Minister Malan's reaction twenty years ago when he took umbrage at the British Government for allowing Sir Seretse's marriage.

Another visit to South Africa which is sure to have a psychological effect on racial attitudes is that to be paid by President Hastings Banda, of Malawi, in return for the visit last August of the South African Foreign Minister to Blantyre. Already the presence of a black Malawi diplomat in Capetown's "white" suburb of Rondebosch has had an impact on public thinking, although similar arrangements in Pretoria have been slow to materialize. Regulations encouraging acceptance of black diplomats are a small but significant step. A future endeavor in the same direction is the construction of a center at the Jan Smuts airport where racially mixed conferences can be held. An incident at the Swaziland Independence celebrations further illustrates the new role South Africa has assumed in Africa. Photographers closed in on the South African Foreign Minister, Hilgard Müller, as he was seated with the Ghanaian Ambassador. Five years ago one would have waited to see if the South African was willing to return the extended hand of the Ghanaian. This time the interest centered on whether the Ghanaian would shake the hand of the South African. He did.

South African diplomacy in dealing with the smaller nations on its boundaries is liberal. Like all strong powers with militarily weak neighbors, South Africa faces the temptation to be demanding, protectionist or exploitative. It has not succumbed to that temptation. While the important mineral developments in Botswana are under the leadership of American, British and South African companies, Botswana is almost completely dependent for its trade routes on South African coöperation, which has been generous. Lesotho, wholly surrounded by South Africa,

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is making headway with the vital Oxbow scheme, which will dam the headwaters of the Orange River and sell power to South Africa. Recently, a hundred Free State Afrikaner farmers voluntarily took their tractors to Lesotho to provide free deep-plowing for the Leribe part of the Lesotho lowland and, not incidentally, to help the image of Prime Minister Jonathan in a stronghold of his opposition. Malawi is receiving technical aid from South Africa plus a soft loan to help build the new capital at Lilongwe. The newest non-racial country within South Africa's orbit, Swaziland, achieved independence in September 1968, ending almost three centuries of British sovereignty over some part of Africa. At the time of independence, the Swaziland Prime Minister made clear that the kingdom values its economic ties and friendship with South Africa next to its own political freedom and non-racist policy. Malagasy may afford South Africa its first official tie with a French-speaking African state following the visit of an official delegation to Pretoria. Anton Rupert, the outstanding businessman, has sent Stellenbosch medical students to work in Swaziland and a number of South African surgeons to operate in Lesotho and other countries further north. Recently, officials in Pretoria have again met with Robert Gardiner, the distinguished Ghanaian and Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, who has wise advice to offer on how to better relations between private South African groups and black Africa.

A particular diplomatic goal is to establish rapport with Zambia. From many points of view the effort would appear to be in vain. President Kaunda's frequent condemnations of South Africa reflect both the sincerity of his feelings and the tense struggle going on within the Zambian Government. Kaunda cannot afford to seem to compromise his attitude toward South Africa. But South Africa is now the chief trading partner of Zambia, replacing Rhodesia and Great Britain. Tons of dynamite are still shipped each month through Botswana and Rhodesia to keep the Zambian mines working. South Africa also has an interest in providing an alternative to the Chinese-supported rail line from Dar es Salaam. The alternate route would extend from Zambia, through Botswana, tapping the new mineral developments there and continue on to a port in South West Africa, where ships could load thousands of miles closer to Europe and the United States. It is significant that considerable dialogue between Zambia and South Africa is occurring.

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South Africa's association with Rhodesia continues to be thorny. Observers at a rugby match last July between the British Lions and the Springboks could not help noticing Vorster and Ian Smith engaged in animated conversation. The next morning, Sunday newspapers conjectured that they had exchanged ideas about an Israeli-like retaliation raid against guerrilla bases in Zambia. Vorster personally telephoned leading Afrikaans editors to deny any such plan. The editors are almost unanimous in opposing the right-wing faction of Ian Smith's party. One commented, "We would be better off with a friendly black Rhodesia than with it as a white tinderbox."

Other African states to the north offer possibilities of closer ties. French-speaking African states such as Gabon, Chad and Upper Volta have had amiable contacts regarding possible diplomatic relations with South Africa. Economic links with the Ivory Coast and the Congo continue to grow. The opposition to South Africa is strongest in Tanzania. Kenya also attacks its "white domination" but in practice is less hostile, as is Uganda, which also trades secretly with South Africa. The United Nations does not seem disposed (to understate its attitude) to a modus vivendi with South Africa. The Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity aims to overthrow white rule in the "Southern Sixth," despite a desire for accommodation among a minority of its members. But it is clear that South Africa will continue seeking coöperation with black nations.

This analysis of South African policies has concentrated upon the white oligarchy and particularly upon the dominant National Party as a force capable of humanizing present institutions or building new ones. If it pursues that road there are thousands of Africans, Indians and Coloureds eager to reaffirm the belief that men divided by ethnic difference can live in harmony. Such hopes are echoed by Afrikaner Nationalist writers such as Professor Van Wyk Louw who proclaim that "mere survival as a goal is death," but that the Afrikaner's survivial is a moral question based on "the need to live in justice with fellow peoples." The columnist of the Johannesburg *Zionist Record,* Henry Katzew, expressed the conviction that "the Afrikaner's struggle for survival and the Black man's demand for free opportunity are not irreconcilable." Recently N. J. Olivier, one of the most popular professors at Stellenbosch University, told an audience of all races, "We are not monsters and I believe it will be realized that

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discrimination based on colour is untenable. It will take time, but we have seen many changes in South Africa, and I believe this one will come."

If this article foresees a community of nations in southern Africa, some amelioration of the political position of the Bantu in "white" cities and peaceful coexistence of the peoples of southern Africa, why is not the South African Government inspired to proclaim these goals? Because the unique historical struggle of the Afrikaner has given him an approach to the future that is dogmatic and simple. His tolerance for ambiguity is exceptionally low. The Afrikaner voter demands that his leader be firm, positive and know the answers both for now and for the distant future. A Nationalist politician who would admit that his country's racial problems are far more complex than those of the United States and Great Britain, and that while believing his party to be on the right road would welcome helpful suggestions, would risk his political survival. It has been the not uncommon experience of this author to hear Afrikaner leaders tell a group of foreigners that policy must be precisely so and so and that foreign doubts as to its success have no basis, and then in a moment turn around and express the selfsame doubts and concerns and begin discussing alternate solutions. It might be added that American policy toward South Africa measures what constitutes "progress" there by an American value system wholly dominated by racial factors.

One would be wrong to conclude on too optimistic a note. No panaceas are in sight. As a long-time student of South Africa, the author simply contends that certain trends now clearly discernible point in a new political direction. But discrimination against the Bantu continues. The position of the Coloured people shows scandalously little improvement; and while many Asians are prospering and their university is a tremendous success, both these minority groups suffer severe legal disabilities with only slight prospect that the Government will find a formula to fit them into the "homelands" concept.

The possibility is ever present that clouds of reaction will block out the new rays. Nevertheless, one can have reasonable hopes that the next decade will see an increase in social and political opportunities for Africans, Coloureds and Asians in South Africa to match their domestic economic advances and the new flexibility shown by the Government in foreign affairs.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By John G. Stoessinger

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Howard Linton, Asia; Joseph A. Ellis, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

THE ESSENCE OF SECURITY: REFLECTIONS IN OFFICE. By Robert S. McNamara. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 176 p. $4.95.

This sane and most readable book contains, *inter alia,* the former Defense Secretary's closely reasoned plea against the deployment of a $40 billion anti-ballistic-missile system.

POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES. By Samuel P. Huntington. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, 488 p. $12.50.

In this brilliant though somewhat disjointed work, the author makes a major contribution to the literature on the politics of modernization.

ALLIANCES AND SMALL POWERS. By Robert L. Rothstein. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 331 p. $10.00.

Drawing his materials from the classical as well as the contemporary period, the author advances a number of fertile theoretical propositions about the role of small powers in the international system.

ALLIANCES AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Robert E. Osgood. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, 171 p. $6.50.

A thoughtful essay on the changing nature of alliances since the advent of the atomic age and a thought-provoking look into their possible future.

PROGRESS, COEXISTENCE, AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM. By Andrei D. Sakharov. New York: Norton, 1968, 158 p. $3.95.

An eloquent plea for superpower collaboration as the key to a better world, by an outstanding Soviet scientist. Capably annotated by Harrison E. Salisbury.

THE UN AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, 1967. By Arthur Lall. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 322 p. $10.00.

A detailed account of the United Nations' activities in the Middle East from the withdrawal of UNEF in May 1967 to the establishment of the Jarring mission six months later.

THE NEW NATIONALISM. By Louis L. Snyder. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968, 387 p. $11.50.

An ambitious effort to assess the phenomenon of nationalism since 1945 on a global scale. Much depth despite the broad coverage.

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NEUTRALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS. By Cyril E. Black and others. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, 195 p. $7.50.

A first-rate analysis of the experience with neutralization arrangements, capped by a pertinent concluding chapter on the relevance of neutralization to South Viet Nam.

LA CONCILIATION INTERNATIONALE. By Jean-Pierre Cot. Paris: Pedone, 1968, 389 p. Fr. 60.

A careful historical survey, from a primarily legal point of view, of the practices of mediation and conciliation among states.

THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Charles De Visscher. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, 527 p. $12.50.

A highly sophisticated analysis of the role of international law in world politics, by a leading European scholar. (A translation of the third French edition, 1960.)

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL CRISIS: AN ANALYTIC CASEBOOK. By Lawrence Scheinman and David Wilkinson. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968, 273 p. $2.75 (Paper).

Seven well-chosen case studies illustrating the complex relationships between power and law in world politics.

DEMOCRACY IN A REVOLUTIONARY ERA: THE POLITICAL ORDER TODAY. By Harvey Wheeler. New York: Praeger, 1968, 224 p. $5.95.

The author attempts to prove, not very successfully, that democracy is the certain outcome of the development process and that balance-of-power politics is obsolete in today's world.

CONDITIONS OF WORLD ORDER. Edited by Stanley Hoffmann. Boston: Houghton, 1968, 397 p. $6.50.

An uneven symposium with contributions by 21 scholars. The most significant essays are those by Raymond Aron, Stanley Hoffmann and Henry A. Kissinger.

THE UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL SYSTEM. Edited by David A. Kay. New York: Wiley, 1967, 419 p. $7.95 (Paper, $4.95).

Twenty-four judiciously selected essays.

THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE CRISIS OF RELEVANCE. Edited by Abdul A. Said. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968, 191 p. $2.95 (Paper).

This anthology is a useful companion piece to Stanley Hoffmann's more thorough study on "Contemporary Theory in International Relations."

PEACEKEEPING: INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE AND CANADIAN RESPONSE. By Alastair Taylor and others. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1968, 211 p. $4.50 (Paper, $2.75).

A valuable account of the Canadian contribution to U.N. peacekeeping operations.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND THE NEW DIPLOMACY. Edited by Arthur S. Hoffman. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968, 206 p. $6.95.

Thirteen scholars assess the impact of communications technology on modern diplomacy.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE BIPOLAR WORLD. By Peter J. Fliess. New York: Random House, 1968, 221 p. $2.45 (Paper).

A survey of contemporary world politics in a bipolar frame of reference.

INTERVENTION AND REVOLUTION: THE UNITED STATES IN THE THIRD WORLD. By Richard J. Barnet. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1968, 302 p. $6.95.

An indictment of "the militarist analysis of the world environment" and a plea that the United States intervene less in the revolutions of other nations and concentrate more on how to make these revolutions unnecessary.

THE PHILBY CONSPIRACY. By Bruce Page and others. Garden City: Doubleday, 1968, 300 p. $5.95.

The well-told tale, at once humorous and terrifying, of one of the great feats of duplicity in modern espionage.

AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD HISTORY. Compiled and Edited by William L. Langer. Boston: Houghton, 1968, 1,504 p. $15.00.

The completely revised fourth edition of an indispensable work of reference, first published in 1940.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1967. Edited by Richard P. Stebbins with the Assistance of Elaine P. Adam. New York: Simon and Schuster (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1968, 524 p. $10.00.

Documentation on the Viet Nam conflict, the six-day war in the Middle East and the meeting of American Presidents at Punta del Este holds first place in the most recent installment of this annual selection from the outstanding documentary materials pertaining to American foreign policy.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. By David W. Wainhouse and others. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, 179 p. $6.95.

The authors of this valuable study focus on the problems of inspection and verification of arms-control agreements. They conclude with a recommendation for a single international verification organization.

A SINISTER TWILIGHT: THE FALL OF SINGAPORE, 1942. By Noel Barber. Boston: Houghton, 1968, 364 p. $6.95.

This is the definitive account of the conquest of Singapore by the Japanese in 1942, "the greatest debacle in the history of British arms."

THE HAWKS OF WORLD WAR II. By Mark Lincoln Chadwin. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968, 310 p. $7.95.

A scholarly monograph on the interventionist movement in the United States prior to Pearl Harbor. The book focuses on the Century Group and the Fight for Freedom Committee.

THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, 1943–45: A POLITICAL AND MILITARY RE-ASSESSMENT. By G. A. Shepperd. New York: Praeger, 1968, 450 p. $11.00.

A British Army officer renders a detailed and dispassionate account of the campaign from the Sicilian landings to final victory.

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KREUZERKRIEG. By Edwin P. Hoyt. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1968, 340 p. $6.95.

The story, well told, of the German East Asia Cruiser Squadron in World War I. The hero clearly is Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee.

THE ORDEAL OF TOTAL WAR, 1939–1945. By Gordon Wright. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 315 p. $7.95.

The author skillfully blends economic, psychological and scientific elements into a fine analysis of World War II in Europe.

ROME FELL TODAY. By Robert H. Adleman and Colonel George Walton. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968, 336 p. $7.95.

An excellent and eminently readable account of "the first time in history that Rome was taken from the south."

VICTORY AT HIGH TIDE. By *Colonel Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. Philadelphia:* Lippincott, 1968, 315 p. $8.95.

In the author's view, the Inchon-Seoul campaign was MacArthur's masterpiece but also led directly to the General's sense of hubris and his ultimate downfall.

THE VIOLENT PEACE. By Carl Mydans and Shelley Mydans. New York: Atheneum, 1968, 478 p. $12.50.

A broad survey, in sharply etched vignettes and numerous superb photographs, of 25 scattered wars around the globe since 1945.

LAWRENCE AND OPPENHEIMER. By Nuel Pharr Davis. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968, 384 p. $7.50.

This book offers some extraordinary insights into the minds and careers of two men who helped to usher in the atomic age. Particularly revealing on Oppenheimer.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: AMERICA'S HIDDEN ARSENAL. By Seymour M. Hersh. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968, 354 p. $7.50.

A well-documented inventory of horrors.

THE GOVERNMENT OF SCIENCE. By Harvey Brooks. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1968, 343 p. $10.00.

Ten papers exploring the multiple relationships between science and government.

WAR IN MODERN SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION. By Alastair Buchan. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 207 p. $1.95 (Paper).

A thoughtful introductory essay by a British scholar. (First published in England in 1966.)

General: Economic and Social

OUR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW. By Robert Triffin. New York: Random House, 1968, 206 p. $4.95.

With his usual clarity one of the most articulate participants in "the marathon debate on international monetary reform" puts the issues in bright historical perspective. Even so he is able to find room for a surprisingly detailed commentary on the current situation and a few licks for his own point of view.

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REMAKING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: THE RIO AGREEMENT AND BEYOND. By Fritz Machlup. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (with the Committee for Economic Development), 1968, 161 p. $6.95.

By pursuing "linguistic pragmatism" the world's monetary statesmen have shown "how to get agreement by avoiding excessively clear language." Professor Machlup sets matters to rights by a very clear exposition, commentary and critique of a plan he approves because it is based on "a genuine breakthrough in monetary thinking."

THE LARGE INTERNATIONAL FIRM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY. By Edith T. Penrose. London: Allen and Unwin, 1968, 311 p. 48/.

The title and subtitle should be reversed. Mrs. Penrose's years of close study of the international oil industry have paid off in a most interesting book that emphasizes postwar changes in the industry, its relation to governments and the interplay of business structure and practice. Her views will not find complete acceptance but they are clearly stated and argued.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE PROBLEMS OF SMALL NATIONS. By Peter J. Lloyd. Durham: Duke University Press, 1968, 140 p. $6.00.

Original analysis and a review of literature enable this young economist to demonstrate that size and various economic characteristics are not as uniformly related as is generally believed.

PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH. Edited by Walter W. Heller. New York: Random House, 1968, 237 p. $5.95.

Nine essays by economists who for the most part had some hand in the Kennedy Administration's focus on growth.

LE G.A.T.T.: DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMMERCE MONDIAL. By Thiébaut Flory. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1968, 306 p. Fr. 36.90.

A thorough analysis that deals more with the practice and procedures of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade than with traditional legal questions.

AGRARIAN REVOLUTION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS. By Rainer Schickele. New York: Praeger (in coöperation with the Agricultural Development Council), 1968, 410 p. $15.00.

An American economist with great experience in less developed countries labels as "a primer" what is in fact a thoughtful and far more rounded and reflective book than most studies of agricultural development.

DEVELOPMENT POLICY—THEORY AND PRACTICE. Edited by Gustav F. Papanek. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, 367 p. $12.50.

The Harvard Development Advisory Service has accumulated a great amount of experience in the application of economics to the problems of developing countries. Ten papers analyzing problems in Argentina, Colombia, Liberia and Pakistan and an essay by the Director are all directed toward seeing what the experience has taught. (Prepared under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.)

THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. By Hans Bachmann. New York: Praeger, 1968, 341 p. $15.00.

A leading Swiss economist has been remarkably successful in making this "manual of economic policies" for people in less developed countries not just a training tool but a ready reference that tells not only what issues are important but how they need to be thought about.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE TROPICS. By B. W. Hodder. London: Methuen, 1968, 258 p. (New York: Barnes and Noble, distributor, $3.00, Paper.)

At the end, the author remarks that "to write about 'tropical' as quite distinct from any other kind of development is impossible." Rejecting the idea that one can generalize about the tropics, he sees no greater obstacles to development there than elsewhere.

DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: INSTITUTIONS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS. By Phillips Perera. New York: Praeger, 1968, 440 p. $15.00.

Wide-ranging but interesting notably for its material on development banks and other efforts to mobilize capital in a number of countries.

THE STRATEGY OF FOREIGN AID. By Lloyd D. Black. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1968, 176 p. $5.95.

A survey of the history, use and results of foreign aid, with the emphasis on development.

BORN TO HUNGER. By Arthur Hopcraft. Boston: Houghton, 1968, 258 p. $4.50.

A journalist's account of hunger and efforts to deal with it in a number of countries. Written for the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, United Kingdom Committee.

The United States

THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT. By Neal R. Peirce. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968, 400 p. $8.95.

This is a well-researched and possibly definitive study on the role of the Electoral College in American history. Predictably the author strongly favors a Constitutional Amendment that would provide a direct vote for President by the American people.

A VERY PERSONAL PRESIDENCY. By Hugh Sidey. New York: Atheneum, 1968, 305 p. $5.95.

The most successful effort to date to fathom the complex personality of Lyndon B. Johnson in the Presidency.

HE WALKED ALONE. By Bernard Bellush. The Hague: Mouton, 1968, 246 p. Gldrs. 30.

An authoritative biography of John Gilbert Winant, with a moving foreword by Allan Nevins.

THE "OTHER" STATE DEPARTMENT. By Arnold Beichman. New York: Basic Books, 1968, 221 p. $5.95.

A crisply written account of the structure, activities and main personalities of the U. S. Mission to the United Nations.

A DIPLOMAT LOOKS BACK. By Lewis Einstein; Edited by Lawrence E. Gelfand. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, 269 p. $7.50.

The evocative and perceptive memoirs of a distinguished American diplomat, spanning half a century.

THE REMNANTS OF POWER: THE TRAGIC LAST YEARS OF ADLAI STEVENSON. By Richard J. Walton. New York: Coward-McCann, 1968, 255 p. $5.95.

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Stevenson's years at the United Nations, in the author's view, were marked by a profound inner conflict between the public and the private man over some of the main policy directions of the Administration.

THE PRESIDENT AND PUBLIC OPINION: LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. By Manfred Landecker. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1968, 133 p. $4.50.

In this workmanlike study, the author attempts to determine how Presidents Roosevelt and Truman assessed and aroused public opinion in the formulation of their respective foreign policies.

DEMOCRACY AND THE STUDENT LEFT. By George F. Kennan. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1968, 239 p. $5.75.

Thirty-nine letters by students and teachers written in response to Mr. Kennan's "Rebels Without a Program," published in *The New York Times Magazine* on January 21, 1968. The book concludes with a reply by Mr. Kennan.

BEYOND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY OF EQUALITY. By Hubert H. Humphrey. New York: Random House, 1968, 193 p. $5.00.

A passionate plea for real equality for all American citizens.

THE PRESIDENTS' MEN. By Patrick Anderson. Garden City: Doubleday, 1968, 420 p. $6.95.

An excellent and informative book about Presidential assistants from Harry Hopkins to Jack Valenti.

THE AMERICAN EMPIRE. By Amaury de Riencourt. New York: Dial Press, 1968, 366 p. $7.50.

The author attempts to prove that America is destined to rule half of the earth. The other half will probably be ruled by the Soviet Union. The scholarship is sketchy. De Tocqueville said it more succinctly in 1835.

A GREAT SOCIETY? Edited by Bertram M. Gross. New York: Basic Books, 1968, 362 p. $8.50.

Thirteen scholars in as many original essays address themselves to the problems of America's future. The symposium maintains a high standard throughout.

INTERIM REPORT: ON THE U.S. SEARCH FOR A SUBSTITUTE FOR ISOLATION. By Thomas K. Finletter. New York: Norton, 1968, 185 p. $4.95.

A widely experienced public servant reviews the main lines of recent U. S. foreign policy and ends on a note of warning against the danger of a "Fortress America."

THE PEACE CORPS EXPERIENCE. Edited by Roy Hoopes. New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1968, 309 p. $6.95.

A sensitive book written from the volunteers' point of view. Many beautiful photographs.

THE MINUTEMEN. By J. Harry Jones, Jr. Garden City: Doubleday, 1968, 426 p. $6.95.

Some frightening insights into the leading personalities and objectives of the American Far Right.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. By Richard P. Traina. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968, 301 p. $10.95.

This monograph displays considerable analytical depth and balance. The author reveals the bewildering complexities of the dilemma which the United States faced in Spain, but is reluctant to judge or to condemn.

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The Western Hemisphere

AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY FOR CANADA? Edited by Stephen Clarkson. Toronto: McClelland, 1968, 290 p. $4.95 (Paper).

Twenty-six Canadian scholars explore the possibilities of a greater degree of autonomy for their country's foreign policy.

THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY: CANADA, 1945–1967. By Blair Fraser. Garden City: Doubleday, 1967, 325 p. $5.95.

A fast-paced journalistic account of Canada's recent history through the eyes of the late Ottawa correspondent of *Maclean's* magazine.

FEDERALISM AND THE FRENCH CANADIANS. By Pierre Elliott Trudeau. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968, 212 p. $6.50.

In nine essays, the Canadian Prime Minister sets forth his views on Canadian federalism. His prescription: national unity tempered by checks and balances and counterweights.

QUEBEC CONFRONTS CANADA. By Edward M. Corbett. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, 336 p. $8.95.

In this fine and scholarly book, the author concludes that the future of the Canadian Federation will depend on the English majority's readiness to meet the demands of the French minority.

CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Cole Blasier. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968, 243 p. $7.50.

A collection of essays on social change, based on University of Pittsburgh Latin American seminars. Of particular interest are the studies on economics by John P. Powelson and on the Latin American intellectual by Germán Arciniegas.

MEXICO'S FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By William O. Freithaler. New York: Praeger, 1968, 160 p. $12.50.

A factual, statistical study. The author concludes optimistically that, despite external trade difficulties, Mexico will continue a sustained economic growth.

AGRARIAN REFORM IN COLOMBIA. By Ernest A. Duff. New York: Praeger, 1968, 240 p. $14.00.

An examination of the problems delaying real agrarian reform; the strength of the study is in its statistics.

ECONOMIC PLANNING IN VENEZUELA. By Fred D. Levy, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1968, 204 p. $12.50.

In this study based upon interviews the author concludes that the Venezuelans should pay more attention to political considerations in formulating their economic policies.

ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING AND DEVELOPMENT IN BRAZIL, 1947–1964. By Nathaniel H. Leff. New York: Wiley, 1968, 201 p. $7.95.

A perceptive study which notes that "the Brazilian government has had a substantial degree of autonomy from interest groups or socioeconomic class pressures in the making of economic policy."

1933: A CRISE DO TENENTISMO. By Hélio Silva. Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1968, 302 p.

The sixth volume of Hélio Silva's study of the age of Vargas contains documents and source materials for the period ending with the emergence of the National Constituent Assembly in 1933.

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CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IN BRAZIL: PRINCIPLES VERSUS PRACTICE. By Lawrence S. Graham. Austin: University of Texas Press (for the Institute of Latin American Studies), 1968, 233 p. $6.50.

The author notes the failure of Brazilian efforts, especially in the years from 1945 to 1964, to incorporate into their administrative practices North American patterns of "economy and efficiency."

A SEARCH FOR STABILITY: UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY TOWARD NICARAGUA, 1925–1933. By William Kamman. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968, 263 p. $7.95.

A detailed, ponderous study, including a useful, critical bibliography.

THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF CUBA. By Edward Boorstein. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968, 303 p. $7.95.

A defense of Cuba's socialist experiment, based on the author's experiences in Cuba in 1960–1963.

DAGGER IN THE HEART: AMERICAN POLICY FAILURES IN CUBA. By Mario Lazo. New York: Funk, 1968, 426 p. $5.95.

A former Havana lawyer, born, raised and educated in the United States, assesses the "totalitarian" nature of today's Cuba. He believes that the liberal establishment in the United States was the basic factor which "delivered Cuba to Communism."

CUBA: THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTION. By Ramon Eduardo Ruiz. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1968, 190 p. $6.00.

A thoughtful examination of the social, economic and political factors responsible for the Cuban revolution.

THE DOMINICAN REVOLT: A CASE STUDY IN AMERICAN POLICY. By Theodore Draper. New York: Commentary, 1968, 208 p. $5.50 (Paper, $2.50).

A perceptive analysis of the nature of the U.S. intervention during the Dominican crisis, based largely on articles published in *Commentary*.

THE COMPLETE BOLIVIAN DIARIES OF CHÉ GUEVARA. Edited by Daniel James. New York: Stein and Day, 1968, 330 p. $6.95.

This translation also includes a preface by the editor and the diaries of three of Ché's advisers.

MY FRIEND CHÉ. By Ricardo Rojo. New York: Dial Press, 1968, 220 p. $4.95.

An intimate story of the life and thought of Ché Guevara, by an Argentinian lawyer and long-time friend of the revolutionary.

FEDERATION OF THE WEST INDIES. By Sir John Mordecai. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968, 484 p. $13.75.

One of the leading proponents of the West Indian federalist movement examines its failure.

GOVERNMENT FINANCE AND PLANNED DEVELOPMENT: FISCAL SURVEYS OF SURINAM AND THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES. By Fuat M. Andic and Suphan Andic. Rio Piedras: University of Puerto Rico, Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1968, 395 p. $5.00 (Paper).

A detailed examination of the relationship between public and private economic sectors in the Dutch Caribbean islands.

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A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF UNITED STATES-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS SINCE 1810. Compiled and Edited by David F. Trask and others. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1968, 441 p. $14.95.

A valuable, annotated bibliography—"eleven thousand published references"—organized chronologically, topically and along national lines.

Western Europe

L'UNION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE. By Armand Imbert. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1968, 238 p. Fr. 33.30.

A scholarly analysis of the political vicissitudes of the first of the European organizations, the Western European Union.

THE STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON MARKET. By A. E. Walsh and John Paxton. London: Hutchinson, 1968, 232 p. 60/.

A comprehensive but detailed British survey. Rather uncritical, it is useful for reference, covers some points often ignored and has interesting statistics.

FOOD, FARMING, AND THE COMMON MARKET. By Michael Butterwick and Edmund Neville Rolfe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 259 p. $7.20.

Essentially a reference work comparing agriculture in Britain and the Common Market as to policy, production and trade.

BRITAIN IN THE CENTURY OF TOTAL WAR: WAR, PEACE AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 1900–1967. By Arthur Marwick. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1968, 511 p. $8.50.

A spirited and controversial account, by a young Scottish historian, of the changes that two wars wrought in British society. Valuable as history and argument, the book is a specific commentary on Trotsky's dictum "war is the locomotive of history."

HAROLD NICOLSON: THE LATER YEARS, 1945–1962: VOLUME III OF DIARIES AND LETTERS. Edited by Nigel Nicolson. New York: Atheneum, 1968, 448 p. $8.50.

A charming and revealing commentary on British life in the postwar era, by a well-known writer and public figure, recently deceased. Perspicacity and prejudice make an informative mixture, as when he says of American assumption of world authority that it is "humiliating and insidious. . . . They are decent folk in every way, but they tread on traditions in a way that hurts."

BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS. By Richard E. Caves and Associates. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968, 510 p. $7.50.

A group of American economists, mostly on the young side, have produced a major work on the British economy. Their prescriptions for policy emphasize growth through increased efficiency rather than the stimulation of investment or demand.

MIDDLE CLASS RADICALISM. By Frank Parkin. New York: Praeger, 1968, 207 p. $6.50.

A timely and suggestive investigation of who supported the nuclear disarmament movement in Britain. Based on survey techniques and marred by jargon.

THE ZINOVIEV LETTER. By Lewis Chester and others. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968, 218 p. $5.95.

An anti-communist forgery of 1924 which had wide ramifications in Britain's domestic politics, skillfully reconstructed by English journalists.

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THROUGH THE BACK DOOR: AN INSIDE VIEW OF BRITAIN'S OVERSEAS INFORMATION SERVICES. By Sir Robert Marett. New York: Pergamon Press, 1968, 224 p. $4.80.

Pleasantly instructive memoirs of more than thirty years in Britain's information services. Of interest particularly to practitioners of the more genteel forms of propaganda.

THE OBSTRUCTED PATH: FRENCH SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE YEARS OF DESPERATION 1930–1960. By H. Stuart Hughes. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 304 p. $6.95.

An impressive survey of the many strands of French thought, by a scholar with an intimate knowledge of modern France.

LES DERNIÈRES ANNÉES DE LA IVe RÉPUBLIQUE. By Robert Buron. Paris: Plon, 1968, 249 p. Fr. 18.

The last five years of the Fourth Republic, as reflected in these informative excerpts from the diary of a leading parliamentarian and sometime minister. Mendès France is at the center of this fine book.

THE OTHER GERMANY. By John Dornberg. Garden City: Doubleday, 1968, 370 p. $6.95.

An East European specialist of *Newsweek* gives a breezy account of East Germany's "transformation from the grim last bastion of Stalinism to a country burgeoning with confidence and nascent nationalism."

GEIST UND MACHT IN DER DDR: DIE INTEGRATION DER KOMMUNISTISCHEN IDEOLOGIE. By J. Wolfgang Görlich. Olten: Walter-Verlag, 1968, 218 p. Swiss Fr. 17.50.

The return of Marxism to Germany—under the auspices of Soviet disciples. A study of official exegesis in East Germany after 1945.

THE DEATH OF ADOLF HITLER: UNKNOWN DOCUMENTS FROM SOVIET ARCHIVES. By Lev Bezymenski. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968, 114 p. $3.95.

The official Soviet evidence, based on the autopsy and interviews, that Hitler killed himself by poisoning. An authentic, if ghoulish, account.

GERMANY AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1914–1918. By Ulrich Trumpener. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, 433 p. $12.50.

An important contribution to the study of imperialism in the First World War. New evidence suggests that German efforts in Turkey were often haphazard and less successful than hitherto assumed.

CENTRAL EUROPE: A REGIONAL AND HUMAN GEOGRAPHY. By Alice F. A. Mutton. New York: Praeger, 1968, 488 p. $11.50.

A useful introduction by a veteran geographer to some aspects of the Alpine, Czechoslovak, Germanic and Benelux countries. Lavishly illustrated. (First published 1961.)

THE POLITICS OF THE VATICAN. By Peter Nichols. New York: Praeger, 1968, 373 p. $6.95.

A non-Catholic British journalist offers a sympathetic view of the contemporary Church, torn from some of her historic moorings by the need to engage more closely with present-day society—in Pope Paul's words, "to get to grips with it, almost to run after it."

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LEGIONS OF BABEL: THE INTERNATIONAL BRIGADES IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. By Verle B. Johnston. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press (for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace), 1968, 228 p. $7.50.

A brief, scholarly account of a great adventure characterized by an extraordinary mélange of men and motives.

IBERIA: SPANISH TRAVELS AND REFLECTIONS. By James A. Michener. New York: Random House, 1968, 818 p. $10.00.

The many faces of Spain, affectionately depicted and handsomely illustrated.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

EXPANSION AND COEXISTENCE: THE HISTORY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1917–67. By Adam B. Ulam. New York: Praeger, 1968, 775 p. $12.95.

A massive and impressive study that carries its scholarship lightly and is full of interesting, perceptive and provocative observations. Probably the best single work on the whole span of Soviet foreign policy.

THE GREAT TERROR. By Robert Conquest. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 633 p. $9.95.

A major and comprehensive study of Stalin's purges in the 1930s, making use of memoirs and other Soviet material of the last few years. The magnitude of this holocaust still staggers the imagination.

DER GROSSE TERROR. By Hellmut Andics. Vienna: Molden, 1968, 416 p. Schillings 148.

An effort to trace the history of terror as an instrument of Soviet policy: ideological origins, the creation of techniques and their application domestically and abroad, to the death of Stalin.

FIFTY YEARS OF COMMUNISM IN RUSSIA. Edited by Milorad M. Drachkovitch. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press (for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace), 1968, 316 p. $7.50.

Papers by a distinguished group of scholars, dealing with various aspects of Soviet life, thought and policy, over the half-century since 1917.

REVIEW OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM. By Charles S. Sheldon II. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968, 152 p. $9.95.

A useful reference book, including comparative data for the U.S. programs.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY: PLAN AND PERFORMANCE. Edited by Vladimir G. Treml. New York: Praeger (for the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.), 1968, 298 p. $8.00.

Essays, mostly rather critical, concerning the achievements and shortcomings of the Soviet economy in the various sectors.

SOVIET NAVAL STRATEGY. By Commander Robert Waring Herrick. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1968, 197 p. $9.00.

A detailed analysis of the evolution of Soviet naval strategy. The author's conclusions respecting the Soviet Navy's strategic role have been the occasion for some debate in U.S. Navy circles.

RUSSIAN LAND, SOVIET PEOPLE. By James S. Gregory. New York: Pegasus, 1968, 947 p. $15.00.

An extensive general and regional geographic survey of the U.S.S.R.

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THE NEW MARXISM. By Richard T. De George. New York: Pegasus, 1968, 170 p. $6.00 (Paper, $1.95).

A concise account of developments and divergencies in Marxist theory in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union since 1956.

ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE. By Michael Gamarnikow. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1968, 204 p. $8.95.

A report on recent economic reforms and the conflict between "dogmatic sclerosis and pragmatic drive." The author is Assistant Director, Polish Broadcasting Department in Radio Free Europe.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY. By Francis J. Kase. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1968, 223 p. Gldrs. 25.

A critical analysis of the theory of "people's democracy" and its application in the various stages of the communist takeover in Eastern Europe after World War II. The last portion of the book looks at the area outside Europe and appraises the utility of this and similar formulas.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by M. C. Kaser. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968, 329 p. $12.75.

These proceedings of a 1964 conference held in Bulgaria by the International Economic Association deal with a variety of theoretical and practical issues. Some of the discussions are very interesting.

DAS SELBSTBESTIMMUNGSRECHT DER VÖLKER IN OSTEUROPA UND CHINA. Edited by Boris Meissner. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1968, 236 p. DM. 32.

Essays, by country, on the right of self-determination in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Communist China.

FINLAND. By W. R. Mead. New York: Praeger, 1968, 256 p. $6.50.

A concise, knowledgeable survey, in part historical, of the land and its people.

AN ELECTION IN FINLAND. By Pertti Pesonen. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, 416 p. $12.50.

An intensive and skillful study of party activities and voting behavior in the Finnish electoral process.

DIE KRISE DER INTELLEKTUELLEN: DIE REBELLION FÜR DIE FREIHEIT IN POLEN. By Peter K. Raina. Olten: Walter-Verlag, 1968, 128 p. Swiss Fr. 13.

A brief account of the conflict between the Polish régime and the liberal intellectuals in 1966–67.

COMMUNISM AND THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL QUESTION. By Paul Shoup. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 308 p. $9.50.

A careful and original study of national rivalries within Jugoslavia and of the efforts of Tito's régime to deal with them.

YUGOSLAVIA: THE NEW CLASS IN CRISIS. By Nenad D. Popovic. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968, 240 p. $7.00.

A former Jugoslav official, who defected in 1961, argues that the régime of Jugoslavia's new class "in its dialectical transformations, unavoidably develops those forces that will eventually bury both the new class and communism."

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YUGOSLAVIA: PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. By F. E. Ian Hamilton. New York: Praeger, 1968, 384 p. $8.00.

A solid study of the economic geography of Jugoslavia and of the development of policy with respect to economic planning and management since 1945.

THE WEB OF MODERN GREEK POLITICS. By Jane Perry Clark Carey and Andrew Galbraith Carey. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 240 p. $6.95.

A useful history of modern Greek politics in quest of an explanation for the political turmoil that has so frequently plagued that land.

LA GRÈCE DES COLONELS. By Marc Marceau. Paris: Laffont, 1968, 273 p. Fr. 16.50.

An Athens correspondent for *Le Monde* reports on and analyzes the coup of April 21, 1967.

The Middle East

ISRAËL ET LE REFUS ARABE: 75 ANS D'HISTOIRE. By Maxime Rodinson. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1968, 249 p. Fr. 18.

Written by a well-known French scholar of the Islamic world, this is perhaps the best of the recent books on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Understanding of both sides, Rodinson is fair and balanced in his judgments but never fearful of stating his own conclusions.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI DILEMMA. By Fred J. Khouri. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968, 436 p. $10.00.

A thorough examination, in which the interpretations and judgments are relatively objective, although the benefit of a doubt rarely goes to Israel or to the United States.

ISRAEL WITHOUT ZIONISTS: A PLEA FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Uri Avnery. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 215 p. $5.95.

Sole member of his own political party in the Knesset, Avnery speaks out against a Zionist Israel and the policies of the "establishment" in this independent and personal book. The main plea is for a federation between Israel and a Palestinian Arab state.

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF ISRAEL. By Nadav Halevi and Ruth Klinov-Malul. New York: Praeger (in coöperation with the Bank of Israel), 1968, 321 p. $10.00.

A detailed survey of Israel's rapid economic growth from 1948 to 1965, together with comments on policy covering public finance, foreign exchange and inflation. The conclusions are moderately optimistic.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT: PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION. By Raanan Weitz and Avshalom Rokach. New York: Praeger, 1968, 404 p. $20.00.

A fundamental study of the economic and social aspects of the development of agriculture in Israel. The experience in the Lakhish area is described as the best concrete example of regional planning.

EGYPT: MILITARY SOCIETY: THE ARMY REGIME, THE LEFT, AND SOCIAL CHANGE UNDER NASSER. By Anouar Abdel-Malek. New York: Random House, 1968, 458 p. $8.95.

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One of the most penetrating studies of the Nasser régime, first published in French in 1962, appears now in translation with a few added references to more recent events.

OPEC OIL. By Ashraf Lutfi. Beirut: Middle East Research and Publishing Center, 1968, 120 p. L.L. 16.

A former Secretary General of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries speaks bluntly on many of the producing countries' problems, including their aim to maximize oil prices and revenues, difficulties inherent in the emergence of the national oil companies and the question of nationalization.

CYPRUS: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CRISIS GOVERNMENT. By Stanley Kyriakides. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968, 212 p. $6.50.

Essentially an analysis of the Constitution of 1960, with good coverage of background material and some suggestions for the future. The international aspects are less deeply explored.

TURKEY: THE CHALLENGE OF GROWTH. By Z. Y. Hershlag. Leyden: Brill, 1968, 406 p. Gldrs. 86.

A thoroughly revised edition of the author's "Turkey, an Economy in Transition" (published in 1958), with excellent coverage of the subsequent period in the text and in statistical tables.

LA DOUBLE AFFAIRE DE SYRIE. By Michel-Christian Davet. Paris: Fayard, 1967, 360 p. Fr. 28.

The first affair is the takeover of Syria by British and Free French forces in 1941; the second, the crisis involving the British, de Gaulle and the Syrian nationalists in 1945. The scholar should not be put off by the touches of literary license or the absence of specific citations. The use of unpublished material and interviews with participants makes this a valuable book.

YEMEN: THE UNKNOWN WAR. By Dana Adams Schmidt. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968, 316 p. $6.50.

A veteran correspondent's detailed, first-hand account of Yemen's six-year-old civil war. Sympathetic to the royalist side in the struggle, the author is critical of the United States for having recognized the republican régime, as well as of the United Nations for having failed to cope effectively with the problem.

South and Southeast Asia

ASIAN NATIONALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By J. Kennedy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968, 244 p. $6.50.

Writings and speeches of Asian leaders, focusing on the first half of this century when nationalism was reacting against new polyethnic states of Asia. Includes biographical notes on twenty Asian leaders from Ben Gurion to Ho Chi Minh.

STATE POLITICS IN INDIA. Edited by Myron Weiner. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, 520 p. $12.50.

Political studies of eight of the seventeen Indian states, showing the changing patterns of political participation, problems of integration within the states, the variety of state party systems which have developed and their performances.

AMERICA AND SWARAJ. By A. Guy Hope. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1968, 136 p. $4.50.

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The formation of American attitudes toward the evolvement of Indian independence, based largely on the part played by Ambassador William Phillips in carrying out President Roosevelt's policy.

PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA, 1947–1966. By G. W. Choudhury. New York: Praeger, 1968, 341 p. $7.50.

A résumé of Hindu-Muslim problems in pre-partition India and an examination of Pakistan's subsequent search for security.

THE PAKISTAN-CHINA AXIS. By B. L. Sharma. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1968, 226 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $4.00.)

The story of how, in this diplomat's opinion, many repercussions have evolved from Pakistani-Chinese machinations against unaligned India.

THE REALITIES OF VIETNAM: A RIPON SOCIETY APPRAISAL. Edited by Christopher W. Beal with Anthony A. D'Amato. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1968, 186 p. $5.00.

This Republican research and policy group, accusing the Johnson Administration of withholding and misrepresenting information on Viet Nam, gives its own, almost totally opposite proposal for solution, claiming to recognize Vietnamese historical realities and political priorities.

THE BETRAYAL. By William R. Corson. New York: Norton, 1968, 317 p. $5.95.

An ex-Marine officer considers the Viet Nam pacification program to be as important as the shooting war there. He argues that the United States has almost completely failed to supply adequate programs for economic, political and social justice.

VIETNAM: ANATOMY OF A CONFLICT. Edited by Wesley R. Fishel. Itasca (Ill.): F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1968, 879 p. $9.75 (Paper, $5.75).

Recognized authorities explain what has happened in Viet Nam and how the United States got involved. The aim is to inform, not to inflame.

VIETNAM: A POLITICAL HISTORY. By Joseph Buttinger. New York: Praeger, 1968, 565 p. $10.00.

An abridgment of earlier works on Viet Nam (lacking the author's voluminous notes), with an added chapter on the Americanization of the war up to June 1968. For the general reader.

LAOS: BUFFER STATE OR BATTLEGROUND. By Hugh Toye. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 245 p. $5.95.

A regular soldier observes the political and military developments of Laos and its place in international politics, especially as a center of the cold war in Southeast Asia, 1940–1964.

MALAYSIA: PROSPECT AND RETROSPECT. By Richard Allen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 330 p. $7.75.

A short general and political survey concentrating on the period after the Japanese invasion, the formation of the Malaysian Federation and confrontation with Indonesia.

East Asia and Pacific Ocean

THE FAR EAST IN WORLD TRADE: DEVELOPMENTS AND GROWTH SINCE 1945. By Alfred K. Ho. New York: Praeger, 1968, 388 p. $15.00.

Spotty but useful data; stronger on description than analysis.

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RED CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION. By Y. T. Hsiung. New York: Vantage Press, 1968, 188 p. $4.95.

The author argues that Mao staged the cultural revolution as a nationwide purge against the spreading opposition within his own party and concludes that the communist régime in China "may be doomed in the not distant future."

CHINA IN CRISIS. VOLUME I: CHINA'S HERITAGE AND THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL SYSTEM. Edited by Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, 2 v. $20.00.

CHINA IN CRISIS. VOLUME II: CHINA'S POLICIES IN ASIA AND AMERICA'S ALTERNATIVES. Edited by Tang Tsou. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, 484 p. $10.00.

Papers with commentaries resulting from two five-day conferences which assembled seventy world-renowned scholars and non-academic experts who discussed the process of change leading to the establishment of the communist régime in China and of its role as a dissatisfied world power.

COMMUNIST CHINA AND ARMS CONTROL: A CONTINGENCY STUDY, 1967–1976. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1968, 181 p. $5.00 (Paper).

A February 1968 report submitted under contract to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Included are studies of Sino-Soviet relations and foreign policy in general, military strategies and tactics and the question of leadership after Mao.

COMMUNISM IN CHINA: AS REPORTED FROM HANKOW IN 1932. By O. Edmund Clubb. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 123 p. $7.50.

The voluntary report of the first American who, as Vice Consul in Hankow, recognized the importance of the internal, organizational aspects of the revolutionary movement in China and assessed its importance with an amazingly high degree of accuracy.

HISTORY IN COMMUNIST CHINA. Edited by Albert Feuerwerker. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1968, 382 p. $12.50.

A review of the work done by Communist Chinese historians, sometimes to the dissatisfaction of the political rulers. The seventeen contributors include many of America's top Sinologists.

BIG BUSINESS IN JAPANESE POLITICS. By Chitoshi Yanaga. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, 371 p. $8.75.

How Japan's postwar recovery as a major industrial power was accomplished politically through the coöperation and collaboration between organized business and government.

KOREA: TIME, CHANGE, AND ADMINISTRATION. By Hahn-Been Lee. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968, 240 p. $9.00.

Developments in the period from 1945 to 1963.

Africa

COLONIAL SEQUENCE, 1930 TO 1949. By Margery Perham. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968, 351 p. $8.75. (London: Methuen, 1967, 55/.)

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This volume, subtitled "A Chronological Commentary upon British Colonial Policy especially in Africa," contains some important articles and letters written and published mainly in *The Times* during the '30s and '40s. They provide a fascinating retrospect into the British colonial period through the eyes of its most knowledgeable student.

AFRICAN NATIONALISM. By Ndabaningi Sithole. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 196 p. $5.00.

The Rhodesian nationalist leader has reorganized, rewritten and brought up to date his thoughtful analysis first published in 1959.

THE DILEMMAS OF AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE. By L. Gray Cowan. New York: Walker, 1968, 167 p. $5.95 (Paper, $2.95).

This small volume by the Director of the African Institute at Columbia University contains a wealth of useful political and economic data as well as a general introductory essay on contemporary African developments. A revised edition of his 1964 book.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY AFRICA. Edited by P. J. M. McEwan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1908, 517 p. $7.00.

One of three volumes of readings in African history (the others being concerned with earlier periods) extracted from books and articles by established scholars. The editor, an Africanist currently on the staff of the Harvard Medical School, has gathered a mixture of conventional descriptive historical pieces and some more sociological and political analyses of contemporary African politics.

THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA IN THE UNITED NATIONS. By William Gedney Baker. Geneva: Université de Genève, 1968, 241 p.

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By Donald Wasson

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